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ABSTRACT 
 
KRISTEN J. DOLAN:  “Isolating Nazism:  Civilian 
Internment in American Occupied Germany, 1944-1950” 
(Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
This dissertation examines the Allied program of mass arrests that, in the aftermath of 
World War II, was part of a larger attempt to locate those suspected of atrocities, neutralize 
potential disruptions to the occupation, and uproot National Socialist ideology.  Under the 
auspices of Allied “denazification,” which sought to eradicate Nazism for security reasons 
and as a precursor to democratization, the American Military Government arrested a wide 
array of Nazi Party-affiliated Germans.  By late 1945, the Army had detained roughly 
150,000 persons in a hastily established system of civilian internment enclosures.  Within a 
year, however, American authorities greatly reduced the number of detainees.  Moreover, 
after recognizing that successful reorientation toward democracy would require increased 
German participation, they handed administration of the camps to German officials—thus 
heralding an important transition in the relationship between occupier and occupied.   
Exploring American and German authorities’ ensuing struggle to translate the goal of 
eradicating Nazism into a coherent plan of action, this study offers insight into fundamental 
challenges of transforming a political culture as well as the difficulties of reconstituting a 
society that has been atomized over the course of a firmly entrenched dictatorship.  Much of 
the historiographical attention to civilian internment has focused on the program’s inequities.  
By closely examining the origins and aims of arrest policies, as well as pragmatic 
 iv
implementation issues with feedback and adjustments, this study investigates whether and 
how such a drastic measure contributed to the security of the occupation and early stages of 
the Federal Republic’s postwar political transformation. 
This dissertation ultimately finds that, in spite of numerous practical shortcomings, 
the program contributed to both endeavors.  Clearly a blunt, inequitable instrument when 
examined on a case-by-case basis, the arrests nevertheless collectively interrupted political 
and social continuity at a critical juncture, creating space in which democracy could take 
root.  The process of confronting large groups of people regarding their activities during the 
Third Reich prompted changes in discourse and behavior toward at least outward acceptance 
of reforms.  Moreover, ensuing debates spurred necessary deliberations over how to move 
forward in the wake of a twelve-year fascist dictatorship. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
In November 1947, American Counter Intelligence officer Alfred Strauss documented 
recent activity at a civilian internment enclosure located near Augsburg, Germany.  He 
matter-of-factly described issues ranging from an escapee’s return after two months on the 
loose to implementation of a new priority system in reviewing cases that he expected to boost 
morale of the former Nazis held in the enclosure.  Surprisingly, he devoted much of his 
report to detailing machinations of the German camp commander, whose rumored past and 
“dictatorial” behavior had not only alienated his own staff, but also created an environment 
of “intrigue” that might prove detrimental to security.  Even more telling, however, Strauss 
ended his remarks by expressing unease that internees were being left behind in Germany’s 
democratic transition, that they were being neither reoriented nor prepared to accept the 
changes occurring outside the confines of the so-called “cages” in which they were held.  “If 
this problem is not solved now,” he declared, “serious danger will ensue.  The internment 
camps may indeed turn out to be the last reservoirs of National Socialism.”1   
Written from his vantage point inside one of several such camps in American 
occupied Germany, Strauss’s misgivings highlight important questions about the relationship 
between military occupation and the successful transition to democracy, as well as the 
civilian consequences of winning a protracted conflict against a firmly entrenched criminal 
dictatorship.  As Allied forces overtook Germany in late 1944, they immediately confronted 
                                                 
1
 Weekly Security Report, CI Officer Augsburg-Göggingen to S-2, 12 Nov 47, National Archives Records 
Administration [hereafter NARA], RG 260, OMGUS Public Safety Branch, Box 305, Folder 54.   
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the dilemma of dealing with the population of a country they had been bitterly fighting for 
several years while also uprooting National Socialist ideology.  Unsure of how to discern 
who had been Nazi sympathizers, they actively rounded up a substantial number of Germans 
in a concerted attempt to isolate those who had committed atrocities, ardently supported the 
Hitler regime, or might pose a threat to the security of the occupying powers.   
Focusing on the American zone, this dissertation examines the particularly 
controversial program of mass arrests—asking whether and how such a drastic measure 
contributed to the security of the occupation as well as Germany’s postwar political 
transformation.  At the heart of this story lie the very difficult problems of reckoning with the 
past, dealing with the exigencies of a chaotic present, and ultimately, laying the foundation 
for a peaceful future.  
Although arrests in the American zone began relatively slowly, the intensity with 
which Counter Intelligence Corps detachments swept local communities in the months 
immediately surrounding the Third Reich’s collapse is particularly striking.  Throughout the 
summer of 1945, the Army hastily established a string of various-sized temporary camps to 
detain war crimes suspects, possible security threats, and those subject to “automatic 
arrest”—a broad category based on association with the Nazi Party.  In contrast to persons 
detained due to suspicion of individual criminality, these guidelines ordered internment of 
those in any of several organizational groups including: Nazi Party officials down to the local 
level; Gestapo agents; members of the military General Staff and High Command; those who 
had been in paramilitary organizations such as the Sturmabteilung (SA) and Schutzstaffel 
(SS); and leaders of the Hitler Youth, League for German Girls, and Labor Front.2   
                                                 
2
 For the April 1945 arrest criteria, see SHAEF letter (with enclosure), “Arrest and Detention—Germany,” AG 
350.09-2 GBI-AGM, 13 Apr 45 in Kathrin Meyer, Entnazifizierung von Frauen: die Internierungslager der US-
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Within the occupation’s first year, the Army had established a substantial network of 
enclosures and detained roughly 150,000 individuals.3  In addition, the Military Government 
had identified civilian internment, along with vigorous purges of government and key 
business management positions, as primary pillars in a sweeping program directed at 
eliminating National Socialist influence, or “denazifying” Germany.  By late-1946, however, 
rather than maintain this trajectory, American authorities had slowed the pace of arrests and 
reduced the number of civilian internees to roughly 40,000.4  Moreover, in conjunction with 
segregating war crimes and security suspects into designated US-run enclosures, they handed 
administration of civilian internment camps to officials of the recently established German 
states (Länder) of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Greater Hessen.  Several factors spurred 
this transfer, such as deteriorating Four-Power relations and logistical concerns, yet it also 
heralded an important transition in the relationship between occupier and occupied—based 
upon recognition that successful reorientation would require increased German participation.  
Particularly given this move away from an initial broad-brush approach, the 
American rush to round up those believed to be ardent Nazis was handled in a way that 
understandably generated immediate reactions to the process as uneven and inequitable.  As 
                                                 
Zone Deutschlands, 1945-1952 (Berlin, 2004), 262-264.  For concise descriptions, see also David Cohen, 
“Transitional Justice in Divided Germany after 1945,” in John Elster, ed., Retribution and Reparation in the 
Transition to Democracy (Cambridge, 2006), 69; Michael R. Hayse, Recasting West German Elites: Higher 
Civil Servants, Business Leaders, and Physicians in Hesse Between Nazism and Democracy, 1945-1955 (New 
York, 2003), 185-186; and Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 
(Washington DC, 1975). 380. 
 
3
 Oliver J. Fredericksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany 1945-1953 (Historical Division, U.S. 
Army Europe, 1953), 98.  Fredericksen provided the figure of 150,000 as cumulative.  The total at any given 
time was in flux due to new arrests and releases, but as Christa Schick noted, reached a high point of 100,000 at 
the end of 1945.  Christa Schick, “Die Internierungslager” in Martin Brozat, Klaus Dietmar Henke, and Hans 
Woller, eds., Von Stalingrad bis zur Währungsreform:  Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, 3d 
ed. (Munich, 1990), 304. For the Soviet zone figures, see Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A 
History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, 1995), 376-378.  
   
4
 On the number of civilian internees at handover, see Meyer, 89; 101. 
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will be further discussed below, however, the concomitant historiographical emphasis on 
equity has become limiting.  Moreover, in considering the motives behind arrests in the US 
zone, historians such as Lutz Niethammer have focused too heavily on security, resulting in 
the predominant framing of civilian internment as an overzealous effort to address 
unwarranted concerns of popular resistance.  While security concerns did play a heavy role in 
initial sweeps, this characterization effectively sidesteps the issue of civilian internment’s 
role in West Germany’s transition from the Nazi dictatorship to a functional pluralistic 
democracy.5  Approaching the subject from the latter perspective provides insight into the 
myriad of challenges that may be associated with transforming a political culture following 
the forced collapse of a firmly entrenched dictatorship.  In addition, this sort of analysis 
serves as a much-needed reminder of the intricacies that are frequently overlooked by those 
seeking to invoke Germany’s transformation as a model for postwar nation building. 
In order to better understand the complicated dynamic of the postwar occupation, this 
dissertation addresses several interrelated questions.  First, how did American policymakers 
perceive civilian internment?  Second, what ideological or pragmatic factors led to the 
dramatic policy adjustment away from wide scale use of arrests?  Third, how was the 
handover to German state officials carried out?  Fourth, once reforms began to take root, in 
what ways did American and German authorities try to navigate the inherent contradictions 
between internment and democracy? 
Detailed examination of civilian internment is also necessary because, albeit very 
briefly, the camps were particular sites for discussions of transformation not pursued as 
                                                 
5
 Lutz Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern: Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter amerikanischer 
Besatzung (Frankfurt am Main, 1972) typifies the framing described above.  Christa Horn, Die Internierungs- 
und Arbeitslager in Bayern, 1945-1952 (Frankfurt am Main, 1992) and Christof Strauβ, Kriegsgefangenschaft 
und Internierung:  Die Lager in Heilbronn-Böckingen 1945 bis 1947 (Heilbronn, 1998) followed suit with 
Niethammer’s assessment.  For a notable exception, see Meyer, Entnazifizierung von Frauen. 
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directly elsewhere.  The first stirrings of German public interest in denazification and civilian 
internment were already visible by late 1945.  The handover of enclosures one year later not 
only piqued media curiosity, but also provided Military Government authorities with a 
platform from which they attempted to cast the programs as rehabilitative.  In the spring of 
1947, a relatively intense German debate quickly enveloped the state bureaucracies 
responsible for administering the enclosures and placed their activities under a microscope.  
It was primarily carried out through political deliberations, speeches, print media, and over 
the airwaves—but included rhetorical strategies propagated by the internees themselves such 
as frequent mention of their readiness to contribute to reconstruction.   As early as 1948, 
however, amid the increasing likelihood of a separate state comprising the western zones, the 
civilian internment program had already been vastly drawn down and there were clear signs 
that awareness of the camps was beginning to recede from the public sphere.  Thus, in spite 
of the resonance of Ernst von Salomon’s fictionalized account of his arrest, and although 
fallout from denazification generated heated debate for some time after the Federal 
Republic’s founding, by the mid-1950s, the topic of the camps was conspicuously absent in 
public discourse and remained so for several decades.6 
 
A Widely Divergent Experience that Transcended Zonal Boundaries 
 The Brandenburg state government’s September 1992 announcement that 12,500 
mass graves dating from the postwar period had been excavated at Sachsenhausen renewed 
public awareness of Allied internment camps in general and the Soviet “special camps” 
                                                 
6
 Ernst von Salomon, Der Fragebogen (Hamburg, 1951). Former Freicorps member von Salomon’s book 
touched an immediate cord among Germans and is often cited in scholarly literature.  On later denazification 
debates, see Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past:  The Politics of Amnesty and Integration, 
trans. Joel Golb (New York, 2002), esp. 27-91.  Gregor Streim, “Germans in the Lager.  Reports and Narratives 
about Imprisonment in Post-War Allied Internment Camps” in A Nation of Victims?  Representations of 
German Wartime Suffering from 1945 to the Present, ed. Helmut Schmitz (Amsterdam and New York, 2007), 
31-49 describes public discourse related to internment. 
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(Speziallager) in particular.7  Scrutinizing the Spezlager has since received a great deal of 
scholarly emphasis.8  Norman Naimark, for instance, found that typical daily rations at 
Sachsenhausen consisted of “one and three-fourths liters of the thinnest soup and 450 grams 
of bread.”  Moreover, according to official Soviet figures, which Naimark deemed to be 
lower than the actual numbers, more than one third of those interned died.  This stands in 
stark contrast to circumstances in the west, where for example, the mortality rate was less 
than one percent in the British camps.9  Such significant differences underscore the fact that, 
in spite of a common grounding in Allied agreements, civilian internment programs diverged 
across zonal boundaries.10  To elaborate this point, and provide a comparative context for 
examination of developments in American occupied Germany, the discussion that follows 
briefly touches on key Allied underpinnings as well as the approaches taken in the French, 
British, and Soviet zones.    
 The firm conviction that Nazism and militarism must be uprooted in order to secure a 
lasting peace was repeatedly reaffirmed during Allied planning conferences to include at 
Potsdam in the summer of 1945, when among other things policymakers laid out overarching 
                                                 
7
 Steven Kinzer, “Germans Find Mass Graves at Ex-Soviet Camp,” New York Times [hereafter NYT], 24 Sep 92, 
A15.  Memoirs have since also provided important glimpses inside the Spezlager.  See for example, Ursula 
Fischer, Zum Schweigen verurteilt: denunziert—verhaftet—interniert, 1945-1948 (Berlin, 1992).  For a fairly 
recent compilation of firsthand accounts, see Eva Ochs, Heute kann ich das ja sagen:  Lagererfahrungen von 
Insassen sowjetischer Speziallager in der SBZ/DDR (Köln, 2006).  
 
8
 See for example, Peter Reif-Spirek and Bodo Ritscher, eds., Speziallager in der SBZ:  Gedenkenstätten mit 
“doppelter Vergangenheit”(Berlin, 1999); and Sergej Mironenko, Lutz Niethammer, and Alexander von Plato, 
eds., Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland 1945-1950 (Berlin, 1998). 
 
9
 Naimark, 376-377; Cohen 70. 
 
10
 For an early comparative examination of denazification, see Wolfgang Friedmann, The Allied Military 
Government of Germany (London, 1947), 111-125.  Friedmann, a German émigré, had participated in the early 
stages of Military Government for roughly two years.  Justus Fürstenau, Entnazifizierung. Ein Kapitel deutscher 
Nachkriegspolitik (Neuwied, 1969) examined the three western zones.  For more recent comparative treatment, 
see Clemens Vollnahls, Entnazifizierung: politische Säuberung und Rehabilitierung in der vier 
Besatzungszonen, 1945-1949 (Munich, 1991).    
  7
guidance that was to govern quadripartite control of Germany.11  Moreover, after its August 
1945 establishment at the site of the Prussian Kammergericht (Supreme Court) in Berlin, the 
Allied Control Council (ACC) issued successive coordinating laws and directives spelling 
out how denazification was to be implemented across the zones.  On 10 October 1945, for 
example, Control Council Law No.2 directed abolishment of Nazi organizations and declared 
them illegal.12  Two months later, Law No. 10 provided definitions to be used as the legal 
basis for prosecution of war criminals under the International Military Tribunal (IMT).13   
ACC Directive No. 24, 12 January 1946, issued specific guidelines for “the removal 
from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private 
undertakings of all members of the Nazi Party who [had] been more than nominal 
participants in its activities, and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes.”  According to 
the directive, this included persons who had: 
i. Held office and otherwise been active at any level from local to national in the 
Party and its subordinate organizations which further militaristic doctrines; 
ii. Authorized or participated affirmatively in any Nazi crimes, racial 
persecutions or discriminations; 
iii. Been avowed believers in Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds; or 
iv. Voluntarily given moral or material support or political assistance of any kind 
to the Nazi Party or Nazi officials and leaders.14    
 
                                                 
11
 Extracts from the Report of the Potsdam Conference, 17 July-2 August 1945 are provided in Beate Ruhm von 
Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954 (London, 1955), 40-50.  
 
12
 For Allied Control Council (ACC) Law No. 2, “Providing for the Termination and Liquidation of Nazi 
Organizations,” 10 Oct 45, see Ibid., 79. 
 
13
 ACC Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945, “Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity,” Official Gazette of the Allied Control Council for Germany, Berlin Allied 
Secretariat, Issue No. 3 (31 Jan 46), pp 50-55; also in Oppen, 97-101. 
 
14
 ACC Directive No. 24, “Removal From Office and From Positions of Responsibility of Nazis and of Persons 
Hostile to Allied Purposes” Official Gazette of the Allied Control Council for Germany, Berlin Allied 
Secretariat, Issue No. 5 (31 Mar 46), 98-115; for extracts, see Oppen, 102-107.  Removed individuals were to 
“be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, [were] deemed capable of assisting in 
developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.” 
  8
In October 1946, ACC Directive No. 38 established a comprehensive policy that 
encompassed the goals of punishing war criminals and principal Nazi regime supporters as 
well as restricting “the activities of important adherents” of Nazism and Militarism.  In 
addition, this set of guidelines called not only for the control and surveillance of those 
deemed potential security threats, but also for the internment of “Germans who, though not 
guilty of specific crimes [were] considered to be dangerous to Allied purposes.”  At 
American insistence the policy mirrored sweeping legislation enacted in the US zone roughly 
eight months earlier, known as the “Law for Liberation from National Socialism and 
Militarism,” in particular by identifying five categories to be used in establishing degree of 
responsibility in Nazi crimes and oppression:  Major Offenders, Offenders, Lesser Offenders, 
Followers, and Persons Exonerated.  Punishments and sanctions ranged from the possibility 
of death or life imprisonment in the case of Major Offenders to economic and employment 
penalties for Lesser Offenders.  At Zone Commander discretion, Followers were subject to 
measures including: periodically reporting to local police; travel restrictions, and inability to 
run for public office.15 
 The arc of increasingly codified cooperation just described belies the fact that, in 
practice, denazification was administered separately and took on a different character in each 
of the zones.  Indeed, by the time of negotiations over ACC Directive No. 38, the differences 
in approach had become so pronounced and a completely uniform binding policy so elusive 
that securing some level of agreement required incorporating a wide latitude for Zone 
                                                 
15
 ACC Directive No. 38, “The Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis and Militarists, and the 
Internment, Control and Surveillance of Potentially Dangerous Criminals,” Official Gazette of the Allied 
Control Council for Germany, Berlin Allied Secretariat, Issue No. 11, (31 Oct 46), 184-211; also in Oppen, 
168-179.  Categorizations in the directive were similar, but not identical, to the Liberation Law. 
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Commanders.16  This is not to suggest a complete lack of similarity in programs.  Timothy 
Vogt has made the important observations, for example, that in all four cases, denazification 
became highly bureaucratic and yielded disappointing results.  In terms of mechanics, each 
of the zones employed some level of automatic arrest and internment; relied to some degree 
on the use of questionnaires to gather information on those under scrutiny; eventually 
transferred processes to German-staffed commissions, subject to Allied oversight; 
distinguished between “active” and “nominal” participation in the Nazi Party; and issued 
punishments that included imprisonment and removal or restriction from employment.17   
The differences are nevertheless quite instructive, beginning with the point that the 
chasm was especially wide between the Soviet Zone and the west.18  This was due in part to 
the fact that, although they developed individually, the three western powers’ programs all 
derived from the shared foundation of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
Europe (SHAEF) directives.19  Generally speaking, however, it was also because beyond 
initial security and transitional justice concerns the western Allies employed civilian 
internment within the framework of denazification, whereas the Soviets used the arrests and 
detention in parallel, as a separate mechanism to effect economic, political, and social 
change.  This fundamental distinction is illustrated, for example, by the fact that by early 
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 OMGUS, Civil Affairs Division (CAD) Rpt., “Denazification, Cumulative Review, 1 April 1947-30 April 
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January 1947 American, British, and French authorities had released nearly half of those 
interned.  In the American zone, this was in spite of having initially applied automatic arrests 
more vigorously than any of the other occupying powers.20       
Even in the west, the push to eradicate Nazism varied according to particular 
circumstances, as well as respective experiences among occupier and occupied.  In the 
French zone, more than with the other powers, early denazification efforts were largely 
uncoordinated, local initiatives.  The especially high degree of initial confusion stemmed 
partly from the fact that Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had not agreed to a fourth zone until 
the February 1945 Yalta conference.  In fact, the transfer occurred in the summer of 1945 
after US Military Government detachments had already begun removing Nazis from public 
office.  Thus, Gouvernement Militaire (GM) authorities effectively got off to a late start in 
establishing their own command and control structure.  The leadership at various levels 
within the French First Army meanwhile did not feel compelled to abide by Anglo-American 
developed SHAEF directives, nor did GM officials feel particularly fettered by agreements 
reached at Potsdam since the other powers had not invited de Gaulle to participate.21 
The French approach to denazification was characterized first, by a very high degree 
of decentralization centered on close supervision of state officials (Württemberg-
Hohenzollern, Baden, and the Rhineland-Palatinate); and second, by more readiness than 
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their American counterparts to acknowledge that Party membership in-and-of-itself was not 
an effective determinant of adherence to Nazism.  GM officials had witnessed the épuration 
of Vichy elements in France, and although strongly pulled by geopolitical and security 
considerations, were less interested in mounting a thoroughgoing purge.  Decisions such as 
not requiring all residents to register under denazification legislation thus arguably kept their 
program more manageable.22  On the other hand, coupled with GM desire to co-opt German 
officials who were willing to cooperate, the lack of rigor also contributed to unfortunate 
cases in which former Nazis evaded Allied authorities in other zones.  Owing in large part to 
domestic pressures for demonstrable results, French officials nevertheless did increase efforts 
at a more systematic approach after the enactment of Control Council Directive 24.23  Most 
notably, programs modeled on the Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung developed by 
SPD officials in Württemberg-Hohenzollern were adopted across the zone in May 1946.24  
Although their adherence to SHAEF categories varied, French authorities afforded 
high priority to arrests on the basis of security.  By November 1945, internment camps held 
11,120 people, with an additional 1,463 in prisons.  Carried out under the guidance of the 
Sûreté, these initial roundups resulted in arrests of high profile Nazis such as former 
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Gauleiter (Regional Leader) Robert Wagner of Baden as well as lesser-incriminated 
Germans.  In January 1946, GM authorities issued uniform guidance that, among other things 
directed establishment of a personnel file for all of those arrested, something that had up until 
this point been decidedly lacking.  The first batch of releases was carried out in December 
1945 but, as Rainer Möhler noted in his examination of denazification in Rheinland-Pfalz 
and Saarland, was followed by new waves of arrests.25  French Public Safety officers 
established eight civilian internment camps at locations such as Lahr, Diez, and Balingen.  In 
the spring of 1947 GM handed the administration of seven camps to German officials.26  
Frequently described as having been more “pragmatic,” the British denazification 
program nonetheless evoked a number of contemporary criticisms from the German public 
similar to those launched at its American counterpart.  The growing belief, for example, that 
too many heavily incriminated Nazis were being let off the hook threatened at times to 
undermine the entire process, as did various slow-downs and concerns that the program had 
become much too bureaucratic.  Importantly the British did, however, rely much less on 
Fragebogen, extensive questionnaires that quickly became emblematic of denazification’s 
shortcomings and that ostensibly enabled Allied authorities to determine degree of individual 
support to the regime.27  After enactment of Control Council Directives 24 and 38, the 
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linchpins of British policy were Zonal Executive Instructions (ZEI) No. 3 and 54, which as 
American officials later noted, did not require registration of the population.28  In a summary 
of ZEI No. 54, for example, Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) 
Denazification Advisor Walter L. Dorn and Public Safety Branch Chief M.K. Wilson 
tellingly wrote:  
The British are not attempting to categorize or impose penalties or sanctions on all 
Nazis in their zone.  Generally speaking, the scope of ZEI No. 54 is limited to (a) those 
who have been arrested and interned as war criminals, security suspects or because 
they were within automatic arrest categories, and (b) those who have been investigated 
by Public Safety Branch under Control Council Directive No. 24 and earlier directives 
on removal and exclusion of Nazis from public office and positions of responsibility in 
important private undertakings.  Inasmuch as both these processes are continuing the 
scope of ZEI No. 54 is actually broader because there is a constant inflow of new cases 
to be considered, but as long as a minor Nazi does not aspire to public office or a 
position of responsibility in an important private undertaking, he is not disturbed.29 
 
The most distinguishing facet of the British approach was that Military Government 
authorities clearly differentiated denazification proceedings from prosecution for having been 
a member of an organization found criminal by IMT or for having committed war crimes.  
The British eventually turned responsibility for the former over to local commissions, but 
retained complete control over the latter.  As such, in practice, German officials dealt only 
with cases falling in the lesser three categories of Control Council Directive 38.  Military 
tribunals tried those suspected of war crimes, while specialized British-run proceedings 
known as Spruchgerichte in civilian interment enclosures considered the cases of those 
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accused of having been members of criminal organizations.  This enabled officials in the 
British zone, as legal historian David J. Cohen has emphasized, to avoid blurring the lines 
between “the political process of denazification in the form of an administrative purge and 
the judicial process of criminal prosecution as a form of punishment and retribution.”30  In 
contrast to the French and American cases, British Military Government did not turn civilian 
internment camps over to German administration.  The directive transferring responsibility 
for denazification excluded such a delegation and specified that, “the trial categorisation, 
periodic review of their inmates together with the trial, categorisation and periodic review of 
other Category I and II cases are reserved to Military Government.”31     
Heiner Wember determined that between 1945 and 1949 roughly 90,000 persons 
passed through the eleven civilian internment camps in British occupied Germany, which as 
in the other zones were established at former Prisoner of War (POW) enclosures, military 
barracks, or concentration camps in locations such as Recklinghausen, Eselheide and 
Neuengamme.  Much like the American case, the majority of internees fell in one of the 
automatic arrest categories, but a significant number had been arrested as “Security 
Suspects.”  Wember rightly characterized this catchall classification as an “elastic clause” 
(Gummiparagraph).32  As will be discussed, American Military Government authorities were 
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aware of the category’s overuse as early as December 1945.   Finally, in contrast to the 
American zone, where internees participated in outside work details, were eventually 
permitted visitors and could petition for furlough in exigent situations, British officials kept 
enclosures strictly isolated from outside contact to a degree similar to Soviet camps.33 
During the initial stages of occupation, Soviet economic and political goals led 
denazification to be a low priority.34  According to OMGUS CAD, this was quite apparent 
during Control Council negotiations.  Soviet occupation forces not only seemed to lack any 
sort of uniform policy, but local procedures varied quite widely.35  This uneven 
implementation continued until well after enactment of Control Council Directive No. 24.  In 
December 1946, however, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) instituted 
a massive, centrally administered purge that was modeled on the US program and became the 
centerpiece of occupation policy.  In mid-1947, with four-power relations vastly deteriorated 
and after the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow had made it clear that agreement on 
economic unity would not be forthcoming, Soviet officials again transformed denazification 
policy.  The result was SMA Military Order 201, issued on 17 August 1947.36 
Against this backdrop, as Norman Naimark has shown, Soviet officials periodically 
justified civilian internment in terms of denazification, but primarily used the program to 
achieve economic and political objectives.  From the outset, arrest and internment were the 
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purview of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD, later MVD or Ministry of 
Internal Affairs), an independent secret police operation.  Under the direction of Lieutenant 
General Ivan Serov, the NKVD quickly transitioned from targeting security threats, war 
criminals and former Nazi Party members, to interning potential opponents to Communist, 
and Soviet, rule. The extent to which economic motivations also factored into arrests is 
evidenced, for example, by the fact that in 1945 the twelve leading sugar manufacturers were 
detained.  Any large landowners or farmers suspected of resisting land reform were also 
rounded up, and many sent to the island of Rügen, where conditions were extremely harsh.37  
Significant numbers of internees were later sent to camps in the Soviet Union.38 
Not unlike developments in the west, Order 201 emphasized the importance of 
reintegrating nominal Nazis in order to enlist their aid in reconstruction.  It also stipulated the 
need to swiftly bring active Nazis, militarists and war criminals to justice.39  Naimark 
determined that the NKVD used the order’s arrest categories, however, to increasingly target 
those deemed the greatest threat to consolidation of Soviet rule, the parties of the Left.  New 
arrests in 1947 thus placed 400 social democrats in the Zwickau prison, 900 in Dresden and 
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800 in Buchenwald.40  Internees held in the eleven NKVD “special camps,” at locations such 
as Bautzen, Buchenwald, Landsberg, Sachsenhausen and Torgau, were completely isolated 
from outside contact.   According to Naimark, the largest population—60,000—was at 
Sachsenhausen, where 10-20 internees died per day of tuberculosis.  The enclosures that 
accounted for the highest percentage of deaths, however, were Buchenwald (13,200) and 
Bautzen (16,700).  At Bautzen, for example, the death rate was 50-60 per day over the course 
of the “hard winter of 1946-47.”41   
Conditions such as these provide a compelling impetus to continue scrutinizing the 
Spezlager.  There is also much to be gained, however, by critically examining civilian 
internment in the US zone.  This includes determining how the American program was 
similar and how it differed from that of the other Allies. 
 
 
Historiography 
 
In many ways, a steady stream of first-hand accounts that began to appear as early as 
1947 has consistently framed scholarly assessment of the American occupation.  Academics 
who participated in planning or executing postwar policies sought in varying degrees to 
illustrate the complexities of military government to an increasingly engaged American 
public; influence the emerging foreign policy apparatus; and inform future study.42  
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Meanwhile, German works conveyed frustrations at American policies, especially those 
geared toward changing the country’s political culture.43  While helpful in terms of 
establishing a narrative of the occupation, much of this first wave of literature is highly 
charged and reflects perceptual biases that have left clearly discernible echoes within 
subsequent scholarship.  With American strategy alternatively cited as too “hard” and too 
“soft,” the resulting picture is one of erratic swings in policy, contradictory approaches, and 
missed opportunities.44        
Beginning with John D. Montgomery’s Forced to be Free:  The Artificial Revolution 
in Germany and Japan (1957), the degree of continuity within the sociopolitical structure 
became a persistent litmus test for evaluating the occupation.  Conceptualizing denazification 
as an effort by American military government to prompt an “artificial revolution” by 
changing the existing basis of power and privilege, Montgomery determined that the result 
was instead restoration of Germany’s Weimar elite system.  He asserted that this was 
understandable from the American perspective given the growing pull of Cold War concerns, 
but also somewhat ambivalently concluded that the social changes brought about in postwar 
Germany were not sweeping enough to provide a solid foundation for the transition to 
democracy.  Moreover, Montgomery’s portrayal of the interaction between “conquerors” and 
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“conquered” was very one-dimensional and did not adequately account for the manner in 
which this relationship developed at various levels.45 
Over the next two-and-a-half decades, scholars probed more deeply into a variety of 
tensions that characterized the occupation, such as the gap between policy planning and 
implementation; the need to balance short-term punitive efforts with the longer term goals of 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and eventual reorientation; and the differing perceptions 
between the American public, policymakers and military government.  Contending views 
held that on the one hand, military government made necessary adjustments to balance 
competing priorities while coping with unanticipated circumstances; and on the other—
hampered by in-fighting, unrealistic goals, and inexperience—made erratic policy swings.46 
John Gimbel’s path-breaking study of postwar political culture as it manifested itself at the 
local level, A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52 (1961), 
revealed the complex interplay between denazification and democratization.  In addition, he 
shed important light on American assumptions and German expectations related to both 
endeavors.47  Ultimately, his conclusions helped to solidify the still prevailing view of 
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denazification as a failure.48  Given his focus on Marburg, however, Gimbel made only 
passing references to arrest and internment. 
Social historian Lutz Niethammer’s comprehensive Entnazifizierung in Bayern: 
Säuberung und Rehabilitierung unter Amerikanischer Besatzung (1972) drew on an 
impressive panoply of sources to advance a revisionist interpretation of Germany’s postwar 
transition.49  While his study centered mostly on developments outside the camps, he 
nevertheless did consider arrest policies, the effects of initial sweeps, and internees’ social 
profiles, thereby setting the interpretive frame for subsequent investigation of civilian 
internment in the American zone.  Based on his finding that the majority of those interned 
represented the middle segments of society, for example, he argued that automatic arrest 
“was not only unjust, but a failure.”  Rather than “concentrated measures against German 
elites,” the civilian internment program was a hasty reaction brought about by American 
fears of Werwolf (organized resistance) activity.50 
Of denazification in general, Niethammer argued that tribunals were essentially 
“factories [classifying Nazis as] followers” (Mitläuferfabrik) that rehabilitated civil servants 
and promoted economic recovery by reintegrating nominal Nazis into the workforce.  
Detailing German frustrations and resistance to denazification, he emphasized that the 
program’s overarching goal mutated not only because the entire endeavor had become 
logistically unmanageable, but also as a result of the Cold War.  His conclusion that the 
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purge was carried out as an authoritarian and repressive military action by the victors 
reinforced the view that the entire program had been misguided.51    
Until the early 1990s, the bulk of scholarly interest in denazification centered on the 
use of purges to remove former Nazi Party members from responsible positions in German 
society, providing only scattered references to how civilian internment fit into the larger 
occupation picture.  Niethammer, in fact, rightly observed that the subject of civilian 
internment was largely underexplored until after reunification, when access to archives in the 
former German Democratic Republic undergirded the active effort to scrutinize postwar 
arrests in the east.52  Civilian internment in the three western zones has, however, received 
much less emphasis.53  In the case of American occupied Germany, the early 1990s saw the 
first of three monographs intended to address this historiographical void.54   
Christa Horn’s study of the camps in Bavaria offered unprecedented insight into the 
civilian internment program as well as key policy adjustments.  The brief glimpses she 
provided into how Bavarian officials sought to mediate between the occupying power’s 
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guidance and German public’s expectations are especially thought provoking.  Ultimately, 
however, Horn’s analysis was over determined by its emphasis on American desire for 
security.  Indeed, she characterized the wide scale arrests and internment as misguided efforts 
driven by the exaggerated fear of Nazi opposition, which she termed “eine Hysterie der 
Besatzungsmacht.”55  Christof Strauß followed suit with a localized study of camps in 
Heilbronn-Böckingen from 1945 to 1947 in which he meticulously documented the poor 
conditions in hastily constructed POW enclosures.  While he also investigated a number of 
important questions related to civilian internment, including the social profiles of those who 
were arrested as well as the daily experiences of prisoners of war and civilian internees, the 
one such camp that he investigated, Heilbronn, was only briefly used for this purpose.56   
The resulting picture from these works, while very detailed on American policy, 
leaves open the questions of whether and how civilian internment contributed to Germany’s 
postwar transformation.  Moreover, what is still missing is an appreciation for the developing 
reciprocity between Americans and Germans—at the Military Government-State level, 
within local communities, and inside the camps.  Kathrin Meyer’s more recent examination 
of civilian internment, which began with a comprehensive overview of camps throughout the 
zone before focusing on the internment of women, not only complicated the negative 
portrayals of American policy put forth by Niethammer, Horn and Strauß, but also 
successfully demonstrated that civilian internment is best understood when considered within 
the broader context of occupation objectives, rather than simply a subset of denazification.57  
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Germany’s postwar transformation has produced two primary waves of nation 
building literature that are particularly relevant to this project.  The first are those studies 
produced during the two decades following the occupation by scholars on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  These works not only questioned the potential for enduring reform, but emphasized 
Germany’s “illiberal” character and non-participatory political culture.58  Moreover, they 
inspired a generation of West German scholars who framed successive “failed” attempts at 
democratic revolution beginning in 1848 as part of a broader pattern of uneven economic, 
social and political development that was eventually overcome during the postwar 
occupation.59  On the other end of the spectrum, recent nation building literature takes 
Germany’s transformation for granted.  These studies emphasize the institutional continuities 
and democratic traditions that made successful reform possible.  In offering the German case 
as a model for externally imposed regime change, they tend to overlook that the transition to 
democracy was fraught with difficulties and posed a unique set of circumstances.60   
Navigating between these two extremes requires recovering the contemporary sense 
of Germany’s ability to change. Did policymakers and military government leaders view 
Germany as having democratic traditions, or did they believe they would need to build 
democracy from the ground up?  In approaching the regime change, from what experience 
did American and German officials draw? 
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American policy, though driven by expediency, worked remarkably well in creating 
the conditions for a democratic Germany.  This has yet to be explained in a way that does not 
overlook the difficulties and contradictions described above, but that also moves beyond 
immediate postwar expectations of engineering a complete break with the past.  Detailed 
investigation of civilian internment offers the opportunity to better appreciate the 
discontinuities that were created.61  This requires considering programs such as 
denazification and civilian internment as the means to create the space in which democracy 
could take hold, rather than by the criteria of removing all individual Nazis from power.  
More than this, it calls for determining how the camps related to larger transformation 
efforts—whether, for example, the enclosures were merely detention centers until 
denazification procedures could take place; or if indeed as Alfred Strauss feared, they 
conserved Nazism beyond the collapse of the Third Reich.  And, finally, it calls for a more 
finely tuned appreciation of the interaction between Americans and Germans—particularly at 
the state level and within the camps.62  This interaction took on increasing importance after 
the transfer to state officials.  The success and failure of military government efforts 
depended even more heavily on how the Germans concerned responded. 
 
Approach and Conceptual Framework 
Scholarly analyses of war termination, military occupation, and nation building have 
consistently identified three primary challenges—the need to provide order and security; the 
difficulties of administration when operating without an effective understanding of local 
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language, institutions and culture; and the importance of selecting a strategy that meets the 
occupier’s objectives without generating nationalist sentiment.63  Applying these dimensions 
to the investigation of civilian internment in American occupied Germany, this dissertation 
focuses on the extent to which arrests and detention policies were motivated by security, 
transitional justice and transformative concerns—to include whether the relative weight of 
this mixture changed over time.  In addition, this study places particular emphasis on better 
understanding the role of German state officials as mediators between American authorities’ 
guidance, public expectations and their own views regarding how to move forward.  As such, 
this analysis builds on the body of literature that focuses on Germans as active participants in 
the post-war transformation.64  
At bottom, this is an examination of American (and later, German) officials’ efforts to 
reconcile the past-looking punitive elements of the occupation with those intended to be 
forward-looking and rehabilitative.  Amid the physical destruction that left the Third Reich in 
political and economic collapse, the Allies emerged from World War II determined to ensure 
that Germany would never again threaten international security.  The fundamental 
reorientation process announced at Potsdam in August 1945 thus included three negative 
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aspects—demilitarization, denazification, and decartelization.  It was also, however, 
decidedly aimed toward eventual inclusion of a fourth “D”—democratization.    
In contrast to the prevailing narrative, in which these negative and positive elements 
are depicted as dichotomous, my own approach is to view them as more intertwined and 
fluid.65  Indeed, the juxtaposition of security concerns with an explicitly political mission 
greatly challenged American civilian and military leaders, who grappled with strategic 
disagreements as well as the sheer complexity of this undertaking.  Furthermore, the tension 
between tandem impulses to carry out punitive and rehabilitative measures became manifest 
much earlier than often recognized.  Initially, arrests occurred largely as the result of ad hoc 
measures directed at bringing defeat home to the German people, punishing war criminals, 
and detaining security threats.  As the Army gained territory under the increasingly watchful 
eye of the American public, policymakers progressively combined the program of arrests 
with denazification efforts.  Nevertheless, as early as October 1945, American officials were 
also concerned over the number of Germans who had been arrested “on technical grounds,” 
and with instituting elements of due process.  More tellingly, the Americans soon worried 
that gathering together former Nazis in isolation might somehow reignite resistance to the 
occupation or endanger nascent reform efforts.  German state officials, who were charged 
with administering the camps soon after entering the postwar political arena, meanwhile 
increasingly faced the dilemma of establishing a collective identity that was neither 
compromised by association with the activities of the Third Reich nor tainted by the lack of 
legitimacy often associated with externally imposed regime-change. 
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An exploration into civilian internment’s role in the Federal Republic’s transition 
from dictatorship to democracy necessarily starts with Allied leaders’ broadly articulated 
stances and Anglo-American policymakers’ frequently acrimonious debates regarding the 
postwar treatment of Germany.  In addition to determining when the use of roundups was 
first discussed and by whom, I sought to identify the ways in which policymakers 
conceptualized the arrests, the purposes various agencies ascribed to them, and the degree to 
which overarching objectives were actually translated into specific guidance and plans.  At 
the National Archives, I thus concentrated on files from the Treasury, State and War 
Departments, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, the Office of Military 
Government-United States, and several elements within the U.S. Army Theater Command 
structure.  Among other things, mining correspondence and reports at these varied echelons 
provided significant insight into how military government and intelligence personnel 
interpreted civilian internment policies and how quickly the rising swell of arrests outpaced 
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Armies’ abilities to establish camps.  
Moving beyond the realm of Washington-directed deliberations and headquarters-
level staff coordination required taking a multi-layered approach to the actual 
implementation of internment policy.  Beginning with brief consideration of the small salient 
carved out near Aachen in the fall of 1944, the analysis in each chapter thus carries through 
from the policy level to consider not only what actually happened on the ground in Germany, 
but also various feedback loops such as press reports.  In particular, I relied on American and 
German sources to conduct a detailed case study of Hessen, where the American zone’s 
largest civilian internment camp was located on the outskirts of Darmstadt.  This approach 
enabled me not only to investigate the gap between policies and their consequences, but also 
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to closely examine the interaction between American and German authorities as they 
struggled to translate the goal of eradicating Nazism into a coherent plan of action.  Their 
efforts were complicated by differing perspectives regarding how to achieve this goal; by 
tensions that resulted, for example, from the American desire to retain control over the 
denazification program while making German officials responsible for it; and, at various 
points, by public pressure from each side of the Atlantic.  
Beyond the fact that Internierungslager Darmstadt was the largest camp in the 
American zone and thus posed a number of significant challenges, several factors led me to 
focus geographically on Hesse.  In contrast to Bavaria and Württemberg-Baden, the 
northernmost state had the distinction of being the only Land in which the leadership of the 
Ministry for Political Liberation and supervising Military Government Denazification 
Division was continuous throughout the most of the period under study.66  Artificially 
constructed after the war out of the former Duchy of Hesse, Prussian province of Hesse-
Nassau, and Frankfurt am Main, it comprised territory that during the early phases of the 
occupation fell within the Western Military District and predominantly under the control of 
US Seventh Army.67  For this reason, the examination of developments during the immediate 
post-surrender period concentrates on the Seventh Army area of responsibility.  
There were enough distinctive circumstances in each of the Länder to warrant caution 
in making a claim to representativeness.  It is important to note, for example, that the 
political makeup of Hesse during the initial postwar years was decidedly more liberal than 
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Bavaria, the Land that served as geographic focus for Niethammer’s comprehensive case 
study of denazification as well as Horn’s work on civilian internment.68  The four political 
parties that, as James Tent noted in his examination of reeducation in Hesse, vied for support 
from the Land Military Government were the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, 
Liberal Democrats, and Communists.  In spite of the relative strength of the Christian 
Democrats, from the occupation’s earliest stages, the Social Democratic Party wielded a 
substantial amount of influence.69  Moreover, in contrast to Württemberg-Baden, where state 
officials took over a handful of geographically clustered enclosures, and Bavaria, which also 
had multiple small compounds, Internierungslager Darmstadt was Hesse’s only civilian 
internment camp, and by far, had the fewest permanent structures.  Because of this, Hessian 
administrators dealt with a number of unique concerns related to conditions in the enclosure.  
With these points in mind, the circumstances in Hesse nevertheless serve as a fruitful 
vantage point from which to assess the impacts of military government policies on the local 
level.  In addition to press reports, while at the Central State Archives I examined 
parliamentary deliberations, internal and official correspondence from the Ministry for 
Political Liberation, and the records of the state office directly responsible for administering 
civilian internment.  I strove to better understand the practical challenges associated with 
accepting the handover of Internierungslager Darmstadt, internee reactions to key 
developments, and the public debate that quickly surrounded the camp.  Moreover, because 
German officials were much more attuned than American authorities to the various ways in 
which membership in the Nazi Party was not strictly a matter of loyalty, but in some cases an 
outgrowth of opportunism and in others of increasing necessity, I concentrated on identifying 
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the ways in which Hessian leaders’ priorities differed from American concerns.  The case 
study thus provides necessary insight into German state officials’ perspectives regarding 
denazification in general and the civilian internment program in particular.    
 
Organization 
In order to contextualize developments related to civilian internment within the 
broader transitions from war to peace and dictatorship to democracy, this dissertation 
proceeds chronologically.   Chapter 1 thus traces the emergent strands of civilian internment 
policy as they developed along divergent paths on both sides of the Atlantic during the 
summer of 1944 and coalesced within the American zone by the following spring in the form 
of thoroughgoing arrest criteria.  It argues that, in spite of profound differences regarding 
how the program should be carried out, from the outset policymakers viewed the arrest and 
detention of a significant number of Germans as both a short-term expedient directed at 
transitional justice and security concerns, and as part of a longer term transformative process. 
Moreover, while initial occupation policy clearly reflected the staunch determination to adopt 
a stern approach as the means to bring the reality of defeat home to the German people, the 
tension between punitive and rehabilitative measures became manifest much earlier than 
often recognized. 
The second chapter details the rapid alterations in American civilian internment 
policy from mid-1945 to the summer of 1946, arguing that these changes occurred as 
officials sought to effectively switch from a past-looking punitive approach to one that was 
forward-looking and rehabilitative.  Although not deducible from the skyrocketing arrest 
figures that characterized the summer months of 1945, the roots of this strategic switch began 
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to be planted within the U.S. zone as early as that August.  In the meantime, amid a wide 
scale effort to restore order, deal with millions of POWs, and cope with untold numbers of 
displaced persons, and with the ink barely dry on the recently drafted Potsdam Communiqué, 
the challenges of quadripartite administration loomed ever larger.  Against this backdrop, 
several increasingly conspicuous and troubling issues related to arrests prompted a major 
effort to regroup beginning in the fall.  The chapter also provides a panoramic overview of 
camps before focusing on the Western Military District and Civilian Internment Enclosure 
(CIE) 91 at Darmstadt while still under American administration. 
Focusing on the state of Hessen, Chapter 3 examines the handover of civilian 
internment to German administration, as well as preparations by state officials to assume this 
responsibility.  It argues that civilian internment and the wider program of denazification 
were not only mechanisms aimed at changing Germany’s political culture, but coincidentally 
served as preliminary steps in the process of cultivating postwar relationships—in the first 
instance between occupier and occupied, but more importantly, among Germans.  The 
chapter explores American and German expectations at the time of handover; coordination 
between state officials and the Military Government; internee reactions to the prospect of 
civilian internment being administered by German authorities; Spruchkammer (denazification 
tribunal) operations; and conditions within the camp at Darmstadt.   
The fourth chapter also concentrates on the state of Hessen in order to explore 
German officials’ attempts to mediate American guidance, their own views regarding 
denazification, and public expectations.  Drawing on media commentary, official 
correspondence, and political discourse, the chapter traces the growth of German frustrations 
with the denazification program and seeks to explain why public scrutiny turned toward the 
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internment camp.   It argues that as the society outside the barbed wire began to transform, 
American and German officials found it increasingly difficult to navigate the inherent 
contradictions between internment and democracy.  Moreover, while comparisons with Nazi 
concentration camps emanated most strongly from the right as a way to cast doubt on nascent 
democratization efforts and the liberal critique focused on the lack of reeducation efforts, on 
the whole, the discourse surrounding the camp paralleled—and was propelled by—broader 
debates regarding denazification. 
The fifth chapter explores circumstances that surrounded the end of the civilian 
internment program, namely, the breakdown in quadripartite coordination as well as 
significant denazification policy revisions.  Situating civilian internment within the altered 
strategic framework, the chapter argues that in spite of disagreements regarding how to go 
about it, American and German officials were united by early 1947 in pushing to draw the 
enclosures down.  Moreover, once the logjam in processing internee cases broke, events 
moved surprisingly quickly.  By October 1948—less than two years after Hessian 
Denazification Minister Gottlob Binder signed Military Government documents accepting 
responsibility for the state’s 11,001 detainees—the civilian internment camp at Darmstadt 
was closed.70  The chapter also details Hessian officials’ efforts to prepare internees to be 
reintegrated into society.  Rather than the outgrowth of a well-planned, long intended process 
on the part of American authorities, these initiatives are best understood as a pragmatic set of 
educational and vocational measures put in place by Ministry officials in the spring of 1947 
based on their observations after taking responsibility for the enclosure. 
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By closely examining the origins and aims of the arrests; pragmatic implementation 
issues of internment policies with feedback and adjustments; and the public debates 
surrounding German takeover of the camps under US supervision, this dissertation seeks to 
cast light on an underexplored facet of the early postwar years.  As the examination that 
follows will demonstrate, by the time Alfred Strauss wrote his weekly report in November 
1947—with society outside the barbed wire on the cusp of transformation—along with the 
continued need to deal with those who had committed atrocities or were diehard Nazis, 
American and German authorities faced the growing quandary of how to cope with the 
significant number of internees still held in enclosures throughout the zone.  This study 
ultimately finds however, that in spite of the program’s practical failings, civilian internment 
contributed not only to the occupation’s success but also the beginnings of the Federal 
Republic’s postwar transition to democracy. 
 
 Chapter 1:   
 
THE ‘FOG’ OF PLANNING:  ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATES ON  
CIVILIAN INTERNMENT, JUNE 1944-APRIL 1945 
 
 
As Allied forces advanced into Germany and grappled with securing the areas under 
their jurisdiction, they were also determined to ensure that neither National Socialism nor the 
German people would ever again pose a threat to other nations.  In short, the Allies sought to 
engineer a break from those elements that they perceived to be the root causes of Germany’s 
militarism and to move the German people toward a polity based upon their own respective 
ideals of governance.  In pursuit of these broad goals, military authorities isolated large 
numbers of the defeated population—instituting what essentially amounted to vast 
quarantines—until determinations could be made regarding who had committed past crimes, 
posed a threat to future reconstruction efforts, or both.  As a result, over 400,000 Germans—
roughly half of them in the west—were interned in Allied camps from 1944 to 1950.  In the 
American zone, this process began relatively slowly, but soon gained such momentum that 
by the end of the first year of occupation, the U.S. military had established a substantial 
network of enclosures and arrested well over 150,000 internees.71 
In approaching this milestone, American officials had already begun to reflect upon 
the wisdom of trying to contain Nazism, asking whether gathering together former Nazis in 
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isolation might actually reignite resistance to the occupation or somehow endanger nascent 
reform efforts.72  The specter of such unintended consequences was seemingly borne out in 
December 1946 when a statement given by two detainees at Nuremberg began to percolate 
through various echelons of the Office of Military Government for Germany-United States 
(OMGUS).  Currently held in the same cell, the two recounted their experiences while 
separately interned at Regensburg and Darmstadt.  Among other things, they alleged that 
active Nazi elements operated within camp administrations in low key but pivotal positions 
such as personnel clerk and interpreter.  Perhaps most disconcerting to American officials, 
however, they described the pervasive activities of groups known as the Femegerichte, or 
“self-appointed secret tribunals” that allegedly controlled various aspects of daily life in the 
camps, using threats and coercion to keep fellow internees from cooperating with Counter 
Intelligence Corps (CIC) interrogators.73   
These concerns raise questions over the nature and purposes of civilian internment, a 
program that grew out of broadly articulated Allied agreements regarding the postwar 
treatment of Germany, and that was applied to varying degrees by each of the occupying 
powers.  This chapter traces the emergent strands of civilian internment policy as they 
developed along divergent paths on both sides of the Atlantic during the summer of 1944 and 
coalesced within the American zone by the following spring in the form of thoroughgoing 
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arrest criteria.  It argues that, in spite of profound differences regarding how the program 
should be carried out, from the outset policymakers viewed the arrest and detention of a 
significant number of Germans as both a short-term expedient directed at transitional justice 
and security concerns, and as part of a longer term transformative process.  Moreover, while 
initial occupation policy clearly reflected the staunch determination to adopt a stern approach 
as the means to bring the reality of defeat home to the German people, the tension between 
punitive and rehabilitative measures became manifest much earlier than often recognized.  
In considering the impetus behind arrests in the American zone, scholars have tended 
to focus too heavily on security and transitional justice, resulting in the predominate framing 
of civilian internment as an overzealous effort to address unwarranted concerns of popular 
resistance.74   In many respects accurate for the immediate post-surrender phase of the 
occupation, this narrow framing overlooks the program’s transformative goals, the genesis of 
which is clearly discernible amid the increasingly discordant framework of Anglo-American 
policy deliberations.  Locating civilian internment within these debates reveals that 
policymakers were confounded by a fundamental lack of understanding of the extent to 
which the very different ideological elements of Nazism and militarism were embedded in 
German society.  This sort of contextualization also illustrates, however, that the civilian 
internment program itself grew logically out of broader Allied policy concerns.  Moreover, 
although security concerns did propel the program, it was the desire to effect an enduring 
change in Germany’s political culture that, amplified by growing media skepticism, led 
occupation authorities to expand the scope of arrests exponentially at a juncture when they 
also sought to overcome planning deficits and clearly define the program.     
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The End of ‘Nazi Tyranny’:  Efforts to Move Beyond Broad Allied Statements 
 While a number of other strategic matters proved persistently vexing, by the time 
their respective troops crossed into Germany, Allied political leaders had already reached a 
common core of agreement that would provide the impetus for arrest directives as well as 
what would be eventually identified as the denazification program.  The goal of destroying 
“Nazi tyranny” proclaimed in the August 1941 Atlantic Charter was later reiterated by 
Roosevelt and Churchill, who publicly agreed that Germany would be made to surrender 
“unconditionally.”  The formula announced at Casablanca in January 1943 linked enduring 
peace with destroying German and Japanese war making capacity as well as with eradicating 
what policymakers perceived as each country’s propensity toward “conquest of other 
peoples.”  Jointly annotated press conference notes illustrate, however, that both leaders 
sought to make it clear that the formula did not call for “destruction of the [German or 
Japanese] populace”.75    
For his part, albeit imprecisely, Roosevelt had long since begun to distinguish 
between the German population on the one hand and the deleterious influences of Nazi 
leadership and militarists on the other.  In his radio address on April 28, 1942, for example, 
he emphasized:   
In the German and Italian peoples themselves there is a growing conviction that the 
cause of Nazism and fascism is hopeless—that their political and military leaders 
have led them along the bitter road which leads not to world conquest but to final 
defeat.  They cannot fail to contrast the present frantic speeches of these leaders with 
their arrogant boastings of a year ago and two years ago.76     
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Speaking to Congress on September 17, 1943 Roosevelt lumped Prussianism, militarism, and 
Nazism together, declaring: 
But there is one thing I want to make perfectly clear:  when Hitler and the Nazis go 
out, the Prussian military clique must go with them.  The war-breeding gangs of 
militarists must be rooted out of Germany—and out of Japan—if we are to have any 
real assurance of future peace…We shall not be able to claim that we have gained 
total victory in this war if any vestige of Fascism in any of its malignant forms is 
permitted to survive anywhere in the world.77 
 
Roughly one month later, the October 1943 Moscow Declaration included a 
condemnation of “Hitlerite forces”, vowing that those military and Nazi Party members who 
had committed atrocities outside of Germany would be “brought back to the scene of their 
crimes” for judgment.  Moreover, those whose offenses were not tied to a specific geographic 
area would be punished by joint decision of the Allied governments.78  Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull later recollected that it was at the Moscow Conference with the Soviet and 
British foreign ministers, Vyachevslav M. Molotov and Anthony Eden, that the United States 
first presented a comprehensive proposal regarding the postwar treatment of Germany.  At 
Roosevelt’s direction, Hull and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had been engaged for a 
number of months in preliminary discussions with the British regarding a plan for “the first 
few months after Germany’s collapse.”  Among other things, the plan called for dissolution 
of the Nazi Party, removal of Nazi officials from positions of influence, and eradication of 
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“every vestige of the Nazi regime.”  Significantly, the proposal also envisioned laying the 
foundation for a democratic system of governance during the armistice period and identified 
a number of early measures to be taken toward that end.  At Moscow, the three governments 
agreed to establish the European Advisory Commission (EAC), a joint body with a seat in 
London and rotating presidency to anticipate and make recommendations on postwar 
issues.79   
In many ways, more detailed long-range planning consistently took a backseat to 
prosecuting the war, particularly once discussions between the “Big Three” proved 
increasingly at risk of being derailed by differing priorities.  Thus, when Allied decision 
makers met at Tehran in November 1943, matters such as determining when and how to open 
a second front against Germany simply took precedence over occupation concerns.80  More 
than this, however, beneath the veneer of widespread agreement regarding the overarching 
postwar objective of rooting out German nationalism and militarism lay an increasing chasm 
over how to achieve it.  Indeed, discussions at Tehran reveal the extent to which Stalin in 
particular doubted that these ideological attributes could be removed from the German 
people.81   Nevertheless, the broadest outlines of what would happen after the Reich’s 
surrender slowly began to congeal during the critical months leading up to invasion.  
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Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed, for example, that Germany would be occupied by 
the three powers on a zonal basis and that an Allied coordinating body would orchestrate 
efforts across the zones.82   
At Tehran, the three governments appointed John G. Winant, Ambassador of the 
United States; Feodor T. Gousev, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; 
and Sir William Strang, of the United Kingdom Foreign Office, as representatives to the 
EAC, which began formal sessions on January 14, 1944.83  The EAC’s formation had an 
interesting and doubtless unanticipated centrifugal effect on Anglo-American postwar 
planning.  For the Americans, chafing over Hull’s agreement to situate planning efforts in 
London ostensibly caused much of this, but subsequent exchanges also reflected profound 
interagency disagreements over roles and responsibilities.  Indeed, as the prospect of entering 
German territory came into clearer focus, the triangular rivalry between the State, War, and 
Treasury Departments became especially pronounced.  Stimson recorded his objections in his 
diary:  “The main thing that is in the foreground in foreign relations now is the British having 
pulled Mr. Hull’s leg into consenting, without reference back to this government, to the 
formation of the EAC.”84  
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Efforts to move beyond the realm of broadly articulated agreements to specific 
military guidance for the occupation received a major impetus once Roosevelt appointed 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower to lead Operation OVERLORD, the impending Allied 
invasion of northern Europe.  Shortly after Eisenhower’s arrival in London, the existing 
combined Anglo-American planning staff, designated Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied 
Commander (COSSAC), was absorbed into the larger Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).  While the newly established headquarters set about 
reviewing and revising COSSAC manuals as well as originating a number of others, 
Eisenhower pushed for clear instructions regarding the military government of Germany.  
The result, prepared within civil affairs channels, was a directive approved by the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff (CCS) for release to Eisenhower on 28 April 1944.  In anticipation of more 
detailed guidance from the EAC, CCS 551, entitled “Combined Directive for Military 
Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender”, was restricted to activities during 
what came to be referred to as the “pre-surrender period.”85   
Importantly, however, CCS 551 translated the long held intention to immediately 
eliminate the Nazi Party into instructions to:  suspend party activity, seize any records that 
were uncovered, and arrest “Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, and all persons suspected 
of committing war crimes,” to include those identified on United Nations prepared lists.  
Orders to arrest “high party officials,” while somewhat more nebulous, made it clear that 
military forces were to immediately begin both dismantling and surgically removing the Nazi 
regime.   Accordingly, the directive called upon Eisenhower’s discretion in striking the 
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necessary balance between removing local party apparatuses and relying upon existing 
structures to effectively administer areas that came under Allied control.86 
Within American planning circles, the issue of which prominent Nazi regime 
supporters to actually arrest began to be concretely discussed as early as May 1944, when the 
Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) circulated proposed Civil Affairs Guides for 
comment.  One such guide, for Elimination of Nazis from the German Banking Structure, 
stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to suppressing Nazism, asserting that beyond 
removing Hitler, his close associates, and Nazi institutions, the Allies would need to 
eliminate the “dominant Nazi footprint…from every important political and economic 
institution…through immediate and forceful action with respect to the ringleaders and 
prominent Nazi spokesmen and adherents.”  Such a policy, the guide continued, would “help 
the German population itself to stamp out Nazism in all its forms.”  Specifically, the 
document called for removing, interning, and declaring ineligible for any future position of 
authority the incumbents of “key positions in the leading German public and private banks 
and credit institutions.”  After reviewing a draft version, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
the Treasury Harry Dexter White wrote to the Director of the War Department Civil Affairs 
Division, General John Hilldring “We are not in a position to comment on the 
recommendation contained in the document that persons who are removed from their offices 
be interned since this is a political decision.”  An internal Treasury Department memorandum 
also expressed concern that the guide assumed that officials dismissed from banks would be 
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ineligible to return, criticizing the lack of  “machinery for such reinstatement of selected 
individuals after their examination from the standpoint of political desirability.”87    
During the late summer and early fall of 1944, American occupation planning 
increasingly diverged from the British approach as momentum shifted toward what has been 
aptly termed the “punitive” mindset.88  While much of the developing postwar framework 
dealt with economic matters, as the following will illustrate, arrest and internment had also 
begun to emerge as a very prominent part of the program intended to bring home the reality 
of defeat and change Germany’s political culture.   
 
The ‘Punitive’ Approach:  Anglo-American Policy Divergence and Civilian Internment 
Often linked with Treasury Secretary Henry J. Morgenthau’s insistence on the so-
called “pastoralization” of Germany, the punitive approach derived from a confluence of 
factors and underscored the fundamental Allied dilemma of how to deal with the population 
of a country they had been fighting for several years while also uprooting National Socialist 
ideology.89  The tendency to fixate on Morgenthau’s influence, which was at its height in the 
fall of 1944 but dropped off sharply soon thereafter, has led many scholars to overlook 
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significant areas of agreement regarding initial stern treatment toward Germany.  The 
bedrock of the punitive approach was the shared frame of reference of those who had 
experienced WWI and Germany’s rearmament during the interwar period, coupled with 
varying perceptions of German nationalism and militarism.  The filaments were 
policymakers’ desire to take a stronger stand against fascism than in Italy and, beginning in 
the following spring, a growing public awareness of the atrocities that had occurred within 
Nazi concentration camps.90  
Nevertheless, by seizing the initiative immediately before and after the Second 
Quebec Conference, Morgenthau and his supporters were able to deploy a memorandum 
entitled Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany to shape subsequent debate in 
Washington, as well as to influence planning efforts on the other side of the Atlantic.91  A 
pivotal policy exchange involving Morgenthau delineates the crystallization of a more 
extreme version of the punitive approach within American postwar planning and further 
highlights the widening Anglo-American gulf that led to similar, but divergent civilian 
internment programs.  This exchange centered on the Handbook for Military Government in 
Germany, the SHAEF document initially intended as a single reference for a wide range of 
information that would be needed by military government personnel.  Arguably late-to-need 
when it was being finalized in late summer 1944, this document was also hampered by a lack 
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of detailed knowledge regarding the relationship between Nazism and German society.  In 
fact, as recently as the previous January, Hilldring had appealed via letter to the FEA for 
assistance in gaining the necessary insight into those laws and institutions that undergirded 
Nazism in order to support effective occupation planning.92   
The inability of plans to keep pace with the developing situation on the ground was 
exacerbated by ongoing disagreements among policymakers regarding the postwar treatment 
of Germany.  Arrest and detention policy factored quite prominently in these debates, which 
were carried out within an active public discourse on both sides of the Atlantic and 
encapsulated in the question of whether to enact a “hard” or “soft” peace.  In August 1944, 
prompted by Morgenthau’s concerns that—under the influence of British philosophies—
SHAEF planners were taking much too soft an approach, President Roosevelt directed the 
recall of the Handbook.93  In a memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson, the President 
objected on the grounds that the Handbook gave “the impression that Germany is to be 
restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium, and the people of Germany brought 
back as quickly as possible to their prewar estate.”  Roosevelt emphasized the importance of 
impressing upon the German people that they were collectively responsible for what had 
taken place during the Nazi regime and that “this time Germany is a defeated nation.”94 
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Although Roosevelt’s memorandum largely cited economic and material aspects of 
SHAEF planning as evidence of an overly soft approach, beginning with DePauw University 
political scientist Harold Zink, scholars have also emphasized the disruptive consequences of 
the Handbook’s recall on initial efforts to eradicate Nazism.  These events are especially 
noteworthy, however, because they provide an important glimpse into the uncertainties that 
made planning for programs such as civilian internment much more problematic than often 
appreciated.  Zink’s first-hand accounts of the SHAEF German Country Unit’s work on the 
Handbook are quite revealing in terms of planners’ difficulties in deciphering Nazism’s 
labyrinthine complexities.  He recalled the organization’s lack of planning capability to 
effectively deal with determining how to eliminate the Nazi Party, and in particular, the 
conundrum of whom to arrest and why.95   
Indeed, Zink’s accounts suggest that, under the pressure filled circumstances of 
imminent invasion, all the more tense amid the growing swirl of high level policy debates, 
the editorial board tasked with collating various subdivisions’ submissions did the best it 
could to piece together a “hastily drafted” chapter on denazification.  The resulting plan 
included a detailed categorization of National Socialists to be arrested or removed from 
office based on the Office of Strategic Services’ “black and grey lists of dangerous and 
doubtful Germans.”  Moreover, Zink noted that in laying the groundwork for civilian 
internment, SHAEF planners had determined that it would be logistically impractical to 
intern lower-ranking Nazi officials “not because they deserved any particular consideration 
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but because facilities available and probable resources to deal with several hundred thousand 
persons could not be expected.”96 
By the beginning of September, deliberations over a directive to General Eisenhower 
covering the “post defeat” period, in essence, the follow-on document to CCS 551, were well 
underway.97   In the wake of the Handbook’s recall, it was clear that the State, War, and 
Treasury Departments had begun to operate from the standpoint of differing, yet intersecting 
conceptions concerning how to approach defeated Germany.  At Stimson’s suggestion, 
Roosevelt appointed the three Secretaries to a Cabinet Committee charged with settling 
various key points.98  On 4 September, presidential adviser Harry Hopkins chaired a meeting 
at which representatives from each department determined the contours of agreement and 
disagreement between State and Treasury proposals.  While issues such as the forcible 
partition of Germany and controls over the country’s economy needed to be reconciled, the 
anticipated need to arrest, intern and possibly try sizeable “groups of particularly 
objectionable elements, such as the SS and the Gestapo,” elicited agreement.99  The persistent 
dilemma, as highlighted by Zink, was one of demarcation, or setting the boundary between 
those whose activities warranted arrest and those to be considered less incriminated.  
Treasury’s Suggested Post-Surrender Memorandum heralded a distinct change in the 
department’s stance, previously articulated by White, toward providing input into the 
political decision of whom to arrest and intern.  Under the heading “Treatment of Special 
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Groups,” the proposal called for a “particularly intensive effort…to apprehend and punish 
war criminals,” and identified five broad groups to be detained pending determination of 
individual culpability:  the S.S.; Gestapo; high officials of the police, S.A., and other security 
organizations; high government and Nazi Party officials; and leading public figures closely 
identified with Nazism. Tellingly, the proposal also stipulated that “apart from the question 
of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar 
groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion[s] to serve 
outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.”100 
Roosevelt effectively reinforced his recent pronouncements during the second 
Quebec Conference, a period that in many ways represented the zenith of Morgenthau’s 
influence over postwar policy.  The meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill, along with 
their respective advisers, took place from 11-16 September 1944.  Much of the emphasis at 
Quebec was on military matters, however Morgenthau took part in high-level discussions 
concerning the occupation that resulted in Roosevelt and Churchill initialing what amounted 
to an endorsement of the so-called Morgenthau Plan, the spirit of which was embodied in the 
statement “This program for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the 
Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and 
pastoral in character.”101  
Postwar scholarship has doggedly mined the rich vein of materials surrounding the 
Morgenthau Plan, ascribing to it varying degrees of influence over initial American 
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occupation policy in Germany.102  Nonetheless, several points bear brief mention.  First, 
news of the plan leaked out, not only piquing public debate in the United States, but also 
fueling concerns over providing Nazi propaganda officials with grist to encourage Germans 
to fight to the bitter end.103  Second, in his 1947 examination of military government 
underpinnings, Hajo Holborn rightly contended that the attention stirred up by Morgenthau’s 
efforts spurred discussion of much-needed occupation guidance and prompted resolution of a 
number of lingering policy issues.104  Third, Roosevelt softened his stance toward postwar 
Germany very quickly, essentially backing away from the Quebec memorandum.  Hull 
suggested that this modulation resulted, at least in part, from his insistence to the President 
that the plan would have punitive consequences far beyond those anticipated.105  It is also 
likely, however, that Roosevelt recognized that such a myopic approach ultimately ran 
counter to his internationalist efforts.  In a campaign address to the Foreign Policy 
Association on October 21, 1944, Roosevelt blended emphasis on punitive elements such as 
the destruction of the Nazi regime, elimination of German military capability, and 
punishment of “those directly responsible for this agony of mankind,” with the rehabilitative 
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promise of Germany’s eventual return to the “fellowship of peace-loving and law-abiding 
nations.”106 
Deliberations over the “post-defeat” directive to General Eisenhower were indeed 
energized during the period surrounding the Quebec Conference and continued for several 
months following Allied entry into Germany.  The full scope of these discussions is much too 
broad to be covered here; however, these meetings are quite significant because scholars 
regard the resulting guidance, known as JCS 1067, as the embodiment of the punitive 
approach.  In considering the document’s tenor, however, it is important to keep in mind that 
although JCS 1067 effectively set the contours of U.S. occupation policy for two years, 
throughout most of the period during which the directive was discussed, it was envisioned as 
short-term military guidance.  In fact, an early draft included verbiage that directed 
Eisenhower to avoid long-term measures, which at the time were expected to be the purview 
of the Allied control machinery.107  In the case of civilian internment, JCS 1067 signaled a 
distinct move away from the arrest philosophy that had begun to take shape in the SHAEF 
Handbook toward a much more encompassing approach.  Better understanding how and why 
the scope of arrests was widened requires juxtaposing policy debates with events that 
transpired as the occupation got underway.   
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The ‘Carpet’ Unfurled:  The Case of Aachen and its Impact on Occupation Policies 
On September 15, 1944, while the Second Quebec Conference was wrapping up, a 
civil affairs detachment (designated “D8B1”) established operations in the border town of 
Roetgen, effectively beginning the American military occupation of Germany.  Within 
weeks, it was followed by I4G2 in nearby Monschau, and shortly thereafter by a larger 
regional (Stadtkreis) detachment, F1G2, headquartered in the city of Aachen.  These units 
were a very thin slice of the planned military government organization, sketched out just 
months before, that was to successively “carpet” Germany as the line of American troops 
moved forward.  Once fully deployed, detachments would range in size from those with over 
sixty officers and enlisted members, designated to operate at the German state (Land) level, 
to those with ten personnel, earmarked for smaller municipalities and rural areas.  Many of 
the officers who made up these units had received training at the School of Military 
Government on the University of Virginia campus, or one of several Civil Affairs Training 
Schools at locations such as Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Boston, Michigan, Northwestern, 
Western Reserve, Wisconsin, and Stanford Universities.108    
These small leading edge detachments were literally embedded with combat forces 
and expected to support efforts to achieve military victory as well as measures to control the 
local population, such as imposing curfews, ordering the surrender of weapons, conducting 
house-to-house searches, and requiring every adult to register with military authorities.109  In 
spite of these expectations, the first military government teams that entered Germany did so 
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without detailed guidance or procedures regarding how to deal with the German population. 
With the Handbook recalled just weeks before, in many ways, Aachen and its environs would 
prove to be both litmus test and augur for the larger occupation, particularly after the 
American advance stalled west of the Rhine.  During this period, the majority of the 
remaining detachments were billeted in Verviers, Belgium, where they received additional 
training and, along with the increasingly interested American press, intently followed 
developments across the border.110   
The case of Aachen lends a great deal of credence to scholarly analyses that have 
argued the Americans lacked a sufficient understanding of the sociopolitical context within 
which they would operate in occupying Germany.111  While this is an important point, 
detailed examination of what took place in the small salient that the Americans initially 
carved into Germany is equally indispensible in order to better understand the layers of 
complexity confronting Americans and Germans alike.  No longer confined to the realm of 
technical studies and conference room debates, the Americans encountered realities that they 
simply had not fully anticipated, such as the immediate tension between arrest directives and 
the need to provide basic necessities.  Many of those with the expertise required for critical 
services including electricity and water were among the Nazi Party members they were 
directed to remove or detain.  Beleaguered and weary from intense fighting, worried about 
disregarding evacuation orders, and well aware that ensuing developments would be heavily 
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scrutinized from the east, the Germans who remained in Aachen successively reencountered 
bitter divisions that had been tamped down by twelve years of dictatorial rule.112    
The way in which events unfolded in and around Aachen complicates the notion that 
American occupation forces’ anxieties about security led to thoroughgoing arrest guidance.  
On the contrary, it was the developing impression of leniency—fueled by pointed media 
reports—coupled with concerns that not enough was being done to eradicate Nazi influences, 
that created a feedback loop into post-Quebec policy debates in Washington.  This is not to 
suggest that security was not an immediate and decisive factor in how the Americans 
undertook the occupation.  Amid pockets of bitter fighting, concerns of espionage, sabotage, 
and other forms of resistance were ever-present.  From the outset, troops tasked with rear 
area duties were placed under strict orders to avoid fraternizing with German civilians.   On 
24 September 1944, for example, as elements of the British Second Army crossed the border 
near Nijmwegen, Holland and captured the German town of Beek, Third U.S. Army forces 
sought to repel a counter-attack in the Moselle Valley.  Lieutenant General Courtney 
Hodges’ First U.S. Army troops meanwhile encountered stiff resistance in the vicinity of 
Geilenkirchen, roughly 12 miles north of Aachen.  Hodges tightened security related 
restrictions after a number of officers and military policemen (MPs) were reported missing, 
to include three MPs who failed to return from night patrol in the vicinity of Roetgen.  Their 
helmets and “riddled jeeps” were found near a road the following morning.113 
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The number of arrests during this period was relatively low; yet, the pervasiveness of 
the ever-widening screening process likely had a profound and immediate impact on the local 
population, some of whom were subjected to multiple reviews.  Historian Perry Biddiscombe 
noted that within days after Aachen’s last German commander, Colonel Gerhard Wilck, 
surrendered on 21 October 1944, military government teams, along with First Army and CIC 
personnel, rounded up over 10,000 inhabitants who had not evacuated and relocated them to 
Homburg Barracks, where they were individually screened.114  Beyond these sorts of efforts, 
however, day-to-day military government activities were punctuated by what historian Earl 
F. Ziemke described in the U.S. Army’s official account as the intertwined ‘drama and 
triviality of the occupation.’  Ziemke very aptly demonstrated this point with extracts of daily 
activity reports from Monschau detachment I4G2. After establishing its headquarters in the 
local movie theater, I4G2 began registering civilians on 29 September 1944.  Information 
documented over the next several weeks ranged from an instance of attempted theft of 
chocolate bars and cigarettes by teenage boys to reports of enemy patrols operating in the 
area.115  In an entry highlighting the distinct perspectives of local military government and 
CIC detachments, the daily report from 19 October expressed the following concerns: 
Having trouble with CIC.  Do not believe security threatened so have concentrated on 
assuring food, proper administration, and property protection on the assumption these 
will prevent unrest.  Have done these at the expense of looking into past activities of 
present civil servants.116 
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Ziemke found that over the next several months, successive “waves of CIC teams” 
followed one another in Monschau, “each refusing to accept the judgment of its predecessors 
and usually locking up some Germans who had previously been screened and passed.”117  
Elsewhere, intermediate headquarters echelons sought to sort out what they perceived as 
significant gaps in the arrest guidance emanating from SHAEF.  While First Army forces 
fought to secure Aachen, for example, 21st Army Group Headquarters pressed SHAEF G-1 
(Personnel) for clarification as to whether certain “undesirables” to be taken into custody as 
Allied troops advanced were to be treated as prisoners of war (POWs) or civilian internees:  
suspected members of the Wehrmacht; officers of Para Military services; Gestapo and SD; 
Nazi Party Officials; Public Officials; Security Suspects; and War Criminals.  Major General 
A. Branch expressed particular concern that the status of those to be dealt with as civilian 
internees be further clarified “as it would appear that, if they were to be treated as civilians, 
they would receive better treatment than the German civilians left at large.”118  
Ziemke determined that the criticism of military government activities in and around 
Aachen actually began before the city was fully secured and was fueled by the seemingly all-
too-cordial interaction between American officials and the populace they were expected to 
control.  Tasked by 12th Army Group to assess troops’ opinions about the Germans, Stars and 
Stripes editor in chief, Major Arthur Goodfriend, predicted American personnel were well on 
the way to completely fraternizing with local Germans in spite of recent orders.  The 20 
October 1944 edition of Stars and Stripes included an article asserting: 
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Here’s what’s going on around Aachen: 
 
1) German civilians are giving Yanks the V-sign, the glad hand, free beer, big 
smiles, plenty of talk about not being Nazis at heart, and hurray for democracy. 
2) Some G.I.s and plenty of officers are returning the smiles, flirting with Frauleins, 
drinking the beer and starting to think what nice folks the Germans really are. 
3) German civilians are being removed from Aachen and driven two miles in U.S. 
Army trucks to Luetzow Barracks, in Brand, a suburb of Aachen.  To move them 
out is a matter of strict military necessity, but these Nazis are being quartered in 
the best buildings outside Aachen.  They are being brought there in Army 
vehicles.  There are canvas covers over them (the vehicles).  They have already 
received 20 tons of Army food.119 
 
 
A number of details regarding the purportedly soft treatment of German civilians 
were exaggerated.120  The image they created, however, stood in stark contrast to SHAEF G-
5 (Civil Affairs) announcements regarding military government plans, and was especially 
incongruous with Hitler’s proclamation of partisan warfare.  Both of these developments had 
received detailed coverage in The Stars and Stripes only one day earlier.  For example, 
SHAEF G-5 deputy assistant chief of staff Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes’ 
announcement that a “massive array of proclamations, laws and ordnances aimed at the 
destruction of Nazism lie ready to be unleashed against Reich regions the moment they are 
crushed by invading troops” was clearly calculated to evoke images of subjugation, while his 
assertion “the cleansing process is already under way in a few towns,” suggested an 
aggressive stance toward stamping out Nazism.  This article was juxtaposed with coverage of 
Hitler’s Berlin Radio broadcast of a Volkssturm, which literally translates as a “storm of 
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people,” that would rise up under the command of Reichsführer of the SS Heinrich Himmler 
in a “last ditch guerilla struggle” to defend the Reich.121  
After gaining a foothold in Aachen, the military leadership there was decidedly 
focused on addressing the myriad of serious problems involved in administering the formerly 
besieged city.   They sought to restore civil government as soon as possible, and relied upon 
advice from the local German Bishop to select a mayor.  Aachen’s military detachment 
commander, Major Hugh Jones, appointed businessman Franz Oppenhoff, a prominent 
Catholic layman who was well versed in Nazi law, had previously provided legal defense for 
Jewish business concerns, and recently fled with his family to Eupen, Belguim after 
attracting the interest of the Gestapo.122  By January, after observing Oppenhoff’s actions in 
constructing a municipal administration, military government officials began to recognize the 
layers of complexity that characterized the local political landscape.  Although Oppenhoff 
represented himself as anti-Nazi, which he indeed appeared to be, he was also clearly 
antidemocratic and had surrounded himself with likeminded staff and workers.123  Moreover, 
while Oppenhoff felt hostility toward fanatical Nazis, as Ziemke described it, he “saw 
nothing wrong with employing those who had changed their minds or who had joined the 
party for business or professional reasons.”124   
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Contention regarding Oppenhoff’s questionable background and actions in 
constructing the municipal government intensified scrutiny of the military government’s 
handling of the occupation.  Leaks to the press, most notably of a critical report by Major 
Saul K. Padover to U.S. Ninth Army suggesting that the Aachen detachment had both 
mishandled denazification and endangered future democratization efforts, intensified media 
disapproval.125  Nearby, other military government detachments also became embroiled in a 
series of controversies over their selections to staff various civil administrations.  In 
Würselen and Roetgen, for example, newly appointed officials were quickly dismissed after 
having been identified as Nazi Party members.  Writing roughly two years later, Harold Zink 
asserted that the sudden wellspring of media coverage resulted in a disproportionate 
emphasis on arresting and removing former Nazis at the expense of other occupation 
programs.126  In his 1968 study of American occupation policies, historian John Gimbel 
noted the intense public interest generated by criticism of military government administration 
in Aachen in the fall of 1944, and suggested that Morgenthau sought such opportunities to 
stimulate active “public discussion on the issues of ‘hard’ vs. ‘soft’ peace.”127   
By November 1944, war-fighting headquarters and occupation authorities had begun 
to receive more specific guidance—and were continuing to actively seek clarification—
regarding arrests.  Army Group Commanders were instructed to detain persons identified on 
SHAEF “personality cards,” specified Nazi organization members, and those suspected of 
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perpetrating atrocities against civilians in liberated countries.  They were further directed to 
segregate these individuals from POWs. Those held by virtue of rank or position within 
given organizations were distinguished from war criminals and designated “security 
suspects.”128  SHAEF planners were meanwhile openly examining differences between the 
American and British positions toward arrests, which had already resulted in the submission 
of draft policy directives via separate channels, the U.S through the CCS and British the 
EAC.   Boiling the fundamental disagreement down to the issue of demarcation, a G-3 
(Operations) Division staff study pinpointed the much more encompassing nature of 
emergent American policy to significant variations affecting three categories. Whereas 
American policy called for the arrest of all General Staff Officers, all officers and NCOs in 
the Waffen SS (militarized units), and all members of the Allgemeine SS (general units), 
British draft directives left arrests in the first category to the discretion of the Commander-in-
Chief and limited arrests in the remaining two categories to officers.129   
Clearly drafted at a time when arrest criteria were in a high degree of flux, this staff 
study nonetheless offers a telling glimpse into pre-surrender planning assumptions for 
civilian internment while the program was still within the purview of SHAEF. Based on 
SHAEF criteria, which at the time more closely approximated British directives; the study 
estimated that 54,600 Germans would be arrested in the British zone and 42,900 in the U.S. 
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zone during the first twelve months of occupation.  Of particular note, planners determined 
“that for both psychological and security reasons German concentration camps [would] be 
the most appropriate accommodation for these persons.”  Although all of these camps would 
not be immediately available for that purpose, the anticipated progressive nature of arrests 
led G-3 staff members to postulate that there would be sufficient capacity to initially house 
and to detain internees as needed.  The study further suggested that the proportion of guards 
to detainees customarily used for POW camps, one guard for every ten prisoners, would be 
sufficient for civilian internment camps even though “the majority of persons under detention 
in these categories [would] be of a dangerous type.”  Moreover, additional manpower would 
be required to serve as escorts “during the process of sorting out and screening.”  Based on 
these parameters, the study concluded that the maximum number of combat troops needed 
for these duties would be 7,700 (or roughly 10 battalions) for the British zone and 6,000 (or 
roughly 7 battalions) for the US zone.  Maintaining the camps, at this point broadly defined 
primarily in terms of administration and supply, would be a German responsibility.130   
In spite of differences over how to delimit certain categories, American, British, and 
SHAEF criteria shared the dual-track approaches of basing arrests on by-name lists and 
organizational affiliation.  The December 1944 SHAEF Handbook for Military Government 
in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender directed the arrest and detention of “Adolf Hitler, 
his Chief Nazi and Fascist associates, their collaborators, and all persons suspected of having 
committed war crimes, including those who appear on lists communicated to Army Group 
commanders by Supreme Headquarters.”  The manual also included a categorized list of Nazi 
officers to be arrested and interned, along with estimates of the number of detainees 
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anticipated throughout Germany by category. As Table 1 illustrates, this initial arrest 
guidance was directed at high-ranking officials from six overarching categories:  GESTAPO, 
SD, Police Officials, Nazi Party Officials, Para-Military Officers, and Public Officials.131 
 
Table 1:  SHAEF Pre-Surrender Arrest Criteria 
 
Title Amplifying Information Estimated Number Remarks 
GESTAPO All Personnel 15,000  
SD All Personnel 15,000  
Police Officials Police Presidents and Directors 
 
Commanders of Order and 
Security Police  
 
Office for Emergency Operation 
of Utilities  
 
Police Officers in Key Posts 
 
100 
 
60 
 
 
50 
 
 
320 
 
 
(Befehlshaber der ORPO und 
der SIPO) 
 
(Technische Nothilfe) 
 
 
Höherer SS, Polizeiführer, 
Inspekteur der ORPO, 
Inspekteur der SIPO und SD 
Nazi Party Officials Administrative officials on the 
Reich, Gau, and Kreis levels 
 
All others holding rank of 
Bereichsleiter 
 
 
 
 
30,000 
Down to post of 
Kreishauptstellenleiter 
Para-Military Officers Waffen SS (militarized units) 
 
Allgemeine SS (general units) 
SA 
 
 
Hitler Jugend 
 
 
NSKK 
 
 
NSFK 
 
 
RAD 
60,000 
8,000 
30,000 
 
20,000 
 
 
10,000 
 
 
5,000 
 
 
250 
All officers 
All officers 
Officers holding rank of Major 
(Sturmbannführer) or higher 
 
Officers holding rank of Major 
(Stammführer) or higher 
 
Officers holding rank of Major 
(Staffelführer) or higher 
 
Officers holding rank of Major 
(Sturmbannführer) or higher 
 
Headquarters Officials 
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Title Amplifying Information Estimated Number Remarks 
Public Officials Reich Ministers 
 
State Secretaries 
 
Ministers of Land Governments 
 
Provincial Presidents and Reich 
Governors 
 
Heads of other supreme Reich 
authorities 
 
 
Heads of certain Reich 
institutions 
 
All Reich Labor Trustees 
 
Designated officials of Reich 
Food Estate 
 
Chiefs of the German military 
and civil administration in 
occupied countries and 
territories 
 
District Presidents 
(Regierungspräsidenten) 
 
Heads of rural Kreise 
(Ländrate) 
 
Mayors of cities 
(Oberbürgermeister) 
 
Officials of Reich Propaganda 
Ministry 
 
 
All high officials in Speer’s 
Reich Ministry for Armaments 
and Production; chairman of 
Hauptauschüsse and Ringe in 
same Ministry 
40 
 
40 
 
30 
 
30 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
40 
 
-- 
 
 
3,000 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
700 
 
 
95 
 
 
300 
 
 
 
70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commissars, Inspectors, 
Division Chiefs in Four-Year 
Plan Office, etc. 
 
NOTE 1 
 
 
 
 
NOTE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cities with over one hundred 
thousand inhabitants 
 
Including regional offices and 
branches; heads of subsidiary 
agencies 
 
From Ministerial Councilor up 
Anticipated Arrest Total 
(for all of Germany) 
198, 215 
Source:  SHAEF, Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, December 1944, Part III, 
Table C, Nazi Party, Police, Para-Military, and Government Officers to be Interned, NARA RG 331, Allied Operational and 
Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), General Staff, G-5 
Division Secretariat Subject File, 1944- Jul 1945, Box 67: Denmark to Handbook, Enemy Weapons. 
 
NOTES: 
1. Such as: Reichsbank, Reich Office for Social Insurance, the Supreme Administrative tribunal, Reich Health 
officer, Supreme Court Martial, and President of the People’s Court. 
2. All Bauernführer—from and including the Kreis level up; Chairman of the Central Market Associations 
(Wirtschaftsverbände) and County or Local Marketing Associations (Unterverbände), Presidents of Regional 
Food Offices (Landesernährungsämter) and County Food Offices (Ernährungsämter); and their deputies. 
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Events in and around Aachen from late 1944 to early 1945 not only revealed the 
difficulties inherent in negotiating between the increasingly polarized objectives of 
eliminating Nazism and restoring order; they led SHAEF and Twelfth Army Group to direct 
more thoroughgoing efforts to root out any signs of National Socialist affiliation, left many 
field commanders unsure of how to proceed with establishing postwar civil administrations, 
and sparked renewed debate over how to deal with the increasing numbers of Germans 
coming under Allied control.132  The so-called “Aachen scandal” took a somewhat 
unexpected turn when German parachutists assassinated Oppenhoff in late March 1945, 
reportedly because he defied Himmler’s orders for a work stoppage among civil 
administrations in Allied controlled territories.  According the U.S. Army’s official History 
of the Counter Intelligence Corps, CIC agents interpreted the assassination as harbinger of an 
organized plan for subversion to be carried out by small close-knit groups acting under the 
direction of Otto Skorzeny, the Waffen-SS commander who had led a daring mission to free 
Benito Mussolini from imprisonment in the fall of 1943.133   
Military authorities meanwhile instituted procedural changes geared toward reducing 
the high turnover rate among military government detachments in the hopes that becoming 
more familiar with a local area would increase the likelihood of being able to identify former 
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Nazis.134  American officials’ experiences in Aachen had by this time demonstrated, 
however, that this task would be neither straightforward, nor necessarily sufficient to lay the 
groundwork for future democratization efforts.    
 
The Occupation Widens:  Arrest and Internment During the ‘Mobile’ Phase 
Amid continuing debates concerning what eliminating Nazism would actually mean 
in practice, throughout much of Germany the first half of 1945 was especially chaotic and 
violent.  Under the weight of determined Allied advances, German military, civic, and 
political order initially broke down, and then collapsed.  In many respects, the changing tide 
of the war had already brought the reality of defeat home to the disoriented population, 
whose questions over an uncertain future were overshadowed by the needs of the chaotic 
present and the almost immediate desire to establish distance from the National Socialist 
past.  In contrast to those who fought bitterly to the end, rather than resist the Americans, 
millions of Germans simply walked away from the Nazi Party.135  This wide scale, self-
selected division process in which even high-level Germans distanced themselves from the 
Nazis created unanticipated problems in determining whom to intern and revealed a 
limitation intrinsic to each version of the arrest categories.  They did not distinguish between 
differing degrees of individual sympathy for the Nazi Party.  
The staff officers responsible for translating emerging policy into military directives 
were not wholly unaware of the inherent defect of categorization.  On 1 February 1945 Major 
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Morton Fisher, Executive Officer of the US Group Control Council (USGCC) Finance 
Division forwarded a list of those to be arrested in the field of finance to the Chief of the 
Intelligence Division, Colonel Charles Blakeney, averring, “The categories listed are key 
positions as stipulated in JCS 1067, but, on the basis of information available at this time, 
this Division is not prepared to state that all of the holders thereof are necessarily Nazis or 
Nazi sympathizers.”  Fisher went on to emphasize that the list was prepared based on the 
assumption that Divisions would be able to coordinate the release of detainees in the event 
that the information leading to their arrest should subsequently prove to be incorrect and in 
those cases in which such release were deemed to further Allied objectives.136  
With a significant number of troops already on the ground in Germany, occupation 
concerns had become much more pressing by the time Allied leaders met at Yalta in 
February 1945, however they were overshadowed by disagreements over postwar frontiers 
and spheres of influence, not to mention the increasingly divisive matter of reparations.  A 
number of key agreements that further defined the overarching framework for the eventual 
occupation of Germany were issued in the subsequent Crimea Declaration.  These included 
the decision to establish a fourth zone to be administered by the French, as well as 
reaffirmation of earlier agreements that Germany must surrender unconditionally, that it 
would be demilitarized, and—in what would later become the major policy statement 
underpinning the use of civilian internment—that it would be thoroughly denazified.137 
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Against this backdrop, practical disagreements regarding how to deal with the 
German population grew wider, particularly once the front again began to move forward 
during the last week of February.  While for Allied leadership the immediate postwar period 
brought the long-awaited opportunity to begin eliminating Nazism, local military government 
detachments, like those who had preceded them west of the Rhine, simply grappled with the 
exigencies of restoring order, preventing resistance, and providing basic necessities.138  
Disagreements that had begun soon after American forces occupied Aachen were now being 
carried out between newly established military detachments, expected to deal with the 
various crises at hand, and higher headquarters, increasingly subject to pressures from across 
the Atlantic.  During this “mobile” phase, military government detachments moved through 
various towns and cities as they proceeded to their assigned locations.  Those that remained 
in one place for any length of time had to contend with jurisdictional issues caused by 
coming under the control of successive tactical units that transited the area.  Because of this, 
each time a new combat unit and commander arrived, the detachment faced the possibility of 
having to implement revised security regulations.139  
In late February 1945, SHAEF dissolution loomed in the offing.  Within the US zone, 
headquarters-level efforts to consolidate the various directives related to eliminating Nazism 
began in earnest after the Yalta Conference.  The Political Division, US Group Control 
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Council (USGCC) was tasked in March 1945 with drafting a single policy paper that would 
synchronize the separate elements of denazification, which by this time was beginning to be 
conceptualized as an overarching program that included arrests as well as removal from key 
positions, but was addressed piecemeal in a number of Military Government laws and 
regulations.140  In the meantime, the differing degrees of strictness between American and 
British staff officers had also begun to manifest themselves in the form of conflicting 
instructions over how to treat former Nazi party members.  As Joseph R. Starr noted in his 
official examination of the occupation’s initial months, SHAEF guidance issued on 24 March 
1945 permitted “a certain leniency for minor Nazis and militarists” and gave field 
commanders discretion in temporarily retaining Nazis considered essential to successful 
military operations.   In contrast, U.S. 12th and 6th Army Group directives, issued 11 and 30 
March respectively, called for removal of all members of the Nazi Party and affiliated 
organizations from influential positions.141 
The need to settle upon a consistent approach provided renewed impetus to 
deliberations in Washington, where the State Department had recently succeeded in staffing a 
memorandum summarizing initial U.S. policy for the treatment of Germany during the post-
defeat period for Roosevelt’s approval.  This policy paper captured the schema that would be 
further defined by eventual release of JCS 1067, stipulating for example, that in addition to 
arresting those suspected of atrocities and war crimes, “Nazi leaders and influential Nazi 
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supporters and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives, [were to] be 
arrested and interned.”142  Under the heading “Suspected War Criminals and Security 
Arrests,” JCS 1067 followed suit by not only ordering the arrest of individuals suspected of 
perpetrating atrocities, but also identifying several categories of persons who “if permitted to 
remain at large would endanger the accomplishment of [military government] objectives”.  
The members of several organizations, ranging from top Nazi leadership and the Gestapo to 
“local officials down to and including urban and rural Bürgermeister (mayors)” were also to 
be arrested and interned.143 
The minutes from an April 24, 1945 Interdepartmental Committee meeting to discuss 
JCS 1067 clearly reveal that these arrests were concurrently viewed as a short-term expedient 
directed at transitional justice and security concerns and as an important means to lay the 
groundwork for subsequent democratization by taking “drastic and deep-seated” measures to 
excise National Socialism.  Moreover, those present, including Morgenthau, Chief of the 
State Department’s Division of Central European Affairs James W. Riddleberger, and 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, recognized the immediate tension between 
implementing arrest criteria and effectively administering the areas under U.S. control. 
Where attendees disagreed regarding this point, however, was on the degree of discretion that 
should be provided to commanders in the field to delay arrests.  They settled upon a very 
centralized approach, through Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.144   
                                                 
142
 Joseph C. Grew, Memorandum for the President (with enclosure “Summary of United States Initial Post 
Defeat Policy Relating to Germany” dated 22 Mar 45), 23 Mar 45 NARA RG 56, Treasury Department, 
OASIA, Box 77, F:  GERMANY:  Directives, Vol. 3. 
 
143
 For full text of JCS 1067, see U.S Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington 
D.C., 1985), 15-33.  The arrest categories are listed on 20-21. 
 
144
 “JCS-1067 – Revised,” NARA RG 56, Treasury Department, OASIA, Box 77, F:  GERMANY: Directives, 
Vol. 3, especially 14, 29.  It is likely that this discussion was at least partly in response to a telegram that was 
  69
Most importantly, the proceedings confirm that while policymakers viewed a broad-
brush approach to arrests—or a “dragnet” as they called it—as necessary, they understood 
that the process would be inequitable and inefficient.  McCloy characterized the arrest 
guidelines as “a pretty good thumb rule test of the important Nazi people”, but emphasized 
that the categories would also net “innocent men” and minor Nazis.  Attendees universally 
agreed on the need for machinery to correct such mistakes, and injected instructions into JCS 
1067 that Eisenhower establish “an appropriate semi-judicial body” to consider the cases of 
those not suspected of war crimes.145  Two days after this meeting, the USGCC Political 
Division policy paper uniting the various elements of denazification program was issued.  
Designated Annex XXXIII (Denazification) to the US Group CC “Basic Preliminary Plan:  
Allied Control and Occupation of Germany (Control Council Period),” this document 
codified the use of arrest and detention as one of the program’s principal elements.146 
During the initial chaotic months of the mobile phase, civilian internment programs 
were in practice largely preventative measures driven by security considerations and the 
corresponding need to restore order.147  Although the number of arrests was not nearly as 
high as it would later become, military authorities were nevertheless very active in screening 
local populations looking for security suspects.  These procedures were especially driven by 
the desire to find and hold individuals accountable for specific crimes.  The CIC, working 
with military police and regular combat troops, sought out and arrested those suspected of 
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perpetrating atrocities, based on centrally prepared lists such as the Central Registry of War 
Criminals and Security Suspects published by the United Nations War Crimes Commission.  
The Americans, for example, determined to find and prosecute German soldiers responsible 
for the massacre at Malmédy.148  According to Starr’s account, Military government 
detachments played a minor role in these arrests, but were responsible for following up to 
ensure key Nazis were arrested and for staying vigilant for new suspects.  He noted that in 
the First French Army area, officials also employed “dragnet” procedures, which consisted of 
directing all males between eighteen and sixty-five to report at a designated time and location 
for vetting by military authorities.149   
By the spring of 1945, all civilians in the First and Third Army areas of responsibility 
were not only required to register with U.S military authorities, but also to be vetted by CIC 
personnel in order to get their identity papers stamped.150  Meanwhile, lack of lateral 
coordination and clearly defined higher headquarters guidance often led to differing security 
approaches among military government detachments.  In Neustadt, for example, former Nazi 
Party members were detained overnight in camps and released each day to perform manual 
labor, whereas in nearby villages, there were no restrictions.151  These uncoordinated local 
initiatives would become less prevalent beginning in the summer of 1945, when several 
factors combined to substantially alter the pace of arrests and require establishment of a 
formal civilian internment program. 
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Conclusion 
“The deeper the Allies penetrate into the Reich, the clearer it becomes that a military 
victory over Germany will be only a beginning.”  In mid-April 1945, reporter Raymond 
Daniell offered his take on the difficult road ahead for the Allies once Germany had been 
fully defeated.  Filed from Cologne after Daniell had spent roughly three weeks in-country, 
his impressionistic news story repeatedly aggregated the entire population into an undefined, 
unrepentant mass that had unflinchingly followed the edicts of the Third Reich.  “Before us 
will loom the gigantic task of re-educating a whole nation which for twelve years has been 
steeped in a philosophy in which ethics have had no part, and cut off from any leavening 
intelligence from abroad,” he wrote.  “If we shrink from that task or shirk it, the war will 
have been fought in vain, for in the docility of the average winebibbing Rhinelander, 
reputedly among the most civilized of Germans, there is no evidence of a recognition of error 
in the way of Nazism but only an acknowledgement of defeat and a determination, if 
possible, to wriggle out of the consequences.”152   
Rife with stereotypes, snap judgments, and a decidedly paternalistic attitude, 
Daniell’s article provides a very distinct marker of the wide gulf separating peoples who had 
bitterly fought one another for several years.  Moreover, it reflects the pervasive Allied 
skepticism and uncertainty regarding individual motives that undergirded calls to bring the 
reality of defeat home to the German people and to take a collective approach to stamping 
out National Socialism.  Before the first troop crossing into Germany, Anglo-American 
policymakers and planners had begun to realize the extent to which deciphering Nazism’s 
labyrinthine complexities was easier said than done, a point aptly illustrated by Harold Zink’s 
impassioned account of the difficulties associated with piecing together denazification and 
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arrest guidance for military government teams.  While Daniell’s article was heavily slanted 
toward the notion of “hard” peace, his emphasis on effecting an enduring change in 
Germany’s political culture also clearly reflected the immediate tension between punitive and 
rehabilitative impulses that characterized Allied occupation policy.     
In the Americans’ case, the way events unfolded in and around Aachen both 
highlighted and amplified uncertainties over how to deal with the increasing numbers of 
Germans coming under their control.  Military government personnel quickly found that they 
were no better equipped to ascertain the degree to which various individuals supported 
Nazism than they were to gauge the genuineness of their responses to the occupation.  
Debates about how wide to set arrest parameters notwithstanding, the use of party affiliation 
as an initial yardstick for measuring political incrimination postponed the need to assess 
individual motives.  In April 1945, as Daniell recorded his impressions and while officials in 
Washington sought the President’s final approval for JCS 1067, SHAEF authorities issued a 
sweeping set of “automatic arrest” criteria based upon degree of Party membership and 
organizational affiliation.153  In many ways, this guidance reflected a concerted American 
effort to “inject the thinking of JCS 1067” into SHAEF post-surrender policies, yet as the 
next chapter will illustrate, a number of factors led American authorities to very quickly 
adjust their approach to carrying out arrests.154  Amid ensuing efforts to transition from a 
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combat Army to a centrally commanded occupation force; clarify civilian internment policies 
and their relationship to the denazification program; and establish the network of camps 
needed to house the rapidly growing number of detainees, the impact of these stringent arrest 
criteria became immediately and undeniably apparent. 
 
 Chapter 2:   
 
‘GERMANY OVERRUN’:  ARRESTS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH  
OF FIGHTING, APRIL 1945-AUGUST 1946 
 
 
 “Security is the watchword for the Allies in their control of Germany—security 
against a revival of militarism, security against Germany’s becoming a focus of unrest.”  In a 
late July 1945 survey of overseas developments, the New York Times combined the 
announcement that Allied leaders had arrived at Potsdam with news that during the previous 
week a “half-million American troops conducted what was perhaps the greatest mass raid in 
history in the American zone of Germany.”  Under the heading, “Reshaping Germany,” the 
news brief proclaimed the thorough search of all residences in the zone.  Every person “had 
his papers scrutinized in a search for SS (Elite Guard) men, who are being hunted as war 
criminals.  As a result of the raids 80,000 persons were arrested.”  The surprise sweep did 
not, however, uncover any signs of organized resistance.  “It marked, American authorities 
explained, the passing from a negative to a positive line of action.  A spokesman said: ‘We 
wanted to act before there was a chance of anything coming up and hitting us in the face’.”155    
 This expansive security check and search operation, designated TALLY HO, was 
carried out at a time that, for several reasons, was a pivotal juncture in the occupation.  First, 
US forces had recently decoupled from the British and repositioned themselves to take 
responsibility for the American zone.  Second, in spite of the lack of wide-scale resistance, 
concerns of potential sabotage—whether directed toward facilities, personnel, or reform 
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efforts—still loomed large, particularly now that the Allies’ mission had changed from 
vanquishing the German military to administering a defeated country.  And third, 
organizational changes necessitated by the transition from combat to an occupation force, 
coupled with the potentially debilitating effects of demobilization, had created a window of 
vulnerability that those seeking to conduct illicit activities or to impede occupation efforts 
might exploit.  Indeed, with major troop redeployments in the offing, the Commanding 
General of 12th Army Group had initiated planning for Operation TALLY HO by requesting 
that a “thoroughly coordinated operation” be conducted across the entire zone.156 
This chapter traces the rapid alterations in American civilian internment policy from 
mid-1945 to the summer of 1946, arguing that they occurred as officials sought to effectively 
switch from a past-looking punitive occupation strategy to one that was forward-looking and 
rehabilitative.  Although not deducible from the skyrocketing arrest figures that characterized 
the summer months of 1945, the roots of this strategic switch began to be planted within the 
U.S. zone as early as that August.157  Because the dramatic increase in arrests during the 
months directly following German surrender was principally spurred by counterintelligence 
concerns over potential sabotage and organized resistance, the characterization of civilian 
internment as driven by security is particularly apropos during this timeframe.  This image is 
clearly reinforced, in fact, by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center’s official history of the CIC, 
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which described Germany as “overrun” by agents engaged in tracking down suspected war 
criminals and ardent Nazis in the period surrounding the Third Reich’s collapse.158   
The chapter will illustrate that, while accurate, this portrayal is nevertheless 
insufficient because it does not account for substantial policy adjustments that began within a 
matter of months and culminated in the decision to transfer civilian internment camps to 
German administration.  These changes included: reducing the scope of arrests, instituting 
elements of due process, increasing German involvement in the program, and steadily 
isolating civilian internees from suspected war criminals.  In the meantime, amid a wide scale 
effort to restore order, deal with millions of POWs, and cope with untold numbers of 
displaced persons, and with the ink barely dry on the recently drafted Potsdam Communiqué, 
the challenges of quadripartite administration loomed ever larger.  
Against this backdrop, several increasingly conspicuous and troubling issues related 
to arrests prompted a major effort to regroup beginning in the fall of 1945.  Circumstances 
surrounding these consolidation attempts clearly reveal that at this stage the civilian 
internment program consisted of at least three distinct dimensions.  The first was a 
determined attempt at the theater policy-making level to bridge the gap between plans and 
reality and, in essence, get out in front of developments; the second, a concerted push at the 
Army level and below to set up camps as well as the logistical support to sustain them, in 
other words, to catch up to developments.  Each of these elements was profoundly 
complicated by the third, a vigorous drive by counterintelligence corps detachments—
assisted by military government, military police, and tactical troops—to proactively 
implement in-place arrest guidance.  
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While a detailed description is beyond the scope of this analysis, a basic sketch of the 
wider organizational and procedural framework is necessary in order to effectively trace 
developments related to civilian internment.  Even after organizational lines were made more 
distinct, arrest and detention remained a shared responsibility involving military government, 
theater army, and counterintelligence personnel.  Moreover, notwithstanding efforts to clarify 
roles, a multiplicity of organizational perspectives concerning the program was especially 
evident during the occupation’s initial stages. As this chapter will illustrate, the most 
significant divergence among U.S. forces was between counterintelligence personnel, several 
of whom viewed automatic arrests as the sine qua non for ensuring security, and civil affairs 
representatives, whose focus on reestablishing civil administration and basic services left 
them open to criticisms of downplaying past affiliations.  
  
Out of the ‘Academic Cloister’ and into the ‘Mud’:  Military Government Emergent  
When it was established in London under the command of General C.W. Wickersham 
in the fall of 1944, the USGCC’s primary function was planning.  Although its anticipated 
relationship to army units within the theater command structure had yet to be fully defined, it 
was also understood that the organization would later be directly involved in allied military 
government activities in Germany.  Thus, as it grew from its nucleus to an operational 
echelon of several thousand personnel the USGCC moved successively closer to Berlin, 
transitioning first to Versailles and soon thereafter to the Frankfurt suburb of Höchst.159  
Wickersham’s successor, Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay, later recalled that the latter half 
of 1945 proved to be both a tumultuous and defining period for military government.  It was 
punctuated by the successive decoupling of British and American staffs, activation of ACC 
                                                 
159
 Zink, The United States in Germany, 26-27.  The USGCC moved to Berlin in the summer of 1945. 
  78
machinery, increasing interactivity with nascent German governments, and much needed 
clarification of the USGCC’s scope of authority.160  
In considering the fourth point, Zink wrote that the prolonged organizational 
jockeying that absorbed a great deal of time and energy at the theater headquarters level 
during the wind-down of combat operations left “field organizations more or less to their 
own devices.”161  This maneuvering was in many ways the culmination of a series of 
discussions amongst Washington policymakers regarding who would head the occupation of 
Germany.  Intrinsically linked with—and, at times subsumed by—deliberations over the 
post-defeat policy directive, at bottom these discussions reflected the fundamental need to 
establish an overarching philosophy for the occupation as well as an important exercise in 
delineating civil-military roles.  Political scientist and Clay biographer Jean E. Smith noted 
that for some time, discussions focused on appointing a high-ranking civilian to the post and 
included candidates such as Harry Hopkins, Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson, and 
John J. McCloy.  Key civilian leadership within the War Department, however, gravitated 
toward the position that, at least in its initial stages, soldiers should staff the occupation.  
Moreover, rather than report to Eisenhower through his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General 
Walter Bedell Smith, whoever was chosen to head civil affairs in Germany “must be 
independent, with direct access to Eisenhower on a parallel basis with U.S. combat 
forces.”162  
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Smith astutely argued that the War Department’s position derived from both the 
anticipated particulars of the German occupation, especially the need for “basic logistics” to 
fulfill Herculean relief efforts, and lessons that had been learned during the occupations of 
Cuba and the Philippines.  In Clay, publicly touted “as a hard-driving executive who would 
put the Germans in their place,” American officials found the amalgamation of a soldier, 
politician, and troubleshooter who had experience in dealing with a wide range of large, 
logistically intensive challenges.163  The concept of an independent, dedicated civil affairs 
apparatus that did not report through the general staff, however, ran counter to Bedell 
Smith’s conception of the postwar command structure.  Also at issue was USGCC’s 
relationship with the US-side of SHAEF G-5, which upon dissolution of the combined 
command would transfer to Headquarters, United States Forces European Theater (USFET) 
and be based in Frankfurt.  USFET G-5’s position was that it should bear full responsibility 
for military government activities within the zone while the USGCC handled quadripartite 
issues and matters subject to the Allied Control Authority.164  Clay, on the other hand, felt 
quite strongly that in order to facilitate eventual transfer to civil agencies, military 
government should be organized separately from the Army Command, with a staff under the 
guidance of a deputy military governor who would report directly to Eisenhower.165  
Although the relationship between USGCC and the theater staff was indeed clarified 
through eventual acceptance of Clay’s proposal, the implementation of programs such as 
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civilian internment inevitably crossed a number of organizational and functional 
boundaries.166  Organizationally, the zone was initially divided into an eastern district, 
headquartered at Munich and under the control of Third Army, and a western district, 
headquartered at Heidelberg and under the control of Seventh Army, along with an enclave 
surrounding the port of Bremen and a sector in Berlin.  Thus four commanders and their G-5 
apparatuses supervised military government activities within their areas of responsibility.167  
Moreover, for some time, USGCC directives were channeled via USFET to the respective 
Armies, who bore primary responsibility for their implementation.168  Because of this 
essentially regional approach, as would soon become increasingly clear, the civilian 
internment program was carried out similarly, but not identically, within each area. 
Functionally, the civilian internment program fell within the scope of several staff 
elements at various echelons, principally G-1 (Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), and G-5 (Civil 
Affairs).  For example, G-2 was primarily responsible for arrests, interrogations, and 
screenings.  Within G-2, counter-intelligence directed the apprehension of those subject to 
automatic arrest criteria, in most cases, relying upon combat troops or Military Police 
(functionally under G-1) to actually conduct arrests.  In addition to maintaining a Central 
Registry of war criminals and security suspects, G-1 periodically sent out “wanted” cards to 
aid in the search for specific individuals, and by virtue of the Provost Marshall function, bore 
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responsibility for overseeing the setup and operation of camps.169  In addition to their civil 
affairs (G-5) duties, Military Government Public Safety Officers were specifically charged 
with assisting counter-intelligence in effecting arrests, to include passing information of 
potential intelligence value and ensuring the cooperation of local police as needed.170 
As they undertook the successive steps necessary to integrate military government 
elements and tactical fighting units into a centrally commanded occupation force, the 
Americans emerged from combat outwardly determined to implement a wide-ranging and 
vigorous denazification program, by now principally defined in terms of arrests and removal 
from office.  In a “policy for hard realism,” described by New York Times reporter Drew 
Middleton on 17 May 1945, Clay laid out the nascent U.S. Military Government’s initial 
objectives as destruction of “whatever remaining power Germany may have for making war, 
and elimination of the Nazi Party.”  Clay went on to emphasize that war criminals would 
“pay for crimes with their lives and liberties, and with their sweat and blood.”  Only once 
these objectives were accomplished would the U.S. “begin to worry about long-range 
problems and the final treatment and regeneration of Germany.”  Clay also acknowledged the 
inherent conflicts between denazification and reconstruction, asserting that: “although some 
Nazis might be used to ‘get the electricity on’…the history of every applicant [for positions 
overseen by Military Government] would be carefully considered.”171 
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On the whole, the “hard” character of Clay’s announcement was consistent with the 
U.S. occupation policy directive, JCS 1067, which had been issued in amended form as a 
classified document just days before.172  Much of Morgenthau’s philosophy had made its way 
into this final version, typified by strict economic provisions, the direction to be “firm and 
aloof,” and insistence that Germany be occupied “as a defeated enemy nation.”  Amid an 
array of punitive measures, the occupation’s ultimate objective of fostering democratic self-
governance was deliberately situated on an as-yet-to-be-defined horizon: 
The principle Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a 
threat to the peace of the world.  Essential steps in the accomplishment of this 
objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms, the 
immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment, the industrial disarmament 
and demilitarization of Germany, with continuing control over Germany’s capacity to 
make war, and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of German political life 
on a democratic basis.173 
 
Clay’s resolute stance, essential to reassuring an increasingly Germanophobe public 
opinion galvanized by the discovery of atrocities, belied continuing behind-the-scenes 
deliberations amongst U.S. policymakers—and between local commanders and higher 
headquarters—regarding how to approach defeated Germany.174  Although his announcement 
characterized the punitive and rehabilitative aspects of the occupation as sequential, he had 
already begun to grapple with the recognition that these elements would necessarily overlap.  
Moreover, his private correspondence with Hilldring and McCloy indicates that his “hard 
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realism” announcement was not only intended to convey the initial stern tenor of occupation 
policy, but also Clay’s conviction that American planners take a more realistic approach to 
the occupation.  Ten days earlier, he had confided to Hilldring that, in his view, USGCC 
personnel needed to move out of the “cloistered and academic” environment and into the 
“mud.”  The existing set of plans, while voluminous, had “stimulated mental activity but 
[were] based on so many assumptions as to lack a great deal of realism in their approach.”175 
Clay’s own sense of the “realities” associated with occupying Germany had changed 
once he left Washington and would continue to do so until well after he arrived in Berlin.  
Once in Europe, he had already begun to reinterpret American occupation policy, adopting 
what amounted to a hybrid stance:  “hard” with regard to denazification and demilitarization, 
“softer” with regard to economic reconstruction.  Speaking of the latter, he wrote to McCloy 
in Washington in the hopes of avoiding what he viewed as unnecessary destruction of the 
German economy, urging that “[t]he progress of the war has accomplished that and it is my 
view now (based on general impressions, I must admit) that the industry which remains, even 
when restored will suffice barely for a very low living standard in Germany.”  Clay went on 
to say, “I hope you won’t think from the above that I am getting soft.  I realize the necessity 
for stern treatment.  However, retribution now is far greater than realized at home and our 
planes and artillery have really carried the war direct to the homes of the German people.”  
Just over two weeks later, he wrote to Hilldring, “Being ‘hard’ now is important to show the 
German people how badly German military might has been defeated.”176     
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Clay’s overarching concerns regarding the gap between plans and reality were well 
on the mark in the case of eradicating Nazism.  In spite of the flurry of discussions over 
arrest and detention policy, little in the way of detailed planning for civilian internment took 
place prior to the German surrender.  As recently as the previous March, this realization had 
come to the fore within SHAEF as various functional divisions sought to solidify roles and 
responsibilities in connection with denazification.   Correspondence between G-5’s Planning 
Committee, headed by Brigadier D.G. Heyman, and the Chief of G-2’s Special Sections, 
Brigadier R.J. Mansell, illustrates that while substantial agreement had been reached 
regarding the handling of arrests, the subject of what would happen to internees once 
detained had yet to be resolved.  On 10 March Heyman wrote:  “As indicated at the meeting 
yesterday, there appears to be no firm policy on this.  G-1 and G-2 would seem to be 
primarily concerned but there are other interests involved, e.g. maintenance of internees, use 
of internees for labour, ensuring that when internees are released they do not regain positions 
of influence and trust.  G-5 and G-4 will be interested in these additional questions.”  In an 
internal letter to the Chief of the G-2 Counter-Intelligence Division, Mansell urged 
consideration of several key factors, including:  the intended length of internment; the types 
of activities for which internees might be used, such as labor within or outside Germany; 
issues related to maintaining internees’ families; and whether attempts were “to be made to 
‘re-educate’ internees with a view to their eventual release when passed as ‘de-nazified’.”177   
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The lack of planning with regard to camps was effectively compounded by 
dissolution of SHAEF.   With the combined command on the wane, however, and as British 
and American military government apparatuses sat poised in the wings, a proposal staffed by 
SHAEF G-2 (Forward) revealed a distinct concern over the enormity of the administrative 
tasks associated with indefinitely detaining individuals found to be within automatic arrest 
categories.  The proposal specifically sought a relief valve of sorts in the form of delegating 
authority to grant releases:  “The Army Groups, through their Armies, are in a position to 
determine which of the arrested persons can safely be released and it is believed desirable 
that they be authorized to release those persons in the arrest categories who, after careful 
screening, are not considered to be a menace to Allied interests and who are neither Security 
Suspects nor War Criminals.”  G-5 disagreed with the proposal on the grounds that, in 
accordance with JCS 1067 and its British counterpart, it was beyond SHAEF purview to 
delegate such authority.178 
These vacillations were both symptomatic of, and soon to be exacerbated by, the 
well-documented larger uncertainty over denazification that came to the fore in the summer 
of 1945—just as automatic arrests were entering full swing.  Still smoldering embers of the 
controversies that had played out in and around Aachen were fanned by new disagreements.  
Differing views were manifested in conflicting guidelines, rapidly changing instructions, and 
an active contestation—in which Germans themselves increasingly took part—regarding the 
degree and forms of participation in Nazi party activities that should be used to measure 
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political incrimination.  In the meantime, while experience had already begun to expose some 
of the fallibilities of a categorical approach to denazification, counterintelligence-led efforts 
to proactively implement in-place arrest guidance, and thus to thwart any isolated or 
organized resistance, would soon be well underway.       
         
Security Suspects and Automatic Arrests:  Casting a Wide Net 
With the termination of hostilities at 090001B May changes were effected in the 
operating procedure of the G-2 section.  Although anticipated and planned for some 
months during operations, tempo and emphasis was shifted from tactical intelligence 
to counter-intelligence, with attention principally directed upon the arrest of Nazi 
personalities and the discovery of clandestine subversive organizations whose 
mission was sabotage and harassment of occupational troops.179 
 
While staff elements struggled with concerns such as the lack of provisions for 
housing internees, the newly issued SHAEF automatic arrest categories set the stage for a 
broader, more centralized approach to civilian internment by establishing an extensive range 
of persons to be detained.180  As with previous iterations of the arrest policy, in contrast to 
those persons sought out based upon suspicion of involvement in war crimes, these 
guidelines ordered the internment of individuals who had held membership in any one of 
several organizational groups.  In a letter promulgating the policy, the SHAEF Adjutant 
General, Brigadier General T.J. Davis, linked the need for the arrests to “the two main 
objects of safeguarding the security of Allied Forces and accomplishing the destruction of 
Nazi organizations.”  The letter identified two key exceptions to the arrest categories:  those 
who had been dismissed as politically unreliable by the Nazis, or had elected to retire from a 
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given position before 1933.  Moreover, members of the German Armed Forces who fell 
within automatic arrest categories were to be held as POWs pending cessation of 
hostilities.181  
The differences between the April 1945 arrest guidance and the criteria put forth 
roughly six months earlier clearly reflect a movement within SHAEF toward the much more 
encompassing American approach.182  Generally speaking, the changes involved the 
expansion of several categories to lower organizational levels and the explicit inclusion of 
women.  The specifications related to Nazi Party Officials, for example, were expanded to 
include administrative officials “down to and including the post of Amtsleiter [section heads] 
at the Ortsgruppe [local district] level,” along with all party members “down to and including 
the rank of Gemeinschaftsleiter [community leader].”183  The segments of the Waffen and 
Allgemeine SS subject to arrest were not only broadened beyond the level of officers, but also 
to include anyone who had served in the SS-Helferinnen or SS-Kriegshelferinnen (SS Female 
Auxiliaries).  In addition, the stipulation covering all Hitler Jugend “officers down to and 
including the rank of Stammführer [Major]” was extended to equivalent ranks within the 
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Bund Deutscher Mädel (League of German Girls).184  This version of arrest and detention 
guidance also reflected an increased emphasis on members of police and security 
organizations.  It is likely that this was due to CIC concerns of extensive plans calling for a 
coordinated effort among German secret intelligence services, paramilitary organizations, as 
well as security and secret police to go underground as allied forces advanced, waiting for an 
opportunity to impede occupation efforts.185  In an especially consequential development 
from the standpoint of Military Government, the broad category of Höherer Dienst (higher-
grade civil servants) was added. 
The inclusion of Höherer Dienst, the highest of four German Civil Service tiers, 
provides a telling example of the “broad brush” approach advocated by American officials in 
Washington.  All higher-grade civil servants appointed after 1939, as well as any who had 
held the rank of Ministerialrat (or equivalent) regardless of date of appointment, were subject 
to arrest.  The resulting compilation of positions, pulled from the 1943 German Legal Code 
(Reichsgesetzblatt) and arranged according to salary, comprised nearly half of the April 1945 
SHAEF Arrest Categories Handbook, which was intended to assist Counter-Intelligence 
staffs in implementing automatic arrest criteria.  These positions ranged from Reich Leader 
of the SS and Chief of the German Police (Reichsführer-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei) 
to higher-grade library officials (Bibliothekräte) and civil service pharmacists 
(Regierungsapotheker).  The conviction that this array of appointees harbored significant 
numbers of committed Nazis stemmed largely from the German Civil Service Statute 
(Beamtengesetz), which by 1937 required unconditional support to the National Socialist 
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State and by 1939 made Party membership compulsory for any State appointment.  Without a 
mechanism for distinguishing between those who had joined the Party out of loyalty, 
expediency or compulsion, the presumption underlying arrest criteria was that higher-grade 
officials who were not convinced Party members would have already been weeded out.186 
Beginning with Harold Zink, scholars have emphasized that in pushing to broaden the 
scope of arrests, U.S. policymakers failed to fully appreciate the extent to which Nazism had 
penetrated German society.187  There is much to be said for this argument.  Brigadier General 
Frank McSherry, Military Government Director, announced at the same press conference in 
which Clay laid out U.S. occupation objectives that there were approximately 2 million 
active members of the Nazi Party before the war; yet the Nazi Party’s master personnel files, 
a card index that was later discovered at a Bavarian paper mill where it had been sent to be 
pulped, revealed that there were 8 million members of the Nazi Party in early 1945.188  
Moreover, party affiliations reached into nearly every aspect of daily life.  One in every six 
persons was in a Nazi organization of one form or another.  This included, for example, 102 
out of 112 doctors in Bonn and 18 of the 21 technicians in Cologne’s waterworks facility.189   
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While American policymakers arguably did not anticipate the full extent of the 
logistical hydra they were creating through expanded criteria, deliberations during the April 
24, 1945 Interdepartmental Committee meeting on JCS 1067 reveal that they did understand 
arrests could be on the order of millions.  Hilldring and McCloy expressed War Department 
concerns over the immensity of administrative problems that had already begun to present 
themselves in-theater as well as the prospect of carrying out the civilian internment program 
while also attempting to provide for untold numbers of POWs and displaced persons.  
Reminding those present of the difficulty of truly conceiving the magnitude of issues in 
Europe without being there, McCloy emphasized that giving Eisenhower the discretion to 
delay arrests as needed would enable American forces to mitigate these problems.  “There is 
an enormous category of people here estimated from two to three million that you have got to 
arrest.  You will have displaced persons coming out by the tens of thousands.”  He went on to 
say, “the idea of imposing on General Eisenhower the rigid restrictions that he has got to take 
care of three million more people no matter what his problems are is just improper from the 
standpoint of administration.  You have given him the tone, the type of people he must arrest.  
He isn’t going to let the whole kit and kaboodle out.  He sees the problem.”190  
As counter-intelligence units pressed forward with implementing the expanded 
criteria, calculations of how many Germans would be affected by automatic arrest categories 
varied significantly.191  Strong’s April 1945 letter proposing delegation of authority for 
releases to the Army Group level, for example, estimated 400,000; the April 1945 edition of 
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the SHAEF Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of 
Germany meanwhile stated, “For all GERMANY, an estimated total number of persons to be 
detained is 250,000.”192  Once set in motion, however, the broad scope of the criteria became 
quite apparent.  Whereas American forces had arrested 1,000 Germans during the entire 
month of March, they arrested and interned more than 700 daily in May and June while also 
coping with over 6 million POWs.193   
Among the more immediate effects, a string of various-sized temporary camps was 
established to detain POWs and the growing number of Germans subject to arrest criteria.  
As the immature logistical structure was quickly outpaced, poor conditions and overcrowding 
soon led to inevitable comparisons with concentration camps.194  Beginning in May 1945, 
increasingly aware of the difficulties associated with holding such vast numbers of Germans 
in various types of camps, SHAEF issued a series of selective discharge instructions for 
POWs.  Third Army, which released 380,180 POWs throughout its area of responsibility 
from 9-31 May, later reported that these mass releases created new logistical problems and 
security concerns as large numbers of POWs and refugees “choked the highways in 
uncontrolled masses in search of their homes.”  By June, SHAEF issued general discharge 
instructions “for all Germans except war criminals, security suspects, and those in automatic 
arrest categories.”  The stipulation that anyone who remained based on these criteria be 
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subsequently discharged and re-incarcerated as a civilian internee, however, required 
screening to determine which POWs were eligible for release.195   
Implementation of the arrest criteria quickly elicited a number of queries and 
recommended modifications from within SHAEF as well as field units.  SHAEF G-2 
correspondence indicates that, although there were instances of suggested additions, the 
overarching push was toward reducing the automatic arrest categories.  Heyman, for 
example, sought unsuccessfully to have the guidance regarding Höherer Dienst withdrawn, 
or at the very least limited, “since it involves the arrest of numerous individuals who may not 
be dangerous but who are essential to the functioning of Military Government.  This 
direction also requires the arrest of many individuals who are not essential to Military 
Government, but who are probably not important enough to bother with.”  To emphasize this 
point, Heyman identified examples of “unimportant” individuals, such as the Director of the 
Weather Services Office of the German Reich (Direktor beim Reichsamt für Wetterdienst), 
whose detention would be required by current criteria.  He proposed reverting to the Civil 
Service arrest categories in previous G-2 directives and in the Handbook for Military 
Government, Part III, Chapter II, Table C.  Members of the Höherer Dienst who had been 
appointed since 1939 should be subject to screening, he argued, but not mandatory arrest.196 
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In response, Colonel H.G. Sheen, SHAEF G-2, wrote that, although he “understood 
and appreciated” the reasons for the request, in actual practice the implementation of 
automatic arrest categories had not unduly hindered Military Government activities.  
Moreover, he insisted: 
This directive was compiled to include those categories of persons who were deemed 
to qualify for arrest by reason of the degree to which they compromised themselves 
with the Nazi Party.  Within this category of persons fall members of the Höherer 
Dienst and, in this connection, your attention is invited to a recent publication, EDS 
Report Number 28 “Nazi Influences on the German Civil Service,” which clearly 
outlines the manner in which the Nazi Party purged the German Civil Service of all 
elements other than those which were politically trustworthy.  It can only be 
assumed, therefore, that these individuals must be regarded as dangerous and that 
their employment would be highly undesirable in Military Government.  
 
Although he expressed reluctance to implement such an amendment given the impending 
dissolution of SHAEF, Sheen left the door open to the possibility that civil servants, “with 
certain exceptions,” might be placed in a discretionary arrest category.  That decision, 
however, would be within separate USGCC and British Control Commission purview.197   
 Among reactions from field units, an exchange dealing with the mandatory arrest of 
female SS members and BDM officers (above the rank of Stammführer) is particularly 
striking.  It highlights growing field concerns over the administrative problems associated 
with civilian internment and provides insight into the perceived relationship, as articulated by 
Sheen, between automatic arrests and security.  In a letter to SHAEF G-2 dated 12 April, 21st 
Army Group advocated dealing with the cases of women individually rather than according 
to categories, asserting that “the automatic arrest of large numbers of women would place a 
grave additional burden on our internment facilities, in view of the necessity for making 
special arrangements for segregation and women searchers and warders.”  21st Army Group 
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recommended that female SS members and BDM officers “be arrested and interned where 
there exists other evidence that they constitute a danger to security.”  Sheen rejected this 
proposal, emphasizing that these groups were more deserving of “internment on security 
grounds…than some of the other categories listed in the directive.  The categories for 
automatic arrest have been selected on the basis that they represent persons who, as a class,” 
he continued, “are deemed to be a menace to security.  The possibility that certain individuals 
in those categories are of no security interest is not denied.  That possibility, however, 
remains to be proved either by individual investigation or in light of more experience in 
dealing with the problem on the ground.”198    
 Sheen was concurrently engaged in conversation with the intelligence staffs at 21st 
and 12th Army Group Headquarters, after the former recommended three significant 
modifications to the automatic arrest categories.  In a letter dated 25 May 1945, 21st Army 
Group suggested restricting mandatory arrest at the Ortsgruppe level to Local Group leaders, 
their deputies, and a handful of key positions.  Based on experience, the British headquarters 
maintained that a number of Amtsleiter (section heads) at the Ortsgruppe level were neither 
dangerous nor possessed information of potential intelligence value, and emphasized that, 
“CI personnel are pre-occupied with the task of clearing their areas of petty officials to the 
detriment of more important investigations, and the work of internment camp staffs will be 
hampered in the same way.”  In addition, intelligence personnel in the field had found that 
rank was not an effective predictor for the importance of officers in the SA, HJ, NSKK and 
NSFK and suggested modifying the arrest categories to either include all officers or at least 
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junior officers who had held positions typically associated with the higher ranks.  Finally, 
21st Army Group recommended that all former staff instructors at elite schools dedicated to 
training Nazi leaders (Ordensburgen), and Wehrmacht political officers, or NSFOs 
(Nationalsozialisticher Führungsoffiziere), be included in the automatic arrest categories.199  
 After Sheen forwarded these recommendations to 12th Army Group G-2 for comment, 
the American headquarters concurred with the proposals to restrict arrests at the Ortsgruppe 
level and to include junior paramilitary officers depending upon the positions they had held.  
Moreover, 12th Army Group offered three additional recommendations: that arrests of 
members of Nazi affiliated organizations such as the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt 
(NSV), Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft (NSF), Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF), and 
Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) be restricted to the leaders (Leiter) of these groups; that arrest of 
civil servants be at the discretion of the investigating agency; and, that any changes made to 
automatic arrest categories be deemed retroactive in order to enable Armies to release those 
no longer covered under the criteria, provided they were not found to be security threats.200 
 As with the G-5 Division recommendations, Sheen refrained from issuing 
modifications given SHAEF’s impending dissolution; however, in this case, he 
acknowledged the need to reconsider arrest directives.  “It has always been envisaged,” he 
asserted, “that the automatic arrest categories, which were evolved prior to operations in 
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GERMANY, would have to come under review in light of experience gained on the ground 
and when Counter-Intelligence Staffs had had the opportunity of coming into direct contact 
with the problem of denazification.”  He went on to admit,  “It is now beginning to be clear 
that, from the viewpoint of practical considerations, the net has been cast in some cases too 
wide and perhaps in others not wide enough.  Similarly a policy of discretionary arrest in 
some categories could, with benefit, be substituted for the present mandatory policy.”  In an 
especially revealing statement, he suggested that while the net could be cast more narrowly 
in the case of lower Party officials such as Ortsgruppenleiter, “On the other hand, subject to 
the limitations of the detention facilities and manpower available it is believed that arrest, 
detention and subsequent release after screening, no matter how short the period of detention 
might be, would have a salutary effect on anyone who had held office in the Nazi Party.”201 
 Discussions such as those described above highlight a number of key points related to 
the American-led push to cast a wide—and deep—net in rounding up former Nazis.  First, 
they illustrate that even after releasing the automatic arrest categories, British and American 
officials continued to reflect upon the perplexing issue of demarcation, or where to set the 
line in terms of those whose activities and affiliations did, and did not, warrant detention.  
Second, the debates and uncertainty crossed a number of lines, reflecting for example:  the 
dissimilar views of American and British authorities; the differing functional priorities within 
SHAEF; the distinct perspectives of higher headquarters and field unit intelligence personnel; 
and, as illustrated by the musing aspect of Sheen’s correspondence, the doubts residing 
within those individuals involved in setting, clarifying, and implementing arrest directives.  
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Finally, the repeated invocation of avoiding danger as a justification for including specific 
groups within the criteria clearly suggests that, in spite of the program’s transformative goals, 
from the viewpoint of those charged with carrying out arrests, the initial emphasis of civilian 
internment was decidedly oriented toward security.   
 
The ‘American Gestapo’:  Counterintelligence and the Dragnet in Operation 
The Anglo-American separation to which Sheen repeatedly referred came to fruition 
in July 1945 with redeployment of forces into assigned areas, dissolution of SHAEF, and 
USFET’s assumption of responsibility within the American zone.202  The Allied Control 
Council held its first meeting at the end of the month.203  By that time, amid a vigorous push 
to spur local military government detachments to more actively remove former Nazis from 
key positions in American occupied Germany, a number of overlapping sweeps were in full 
swing.  Describing this period in his detailed examination of denazification in the US Zone, 
Kormann wrote, “As Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, Public Safety units and 
Military Police swung into action, arrests were made by the thousands and individuals were 
jailed as quickly as their identities could be established, checked with the list and arrest forms 
filled out.  A small scale reign of terror followed, led by CIC detachments which efficiently 
rounded up persons on the ‘target’ lists.”204  While his characterization of efficiency is 
contradicted by CIC reports and his use of the phrase “reign of terror” somewhat overplayed, 
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counterintelligence, Military Government and State Department records all clearly show the 
intensity of operations in the summer of 1945.   
In tandem with wide-scale arrests, American policies during this timeframe reflected 
increasingly stringent centralized guidelines for removal “of Nazis and German Militarists 
from public office and positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprise.”205  Of 
particular note, on 7 July 1945 USFET issued a comprehensive directive that established 
detailed Removal and Exclusion Categories—136 of which were Mandatory and 22 
Discretionary.  In the case of the former, the directive read:  
The term ‘removal’ as used herein shall mean to discharge the person immediately 
and summarily from the position in question and to terminate his influence and 
participation therein, directly or indirectly.  The property of all removed persons will 
be blocked.  Persons removed from public office will not be entitled to the benefit of 
any pension or civil service rights except with the consent of the Military 
Government Detachment.206  
 
Importantly, the directive also required Commanders and Military Government 
Detachments to directly petition USFET headquarters for approval to appoint or reinstate an 
individual to public office or positions of importance.  This was not to be requested on the 
basis of “administrative necessity, convenience, or expediency;” but rather, was to be limited 
to instances of “individual injustices,” in which investigation revealed a member of a 
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specified category had been “in fact only a nominal Nazi.”  In addition, the option was only 
to be used in the case of “essential administrative or technical positions for which…a 
qualified replacement of acceptable character” could not be located.207  
In considering the high degree of emphasis USFET and USGCC put on denazification 
during this period, Zink later rightly asserted that it directly resulted from public interest 
galvanized by press reports in the wake of the Aachen scandal.208  A 6 July 1945 letter from 
John J. Muccio to Ambassador Robert Murphy, however, also reflected concern over local 
reactions.  Muccio stressed the need to gain momentum in removals and arrests in order to 
“[c]onvince non-Nazi Germans that we really mean business.”  According to press 
conference notes prepared for Clay in early July 1945 by Lieutenant Elmer Plischke 
(USGCC Political Division), standardized questionnaires (Fragebogen) would be the primary 
tool for carrying out individual reviews.  These documents would gather personal, 
educational and employment history, along with details about: “experience and military 
service; membership and role in all types of organizations before and after the Hitler regime, 
especially the Nazi Party and its organizations; writings and speeches since 1923; income 
and assets since January 1931, and travel and residence abroad.”  Working closely with the 
CIC, responsibility for evaluating Fragebogen was to rest with Special Branch sections 
assigned to the Public Safety Division at Military Government detachments.209    
In practice, use of the questionnaires led the denazification program’s administrative 
scope to mushroom and had immediate organizational impacts.  In addition to establishing 
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Special Branches, for example, Public Safety Officers at larger Military Government 
detachments recruited German staffs to assist in sifting through large quantities of 
information.210  According to the official CIC history, along with carrying out arrests, during 
June and July 1945 agents assigned to the counterintelligence team at Heidenheim collected 
and pored over approximately 150 Fragebogen per day.211  At roughly the same time Third 
Army G-2 appointed an Internment Camp Officer to oversee the implementation of counter-
intelligence directives, and dedicated fifty-seven intelligence personnel to the task of 
screening internees to determine whether their “background or political predilections” 
warranted continued detention.  Counter-intelligence detachments, meanwhile, had begun to 
rely increasingly on “informer systems” to locate and apprehend those subject to automatic 
arrest categories.212  
In their frequency, comprehensiveness, and reliance on the element of surprise, 
counterintelligence measures were calculated not just to locate those subject to arrest criteria, 
but to also have a psychological impact on the population.  For example, “unannounced 
check-and-search operations” in local communities sought to: root out “illegal and 
subversive activities; confiscate illegally-possessed weapons and vehicles; disband black 
market activities; check identification and travel papers; and impress the Germans with the 
vigilance, sternness, and determination of the Occupation forces.”213  The “dragnet” to which 
Washington policymakers had often referred consisted in practice of a combination of 
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individual arrests, coordinated security checks dubbed “Swoop Operations”, and large-scale 
sweeps conducted at the community, military district or zonal level.  These tactics were used 
repeatedly and in various forms over the ten-month period following German surrender.  The 
months of June, July, and August were particularly active.  According to the CIC official 
history, for example, over 6,500 arrests were made from 5 – 11 July.214  
Ernst von Solomon’s depiction of CIC agents in Der Fragebogen cast them as 
members of “an American Gestapo-type organization.”215  The official history reveals that 
American intelligence personnel sought to promote this association.  Among several 
vignettes, the multi-volume document described the experiences of a “more or less typical” 
detachment as related in 1955 by an agent who had been based in Heidenheim.  The 970th 
CIC team “adopted a firm attitude in dealing with Germans” and often received letters 
“addressed to the ‘American Gestapo’ or the ‘American SD’,” which, according to the 
account, agents interpreted as “a clear token of German respect for the Americans’ 
authority.”  Because they were “deluged” by denunciations, the team frequently interned both 
denouncers and those they had informed against until their respective stories could be 
investigated.  In a criticism reflecting the frenetic impulse behind initial operations, the agent 
noted that because organizing the 80,000 personality cards distributed by SHAEF during the 
closing phases of combat proved to be an “impossible task,” CIC personnel in Heidenheim 
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found their own personal initiative and lateral coordination with nearby teams to be much 
more valuable than information from higher headquarters in carrying out automatic arrests.216  
On a day-to-day basis, however, arresting “petty Nazis” became a matter of routine 
once the Heidenheim team became well established in the area: 
CIC sent a note to the wanted person, stating that he should report to Room 13 (the 
CIC office) in the city hall on a specified date at a specified time.  The procedure was 
much like ‘issuing a draft notice’ to a prospective American service man.  Most of 
the suspects appeared, however when an appointment was not kept, the CIC team 
spread an alert for the wanted person, throughout the Seventh Army area.217 
  
In addition to local operations such as this, large-scale systematic searches were secretly 
planned and swiftly carried out.  Typical procedures involved blocking primary and 
secondary access roads in order to isolate the targeted area while teams of three to six 
soldiers searched house-by-house for “wanted individuals.”  After CIC interrogations, those 
deemed to be security threats or subject to automatic arrest were detained, while those 
determined to have violated civil regulations were turned over to the military government for 
subsequent trial.218   
Operation “TALLY HO,” the zone-wide search and screening operation described 
above that took place from 21 to 23 July 1945 and led to the arrest of over 80,000 Germans, 
was immediately followed within the Seventh Army area of responsibility by Operation 
“LIFEBOUY,” a wide scale purge of Nazi officials from civil administrations.  All static CIC 
teams were dedicated to the primary mission of screening appointed officials and other 
employees, recommending retention or removal, and arresting anyone falling within SHAEF 
automatic arrest criteria.  In addition, CIC teams were instructed to screen all projected 
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replacements for removed persons.  By early November, Seventh Army G-2 estimated that 
the denazification of civil administration within the Western Military District was 85% 
complete.  Over 93,000 employees had been screened, and just under half of them “approved 
for retention.”  22,358 had already been dismissed, with roughly 3,881 dismissals still 
pending.  The total number of arrests was just over 2,000:  1,810 automatic arrests, 89 
security threats, and 117 listed as miscellaneous.219     
By end of 1945, “more than 120,000 counterintelligence personalities had been 
apprehended.”220   Although arrests had by this time begun to slow down, they continued into 
1946.  Among the longest duration and most spectacular roundups, Operation “NURSERY” 
targeted an underground network organized by former high-ranking Hitler Youth leaders in 
response to Reichsleiter Artur Axmann’s April 1945 order to proceed to south Germany in 
preparation for systematically supporting anticipated Werwolf (resistance) activities.  Rather 
than a single sweep, the operation consisted of a number of individual arrests beginning in 
June 1945.  Counterintelligence personnel sought to remove key members, including Reich 
Youth Leader of the Nazi Party Axmann, without alerting the rest of the organization.  
Operation NURSERY culminated, however, in a “swoop” operation targeting 2,500 suspects 
                                                 
219
 HQ Seventh Army to Commanding Officer 307th CIC Detachment, “Operating Instructions for Static CIC 
Teams,” 24 Jul 45 and Murphy to the Secretary of State, “Transmittal of Report on Operation “LIFEBUOY,” 16 
Nov 45 (with enclosure:  Seventh Army G-2, “Progress of Operation LIFEBUOY in Seventh Army/Western 
Military District,” 8 Nov 45), NARA RG 84 POLAD Classified General Correspondence 1945-1949, Box 18, 
F:  810 – Denazification – Bavaria.  By removing Nazis from key positions, the operation sought to alleviate 
fear among the German people of cooperating with US forces.  For brief descriptions of LIFEBUOY, see also 
Armin Schuster, Die Entnazifizierung in Hessen 1945-1954 (Wiesbaden, 1999), 26-29; and Ziemke, The U.S. 
Army in the Occupation of Germany, 382-383.  On TALLY HO, see OMGUS Monthly Rpt No. 1, 
Denazification, 20 Aug 45, cited in Gimbel, Marburg, 49, n. 4. 
 
220
 HQ USFET, AC of S G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 2, 24 Jul 45 and No. 26, 10 Jan 46, both cited 
in History of the CIC, Vol. XXVI, “CIC in the Occupation of Germany,” XXVI-12, n. 19 and 20.  
 
  104
carried out under the direction of USFET G-2 and in coordination with British 
counterintelligence.221  
 
Caught in the Bow Wave of Arrests:  Ad Hoc Establishment of Camps 
As arrests proceeded apace in the summer of 1945, Third and Seventh Army staffs 
made scrambled preparations to process and house internees, a point that permeates Seventh 
Army Provost Marshall monthly reports.  The synopsis for May described as a major 
problem the challenge of receiving, segregating and holding thousands of POWs and civilian 
internees in “hastily constructed cages and German barracks.”  Clearly caught in the bow 
wave of arrests, the staff reported that as the month began “it was determined that numerous 
camps would have to be organized to accommodate the large numbers of War Criminals, SS 
troops and CI arrestees.”  Successive monthly installments reveal that camps were opened as 
quickly as combat units could be tasked with their administration, workable locations found, 
and facilities made ready to accept detainees.  In each case, enclosures were almost 
immediately filled to capacity—several well beyond.  The turnover rate among units charged 
with overseeing camps was very rapid.  Moreover, large-scale troop redeployments 
intensified the fluidity of a situation already in a high degree of flux.222            
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On 9 May 1945, Seventh Army established the first American civilian internment 
enclosure (CIE) in Ludwigsburg at what had been Stalag 5A.  Reserve material and 
equipment that had been staged there by the German Army facilitated initial supply and 
repairs of the camp.  The local Bürgermeister (mayor) was tasked to provide food as well as 
labor for set-up, which included establishing a camp dispensary, hospital, sewing and tailor 
shop, shoe repair shop, laundry, and kitchen.223  The camp received 37 prisoners upon 
officially opening, but before month’s end was already pushing its capacity of 2500.  
Administration, internee processing and guard duties were assigned to units from the 67th 
Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion, initially assisted by two members of the Provost 
Marshall staff.  In addition, an on-site counter-intelligence team was tasked with 
interrogating internees, making recommendations regarding release, and assessing security.  
According to the Provost Marshall reports, prisoners were segregated and separate facilities 
established for women, POWs, and counter-intelligence arrestees.  As of 24 May the camp 
held 21 POWs and 2445 counter-intelligence arrestees, of whom 113 were women.  Three 
days later, a second enclosure was opened in very close proximity with a capacity of 3500.224   
With the exception of a camp roughly 70 miles away at the Sedan Kaserne in Ulm, 
which began operations on 4 June 1945 and was closed shortly thereafter, Seventh Army 
officials concentrated initial efforts to establish CIEs in and around Ludwigsburg.  Early 
acquisitions included the Flak Kaserne with an expected capacity of 8,000; a prison that 
would also house a Central Records Branch to assist in tracking down specific individuals; 
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and—in nearby Kornwestheim—the former Hindenberg Kaserne, where an enclosure 
designated for SS troops was opened on 16 June.  With the mid-month redeployment of 
Ninth Army, however, Seventh Army also assumed responsibility for three enclosures to the 
north of Frankfurt:  Schwarzenborn, Ziegenhain, and Ohlendorf.  One of the first tasks in this 
northern area was to evacuate detainees from Ohlendorf once the establishment of zonal 
boundaries placed it in Russian occupied territory.  In July, Seventh Army acquired the 
fortress at Hohenasperg, just to the west of Ludwigsburg, to detain diplomatic internees.225  
The American spiral toward a more thoroughgoing use of arrest and internment was 
formalized at the Allied policy level in early August 1945 by the Potsdam communiqué, 
which established denazification as a key component of the quadripartite program designed 
to initially punish and eventually rehabilitate Germany.  The characterization of the vigorous 
use of arrests as having derived from policy put forth at Potsdam, however, would suggest a 
linear relationship that simply was not the case.   In order to gain some level of agreement, 
the principles laid out at Potsdam were necessarily kept very general; the stipulations related 
to arrests effectively echoed residual SHAEF and existing American policies.226  Moreover, 
events that took place immediately before and after Potsdam underscore that the USGCC had 
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already recognized the need to make significant adjustments to arrest policies amid a theater-
level effort to regroup.  These changes began as early as July 1945, in the weeks leading up 
to Operation TALLY HO.  Clay reported to Hilldring that there were no indications of 
anticipated popular resistance.  With roughly 75,000 individuals already detained in 
accordance with black lists and arrest directives, he stressed the program’s size and 
complexity and advised Hilldring that the wheels were in motion to train “reliable German 
personnel to assist in screening.”227   
Speaking at a Military Government Conference in Frankfurt on 27 August 1945, 
Sheen, by this time Chief of the USGCC CI Branch, admitted the difficulty in ascertaining 
the total number of individuals within the zone who were subject to automatic arrest, citing 
“the large shifts of population” that had occurred in the latter stages of active combat, and the 
fact that estimates were based on positions rather than persons and therefore could not 
account for overlap.  “However,” he continued, “the figure of 600,500 might be given as the 
total arrestable positions in all of Germany.  We estimate about 1/3 of these are in the U.S. 
Zone, or 200,200.  The largest single arrestable category included in the overall figure is that 
of Nazi Party Officials, which is almost 50% of the total.  Nazi Party officials are arrestable 
down to and including the Amtsleiter (department heads) at Ortsgruppe level.”  Sheen 
reported that weekly arrests had begun to taper off, but emphasized that a new influx of 
civilian internees would be generated by release and subsequent re-internment of POWs 
subject to automatic arrest categories.228   
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Third Army G-2 reports clearly indicate the extent to which personnel shortages 
hampered American ability to screen large numbers of internees.  By the end of August, 
counter-intelligence screening staffs were operating at five civilian internment camps in 
Third Army’s area of responsibility:  Camp #4, Hersbruck; Camp #5, Natternburg; Camp #6, 
Moosburg; Camp #8 Garmisch-Partenkirchen; and Camp #9, Hammelburg.  Each team, 
however, was significantly below the headquarters designated level of at least 24 personnel 
(5 officers/19 enlisted).  With ten personnel, in fact, Hammelburg and Hersbruck, were at 
less than half strength.  The two camps with the largest screening staffs, Natternburg and 
Moosburg, each had only 14 personnel assigned.  According to the August 1945 report, the 
shortage of interrogators and typists “remained the greatest single obstacle to the efficient 
functioning of Counter-intelligence Screening Staffs.”229    
Against the backdrop of an increasingly taxed logistical network, USFET officials 
sought to situate civilian internment within a burgeoning landscape of differing camps.  In 
late August and early September, a directive that circulated through USFET G-5, G-4, G-1, 
and JA (Legal) channels sought to clarify civilian internees’ status: 
Civilian internees are civilians detained for security or policy reasons without being 
charged with a specific offense and without trial.  The principal class detained in 
Germany at present consists of persons in the mandatory arrest categories of JCS 
1067 by reason of Nazi affiliations or official positions held…Persons held for 
investigation with a view to trial on specific charges are not civilian internees, 
although they may become so.  There have never been any specific requirements of 
international law with respect to their rations or living conditions…Notwithstanding 
the language of FM 27-10 par. 76g, civilian internees are not considered Prisoners of 
War in the sense of the Geneva Convention, but they have been considered by the 
U.S. Government to be entitled to substantially similar treatment.230 
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Such attempts to clarify policy are indicative of theater-level efforts to get out in front 
of developments, but they do not convey the concerted push still underway at the Army level 
and below to establish internee camps amid the flood of arrests.  Over the next several 
months within the Western Military District, for example, Seventh Army officials established 
a substantial network of camps, prisons and hospitals specifically designated for civilian 
internees (Table 2).  Yet, beneath the surface of this apparent progress, lay a number of 
vexing problems that not only concerned Seventh Army, USFET and Military Government 
officials alike, but also made it quite apparent that it would take some time to overcome the 
effects of lagging behind arrests.  This realization quickly became a prominent motif in 
reports sent through Provost Marshall, Counter-intelligence, and Public Safety channels.  An 
October counterintelligence inspection of arrest operations within the zone, for example, 
determined that because of a very large backlog of unprocessed detainees who had yet to be 
“properly documented by Fragebogen or arrest reports,” it was unclear how many internees 
were actually in the by-now-overcrowded camps.231     
 
Table 2:  Western Military District Civilian Internment Camps (as of 31 Dec 45) 
Administering Unit Station Designation Location Remarks 
13 FOB Internee Prison No. 1 Ludwigsburg  
630 TD Bn Internee Prison No. 2 Schwäbisch Hall  
13 FOB Internee Camp No. 71 Ludwigsburg  
68 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 72 Ludwigsburg  
141 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 73 Kornwestheim  
127 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 74 Ludwigsburg  
141 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 75 Kornwestheim  
13 FOB Internee Camp No. 76 Asperg Diplomatic Internees 
68 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 77 Ludwigsburg Women 
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Administering Unit Station Designation Location Remarks 
68 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 78 Zuffenhausen War Crimes 
62 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 79 Bruchsal  
256 FA Bn Internee Camp No. 80 Ulm  
142 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 92  Schwarzenborn  
142 AAA Bn Internee Camp No. 95 Ziegenhain  
401 FA Bn Internee Camp No. 98 Rockenburg  
401 FA Bn Internee Camp No. 99 Butzbach  
547 FA Bn Internee Hospital No. 1 Ludwigsburg  
62 AAA Bn Internee Hospital No. 2 Karlsruhe  
630 TD Bn Internee Hospital No. 4 Bad Mergentheim  
Source:  Final Report, Seventh US Army, Part I, G-1 Section, Annex J Provost Marshall, NARA RG 338 Records of US 
Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations, Seventh Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Final 
Reports 1944-1946, Box 1, 7th Army G-1 Reports 30 November-31 December to G-1 Section: Annex M August 1945-
March 1946, F:  G-1 Section: Annex J May 1945-March 1946. 
 
Even as the push to establish camps was ongoing, a series of closely scrutinized 
events in Bavaria during the summer and fall of 1945 highlighted differing American 
perspectives regarding denazification in general and civilian internment in particular.  After 
appointed Governor Fritz Schäffer came under scrutiny for pre-war anti-democratic political 
activities as a leading member of the Bavarian People’s Party, questions arose regarding the 
backgrounds of several members of his administration.232  In September, newspaper 
reporters, including the New York Times’ Raymond Daniell, questioned Bavaria’s Military 
Governor, General George S. Patton about the situation.  Daniell quoted Patton, who had 
recently suggested to Clay in a staff meeting that civilian internees be released, as comparing 
Nazi Party activities to “a Democrat and Republican election fight” in the United States.   In 
the wake of the ensuing “Patton and Schäffer affairs,” which intensified public interest in 
how military government authorities were handling former Nazis, military government Law 
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No. 8 was passed to strengthen denazification in private enterprise.233  This law barred Nazi 
Party members from being employed in “any capacity other than common labor.”  Soon 
thereafter, USFET Headquarters initiated a “special 24-hour sweep,” designated Operation 
CHESTERFIELD, to re-apprehend one of the lowest-ranking and largest groups affected by 
automatic arrest, the Ortsgruppenleiter, whose recent unauthorized release by Patton’s Third 
Army, as Ziemke described it, appeared incongruous with widespread dismissals of “their 
presumably less implicated comrades.”234   
Although brought about by disagreements over denazification’s sweeping scope, this 
series of events also underscores the lack of mechanisms for effecting releases from civilian 
internment.  In this case unwilling to release the Ortsgruppenleiter, American officials were 
nevertheless becoming increasingly concerned over the number of Germans who had been 
arrested on “technical grounds,” and with instituting elements of due process.  More tellingly, 
they worried that gathering together former Nazis in isolation might reignite resistance to 
Allied occupation or endanger nascent reform efforts, which were beginning to move at a fast 
clip.235  The cumulative effect of automatic arrest categories, carried out in an environment of 
thoroughgoing denazification, was quite significant.  On 13 October, Clay reported that 
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roughly 80,000 Germans were being held, not including members of the Waffen SS and 
security police forces currently detained as POWs, which would potentially double this 
figure.236  On 15 October 1945, for example, of the 4,811 internees in Garmisch-
Partenkirchen, 243 were considered “security threats,” 37 had appeared on the “black” list, 
23 had been arrested for various unspecified reasons, and 8 were being held on suspicion of 
having committed war crimes.  The remaining 4,500 fell under automatic arrest criteria.237    
 
‘Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism’:  The Case of Greater Hesse 
American authorities at the theater level began to grapple with the indiscriminate 
nature of arrests as early as the fall of 1945.238  On 26 October—the same day that OMGUS 
Public Safety estimated that 90,107 arrestees were in custody—USFET issued blanket 
instructions that detainees be informed within 24 hours of the grounds for arrest and 
permitted to notify their next of kin (or a designated representative) of their whereabouts.  
Murphy advised the Secretary of State that this was intended to correct circumstances in 
which many relatives had been kept in the dark for weeks and months regarding the 
whereabouts of arrestees.  He attributed this in part to the “high degree of secrecy necessary 
during the early stages of the occupation,” but acknowledged, “over-zealousness” on the part 
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of some arresting authorities.  “It had begun to invite comparison,” he elaborated, “between 
our methods and those of the Gestapo and other autocratic police agencies and was also 
operating against our interests in creating sympathy for the arrested persons and their 
families.”  Murphy stressed that he and Clay had “intervened energetically in changing a 
practice which had gone so far as to be an abuse and which we felt was not in the American 
tradition.  Alleviation of the treatment of the arrested individual was a consideration with us 
only to the extent of meeting what we believed to be the ordinary standards of humanity.”239  
Prompted in large part by the need to drastically reduce manpower by early 1946, 
American authorities made a number of organizational adjustments in the fall of 1945 that 
were also part of a broader trajectory toward greater German involvement in the postwar 
transformation.  In keeping with Clay’s determination, as he later recalled, to “restore 
political government from the ground up,” on 19 September Eisenhower signed the 
proclamation officially establishing three states in American occupied Germany.  The state of 
Greater Hesse, unlike its counterparts to the south (Bavaria and Württemberg-Baden), was 
essentially constructed by American decree.  The decision to consolidate Land Hessen with 
the Prussian province of Hesse-Nassau was, however, based on German officials’ advice and 
derived from pre-1933 efforts to combine these territories.240  Special Adviser to Clay, James 
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K. Pollock, wrote that factors such as allocation of Hessian territory to the French and 
destruction of the former provincial capital of Kassel also led to the consolidation.241  
On 1 October 1945, American forces took the first of several steps toward 
establishing the separate Military Government chain-of-command that Clay had long since 
envisioned.  USGCC became the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) and 
USFET G-5 was redesignated the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone).  On 5 October 
1945, military government detachments at the Land level and below were instructed to begin 
a phased pull back from directly supervising nascent local governments.242  Moreover, to 
facilitate the initial stages of German self-government, community level detachments were 
transformed into “Security and Liaison” teams.  These elements were not to issue 
instructions, but instead charged with keeping tabs on local developments, in some cases for 
more than one area.  The conduit for American guidance was restricted to newly established 
Land offices of military government and appointed German state officials, who were to 
promulgate orders to districts, rural counties and cities.243  On 8 October 1945, the Office of 
Military Government for Greater Hesse (OMGH), led by Lieutenant Colonel James R. 
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Newman, replaced the existing E-5 detachment.  Roughly one week later, Newman installed 
Professor Karl Geiler as Hessian Minister President.244   
As the above suggests, when USFET granted executive, legislative, and judicial 
authority to German officials, it was to each individual Land.  The Länderrat (Council of 
States) consisting of the Minister Presidents, and with a permanent secretariat in Stuttgart, 
was also established in October 1945 to coordinate matters on a zonal basis.  Once operating, 
roughly 14 committees and 46 subcommittees considered a variety of common issues, 
ranging from food shortages, labor supply and education.  Clay noted that, “Although the 
Länderrat was not given executive authority, its agreements, when approved by Military 
Government, could be issued as decrees in each state by its minister president.”  The 
responsibility for supervising the Länderrat on behalf of Military Government rested with the 
Regional Government Coordinating Office, directed by Pollock.245        
Measures toward increasing German involvement in denazification also moved very 
quickly.  On 29 October 1945, the Chicago Daily Tribune announced that, “Long-range 
success or failure of the rigorous American denazification policies in western Germany was 
authoritatively described tonight as resting primarily with German review boards set up to 
‘rectify errors and injustices.’”  The boards consisted of at least three Germans authorized to 
consider appeals of those affected by Military Government Law No. 8.  This system had been 
instituted roughly three weeks earlier, prompting the establishment of hundreds of panels 
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throughout the zone.246  In November, USFET directed the Commanding Generals of the 
Eastern and Western Military Districts to establish procedures “for the semi-judicial review” 
of arrest cases, except those involving “charges of violating Military Government or German 
laws; individuals (other than Germans) subject to U.S. Military law; individuals being held as 
POWs; German General Staff Corps Officers; German Intelligence Services personnel; and 
the German Secret Police.”  The directive also required immediate establishment of separate 
German and Military Government Security Review Boards charged with examining 
individual cases to determine whether internees were being incorrectly held.  In addition, all 
internees, excluding those identified above, were to be notified of their right to request that 
the specifics of his or her case be examined.  “It is the policy of this headquarters,” the 
directive read, “that any persons whose cases on review are determined to be entitled to 
release, shall be promptly discharged from custody.”247   
Meetings between Geiler and his cabinet members suggest a distinct awareness of the 
difficulties associated with translating individual review policies into practice.  Their 
concerns come through quite clearly, for example, in the official record of the session on 6 
December 1945.  After highlighting the need to sort through American guidance regarding 
consolidation of German civil government in the American zone, Geiler asked Minister of 
Justice Georg August Zinn to prepare a brief statement (in English) explaining how Greater 
Hesse planned to approach the review of arrest cases.  Zinn replied that four central offices 
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would be established for that purpose in Wiesbaden, Frankfurt am Main, Darmstadt, and 
Kassel.  He emphasized, however, that the fact arrests had been carried out by military 
government order, coupled with the general lack of information regarding internees, left 
German officials “in a very difficult position.”  Zinn also noted that American authorities 
became “aggravated” when he tried to broach the subject with them.248   
Clay later wrote that as the year drew to a close, OMGUS officials had not only 
considered the need to establish the mechanisms necessary for processing internee cases, but 
also fully recognized the need for German involvement:  
By the end of 1945 there were in our zone alone more than 100,000 Nazis, classified 
as dangerous under our definitions, in internment camps under guard.  There was no 
law to govern their trials and it was against our tradition to hold them indefinitely 
without trial.  It was clear that American tribunals could not be established, since we 
had been able to secure competent personnel for the smaller Nuremberg and Dachau 
trials only with great difficulty.249 
 
In December 1945, Clay requested and received authority to limit mandatory arrest to 
active members of those organizations being tried by International Tribunal, threats to 
security and those whom evidence implicated in war crimes.  He further requested to release 
detainees who were not within these categories.250  Less than a week later, Major W.L. 
Powers of OMGUS Public Safety Branch submitted an informal report to the Chief, Internal 
Affairs and Communications Division detailing his visit to the enclosures in the Seventh 
Army area of responsibility (AOR), which at the time held an estimated total of 48,000 
civilian internees.  His impressions confirm that although internees were classified according 
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to whether they were being held in connection with war crimes cases, as security threats, or 
due to automatic arrest criteria—in practice, the lines between the second and third groups 
had become blurred.  Powers described the term ‘security threat’ as ‘very elastic,’ and noted 
that at least some members of the Seventh Army CI section had used an expansive definition 
in which every automatic arrest was perceived as necessary in order to avoid a danger to the 
occupation.  His remarks suggest that this view differed quite substantially with the “normal” 
conception among Public Safety Branch personnel, who defined a security threat as someone 
“in a position to sabotage our occupation in some respect, and whose record indicates he is 
the kind of person who might resort to violent and concrete methods.”251    
By late 1945, the quadripartite Allied Control Council (ACC) began issuing 
coordinated denazification policies, providing directives that Allied authorities would use not 
only to legitimize their own programs, but as a foundation for launching criticisms across the 
fault line that had begun to form between east and west.  ACC Law No. 10 (20 December 
1945) provided the definitions that would be used as the legal basis for prosecution of war 
criminals under the International Military Tribunal.252  ACC Directive No. 24 (12 January 
1946) provided specific guidelines for denazification, to include determining whether 
individuals were to be treated as “more than nominal participants in Party activities” and/or 
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as “hostile to Allied purposes.”253  In tandem with the organizational measures described 
above, Clay took steps in early 1946 to speed up the process of democratization, thereby 
making a significant tack away from the past-looking punitive approach that had thus far 
characterized American occupation policy toward a forward-looking rehabilitative approach.  
Convinced that practical experience was necessary in order to effectively impart democracy, 
he decided to hold local German elections by January and pushed for the drafting of state 
constitutions one month later.  In February, a revised mandatory arrest directive reduced the 
number of automatic arrest and detention categories (Table 3).254 
Table 3:  February 1946 Amended Automatic Arrest Categories   
Title Amplifying Information Remarks 
Gestapo All personnel Not including personnel such as typists, 
messengers, chauffeurs, charwomen, 
confidential agents (V-Leute; V-
Männer), or petty unpaid informers.  
SD All personnel Not including personnel such as typists, 
messengers, chauffeurs, charwomen, 
confidential agents (V-Leute; V-
Männer), or petty unpaid informers. 
Para-Military Organizations Waffen-SS 
 
 
 
 
Allgemeine SS 
 
 
 
Sturmabteilung 
Officers and NCOs down to/including 
the rank of Scharführer, all ranks of 
Totenkopfverbände, and all SS-
Helferinnen or SS-Kriegshelferinnen 
 
Officers and NCOs down to/including 
the rank of Unterscharführer and all SS-
Helferinnen or SS-Kriegshelferinnen 
 
All officers down to and including the 
rank of Sturmbannführer 
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Title Amplifying Information Remarks 
Nazi Party Leadership Corps Administrative officials down to 
and including Amtsleiter at Kreis 
level and all Ortsgruppenleiter 
 
All party members down to and 
including the rank of 
Obergemeinschaftsleiter 
 
Reich Cabinet Including those who at any time 
since 30 January 1933 have been: 
 
Reich Ministers, with or without 
portfolio (the heads of departments 
or Ministries of the Central 
Government); State Ministers 
acting as Reich Ministers; and 
other officials entitled to take part 
in meetings of the “Ordinary 
Cabinet.” 
 
Members of the Council of 
Ministers for the Defense of the 
Reich 
 
Members of the Secret Cabinet 
Council 
 
General Staff and High Command All individuals who were either 
Army or Air Force General Staff 
Corps Officers at any time, and 
all individuals who held the 
following appointments between 
February 1938 and May 1945: 
 
Commander in Chief of the Navy 
 
Chief of Naval War Staff 
 
Commander in Chief of the Army 
 
Chief of the General Staff of the 
Army 
 
Commander in Chief of the Air 
Force 
 
Chief of the General Staff of the 
Air Force 
 
Chief of the High Command of the 
Armed Forces 
 
Chief of the Operations Staff of the 
High Command of the Armed 
Forces 
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Title Amplifying Information Remarks 
Deputy Chief of the Operations 
Staff of the High Command of the 
Armed Forces 
 
Commanders-in-Chief in the Field 
with status of Oberbefehlshaber of 
the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air 
Force 
War Criminals Individuals identified by the UN 
War Crimes Commission; on any 
other official list of War Criminals; 
or against whom specific evidence 
of participation in atrocities or war 
crimes is available. 
 
Security Suspects Cases in which reasonable grounds 
exist to believe that continued 
freedom would endanger the 
security of the occupation forces or 
objectives of military government. 
 
Source:  HQ USFET letter, signed L.S. Ostrander, “Arrest and Detention – Germany,” 2 February 1946, NARA RG 260, 
OMGUS, Records of the Legal Division, Prisons Branch, Administrative Records, 1945-1949, Box 139, F:  Spruchkammer. 
 
 
By March 1946, Clay privately advised Hilldring that he was about to approve a law 
turning a substantial amount of responsibility for denazification over to local authorities, 
explaining “With 10,000 people I couldn’t do the job of denazification.  It’s got to be done 
by the Germans.”255    Clay’s insistence on transferring the process had both practical and 
ideological components.  Experience had clearly shown that National Socialism could not be 
quickly isolated and surgically removed from German society.  Instead, its eradication would 
necessarily be the result of a more long term and painstaking process in which German 
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officials were to play a very direct role.256  Indeed, under Pollock’s guidance, representatives 
from the three Länder were actively involved in developing the legislation Clay described.257   
With the “Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism,” enacted on 5 
March 1946, denazification assumed a highly bureaucratic nature for which it has been 
understandably criticized.  The law led to the creation in each state of an extensive apparatus 
under the direction of the Minister for Political Liberation and responsible for administering 
the program.  All Germans over the age of 18 were required to submit a registration form, 
known as the Meldebogen, detailing their political, financial and occupational histories 
during the Nazi period.  Public prosecutors at more than 400 tribunals, or Spruchkammern, 
were tasked with sifting through a staggering number of cases, to separate those subject to 
the provisions of the law from those who were not, and, in the case of the former, to prefer 
charges using a framework based on ACC Law No. 24.  The Liberation Law also enumerated 
a detailed gradation of sanctions to be levied upon respondents depending upon the outcome 
of their proceedings and once they were classified according to degree of incrimination as:  
Major Offenders, Offenders, Lesser Offenders, Followers, or Persons Exonerated.258 
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Largely due to the time needed to fill out and process Meldebogen, tribunal 
operations did not start immediately after promulgation of the law.  During the latter half of 
April, while each Land staffed its respective Ministry for Political Liberation, representatives 
of all three met in Stuttgart to draft the Durchführungsverordnungen, or implementing 
orders, needed to carry out the Law’s provisions.  In practice, Lieutenant Colonel Fritz 
Oppenheimer and Major M. Keith Wilson, representing Military Government, played 
prominent roles in penning these instructions, which were later officially put into effect by 
the minister presidents, in their collective capacity as Denazification Committee of the 
Länderrat.259  On 9 May 1946, Geiler informed his cabinet of Clay’s announcement during a 
meeting in Stuttgart, that in conjunction with the broader denazification program, German 
authorities were to assume full responsibility for civilian internment camps.260  The one such 
camp in Greater Hessen was a massive compound located on the outskirts of Darmstadt.  
Civilian Internment Enclosure 91 at Darmstadt was, by far, the largest in the zone. 
Located roughly 15 miles south of Frankfurt am Main along a road used to travel to and from 
the Autobahn, the 457,000 square meter compound was essentially grafted onto a handful of 
useable buildings at a small Kaserne heavily damaged by air raids.  After gaining control of 
the site, Army authorities equipped it with tents in order to quickly ramp up its capacity and 
house a large influx of first POWs, and later, civilian internees.261  Double strands of barbed 
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wire, along which several guard towers were strategically and prominently placed, cordoned 
off the area from outside access.  Barbed wire also physically separated five internal sectors, 
designated camps 1 through 5, and restricted freedom of movement within the larger 
enclosure.  Amid the sea of two- and four-pole tents used to house internees, an assortment of 
more permanent structures—stone buildings, wooden and steel barracks, and Nissen huts—
served a variety of purposes.  These facilities included, for example, various administration 
buildings, three hospitals, a motor pool, several workshops, a post office, and two theaters.262 
Conditions in the enclosure reflected the dearth of basic necessities that had become 
central to life on both sides of the barbed wire, although access to United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) supplies, including food and clothing, alleviated 
some of the shortages.  In general, tents were inadequately heated, poorly lit, and lacked 
proper bedding.263  The average internee age in the summer of 1946 was 43:  the youngest 
born in 1929, the oldest in 1869.  While all but one of the intervening years (1871) was 
represented, the majority of internees were born between 1890 and 1913, with the greatest 
concentrations clustered around the turn of the century and 1910.  Fifteen broad occupational 
categories were represented in the camp (Table 4); however, nearly half (45.9%) of the 
internees fell under the categories of salaried employees, independent businessmen, and 
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middle- and lower-grade civil servants.264  The figures show the concentration on the upper 
ranks of both government and business, complemented by the middle class, but relatively 
few workers and a surprising amount of farmers.      
 
Table 4:  CIE 91 Population Break Down by Occupation 
Category Number Percentage 
Higher-grade Civil Servants [Höhere Beamte] 1155 5.6% 
Middle-grade Civil Servants [Mittlere Beamte] 3644 17.6% 
Lower-grade Civil Servants [Untere Beamte] 941 4.5% 
Salaried Employees [Angestellte] 3624 17.5% 
Independent Businessmen [selbst. Kaufleute] 1305 6.3% 
Manufacturers [Industrielle] 137 0.7% 
Tradesmen [Handwerker] 1826 9% 
Craftsmen/Technicians [Facharbeiter] 2153 10.4% 
Semi-skilled Workers [Angel. Arbeiter] 466 2.1% 
Common Laborers [Ungel. Arbeiter] 193 0.9% 
Farmers [Landwirte] 2373 11.4% 
Free Professions [Freie Berufe] 1516 7.2% 
Career Soldiers [Berufssoldaten] 458 2.2% 
Students/University Students [Schüler u. Stud.] 430265 2.1% 
Miscellaneous [Sonst. Berufe] 521 2.5% 
Total 20,742 100% 
Source:  Berufsgliederung, CIE Darmstadt, 20.6.46 in HHStA 522/488 
 
 
By July 1946, CIE 91’s population was roughly 18,000—just over half identified as 
US zone residents.  Along with other parts of Germany, the remainder came from a variety of 
areas, such as Austria, Brazil, Japan, the United States, Egypt, and Russia (Table 5).266   
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Table 5:  CIE 91 Population Break Down by Zones 
Location Number of Internees 
Russian Zone 1,749 
British Zone 3,673 
French Zone 1,022 
American Zone 9,722 
Berlin District 261 
Non-German 1,670 
Total 18,097 
Source:  CIE 91, Zonen-Aufgliederung, 21 July 1946 in HHStA 521/90 
 
During the latter part of August, the total population hovered just above 16,000.  The average 
internee weight was roughly 136.47 pounds, or 61.9 kilograms.  Individual calorie intakes 
were closely regulated and varied depending on activity level and state of health.  During the 
period from 23 to 29 August, for example, on average non-working internees were provided 
1,792 calories.  Workers received 2,423 while hospital patients and the undernourished 
(Unterernährte) were given 2,596 and 2,597 calories, respectively.267  
Internees were organized into an extensive and very detailed camp self-administration 
(Lagerselbstverwaltung), a highly regulated system that, while infused with the most basic 
mechanics of democracy, was fundamentally a mechanism for communication and control.268  
For the individual internee, daily life centered on his assigned tent, each of which elected an 
Elder (Zeltälteste) and was grouped into increasingly larger units known as Communities 
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(Gemeinde) and Districts (Bezirk).  The latter sent elected representatives (Vertreter) to one 
of the camp’s two assemblies (Gemeinderat), the members of which in turn elected the other 
assembly (Stadtrat).  An appointed “Lord Mayor” (Oberbürgermeister) resided at the top of 
the camp self-administration.269   
The strict rules that governed daily life offer a glimpse into the clear predominance of 
hierarchical practices in the camp, reinforced by requirements such as calling an area to 
attention upon sighting an American officer and the need to advise the Tent Elder of one’s 
destination prior to leaving one’s assigned tent.  In addition to not being permitted to exit the 
camp except under American guard, internees were not to approach the barbed wire, speak 
with civilians outside the camp, or receive any unapproved forms of communication.  The 
tightly controlled routine included multiple daily head-counts.  Those who committed 
infractions were subject to punishment imposed by a court known as the Lagergericht, one of 
several internee-staffed administrative organs that also included, for example, “culture” and 
“media” departments (Kulturabteilung; Abteilung Presse).270 
Internees carried out two key initiatives while under American administration that not 
only helped break up the tedium, but quickly became a central part of daily camp life:  the 
establishment of a structured system of courses referred to as the “camp university” 
(Lageruniversität), and a camp newspaper, known as “Die Bergstrasse.”  The former was 
organized under the self-administration’s Kulturreferat, had an internee-staffed 
administrative apparatus (Rektor, Prorektor und Senat), and offered a curriculum that ranged 
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from the humanities and sciences to more vocationally oriented subjects.  Classes were 
taught primarily in a cluster of steel barracks on the eastern side of the compound by several 
broadly-ranged faculties:  theology, law, medicine, language and cultural studies, economics, 
engineering, natural sciences, forestry, agriculture, music and theater, pictorial art, and 
sports.  A detailed overview of course offerings for the summer semester 1946—featured as a 
two-page spread in Die Bergstrasse—provides insight into the university’s scope.  Those 
interested in language and cultural studies, for example, could choose from among 54 
courses including Spanish, French, Construction and History of the English Language, and 
Geothe’s Faust.271  Weekly participant hours for June, July and August 1946, which reached 
84,000; 94,000; and 87,000 evidences the university’s impact in the camp.272   
The newspaper, which was printed in the nearby Stars and Stripes plant in Pfungstadt 
and vetted through the CI staff, fell under the media department.  In addition to delving into 
issues that were of particular concern to internees, it offered rundowns of ongoing economic 
and political developments outside the camp.   As the next chapter will demonstrate, in late 
August 1946 this included, for example, an update on the Nuremberg Trials, with particular 
emphasis on proceedings against those National Socialist organizations indicted as criminal.  
In the meantime, internees also followed preparations for the establishment of tribunal 
operations, not to mention circumstances related to the camp’s handover, very closely.   
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Conclusion 
In undertaking the occupation of Germany, American military forces did not know 
whether or to what extent they would encounter opposition.  While security and 
transformation were both overriding goals, the former clearly took precedence during the 
months initially following German surrender.  As they assessed the situation, however, and 
began to encounter what Hans Woller has described as the “decisive domestic political 
condition” for change—in other words, a German society vastly different from 1933 or 
1938—the Americans adjusted their approach significantly.273  The alterations to arrest 
policies that began in the fall of 1945, while also driven by logistical concerns, thus offer a 
means by which to chart the transition from a past-looking punitive occupation strategy 
toward one that was forward-looking and rehabilitative.  The kernels of this change are 
discernible at the theater policy level as early as Clay’s July 1945 conversation with Hilldring 
in which he described the complexities associated with eradicating Nazism and emphasized 
the need for German involvement, a point that he reiterated the following spring. 
In mid-January 1946, Clay’s correspondence with Hilldring indicated that 
circumstances surrounding passage of ACC Directive No. 24 had prompted him to take stock 
of occupation policies.  This is illustrated, for example, by his view that based on the 
“quadripartite agreement on exclusion from office, and with recent approved modifications in 
mandatory arrests,” further adjustments to JCS 1067 were no longer necessary.  Moreover, 
“in spite of handicaps” in the operation of essential services such as transportation and 
communication resulting from mandatory removal provisions in JCS 1067, Clay wrote “we 
believe that our prompt action in removal of Nazis has speeded up the application of 
                                                 
273
 Hans Woller, “Germany in Transition from Stalingrad (1943) to Currency Reform (1948)” in America and 
the Shaping of German Society, 1945-1955, ed. Michael Ermath (Oxford, 2003), 32-33. 
  130
democratic processes in Germany and will result in stronger organizations at an earlier date 
than would have been obtained by a more gradual release of Nazis.”274 
The period from mid-1945 to the fall of 1946 represented a major pivot in US 
occupation policy for several reasons.  First—albeit successively and after a significant 
amount of wrangling—American authorities succeeded in transitioning from a tactical 
fighting structure to a centrally commanded occupation force.  This newly installed 
organization was not only intended to facilitate the transition from military to civilian 
control, but also designed to promote coordination between Military Government and 
German state officials.  Second, during this period, in addition to dismantling remaining 
vestiges of the Third Reich, American forces began to take decisive steps toward enabling 
German officials to lay democratic foundations.  Clay’s remarks suggest the extent to which 
measures such as civilian internment contributed to reaching this point by inhibiting Nazism 
at a critical juncture.  Third, Military Government authorities had recognized the need not 
only to move away from wide scale arrests, but to also institute elements of due process.   
The broad-brush approach to arrests, while it had provided security and opened the 
space in which democracy might take root, was no longer tenable.  Indeed, it had created a 
jumble of unintended consequences for which American authorities were clearly ill equipped.  
With the Law for Liberation, denazification assumed a highly bureaucratic nature for which 
the program has been understandably criticized.  In spite of its many faults, however, the 
directive nevertheless provided a necessary framework for moving forward—one in which 
responsibility for their own rehabilitation became the fundament of reintegrating Germans. 
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Chapter 3:   
 
‘NO KNOWLEDGE ATROCITIES WERE PERPETRATED’:  INTERNMENT AT 
THE HEIGHT OF MILITARY OCCUPATION, AUGUST 1946-JANUARY 1947 
 
 
 In late August 1946, amid varied reports of recent happenings in and beyond 
Darmstadt, CIE 91’s internee produced camp newspaper, Die Bergstrasse, featured a 
succinct update on the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg.  The courtroom’s 
prevailing atmosphere had recently changed, the article noted, as proceedings against high 
profile defendants including Hermann Goering, all of whom displayed “a striking weariness” 
(auffällige Müdigkeit), appeared to be drawing to a close.  The impending individual 
judgments on these accused Nazi leaders captivated much of the worldwide reading public; 
although not explicitly stated, the article’s summary of the declaratory judgment filed against 
seven Nazi organizations held much more immediate ramifications for civilian internees.   
The IMT had been asked to declare that the SS, SD, Gestapo, Leadership Corps of the Nazi 
Party, Reich Cabinet, SA, and both the General Staff and High Command of the German 
Armed Forces be considered criminal.275 
While the full scope and impact of such a finding for those individuals still held in 
Allied civilian internment enclosures were as yet unclear, the organizational indictments in 
some way affected roughly 6 million Germans.   Indeed, “repeated broadcasts and press 
reports,” explained that in response to IMT accusations a flood of statements had been 
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submitted from various quarters, including 25 camps located throughout the western 
occupied zones.  In general, these documents professed innocence and insisted that the bulk 
of indicted organizations’ members did not participate in the horrible crimes committed 
under the Third Reich.  A number of Gestapo functionaries, for example, claimed to have “no 
knowledge atrocities were perpetrated.”276   
No doubt wary of such sweeping statements, American Military Government and 
German authorities had by this time nevertheless begun to grapple with the quandary of how 
to strike a balance between past- and forward-looking aspects of the occupation.  In many 
ways, the Nuremberg trials thus represented the first wave of a concerted effort to both 
discredit the Nazi regime and to come to terms with its criminality.277  Clay’s correspondence 
with Major General Oliver P. Echols, who succeeded Hilldring as head of the Civil Affairs 
Division, illustrates that as the IMT moved toward completion of the high profile trials of 
those indicted as major war criminals, OMGUS had already conceptualized civilian 
internment as part of an integrated and multi-tiered approach to creating the environment for 
Germany’s transition from dictatorship to democracy.  As part of this strategy, American 
authorities would concentrate their direct activities on a select number of cases while German 
state officials were to assume a greater role in transformative efforts.  It would be difficult to 
ensure equity on a case-by-case basis.  Clay emphasized, however, that conducting trials 
within a democratic framework that was key:   
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We are proceeding under the denazification law in a systematic, orderly manner, but 
as of yet have not tried any offenders already under detention.  Of course, this law 
will not provide uniform punishment for all Nazis, any more than such a law would 
in the United States. However, it is applying the principles of individual trial and 
punishment according to the individual’s participation, which appear basic to 
democratic justice.  The Army will continue to try those cases involving specific 
atrocities or to turn over to the United Nations for trial those individuals who 
participated in such atrocities against citizens of the country in question.  Beyond 
that, we must limit our zonal trials in our courts to a comparatively few Nazis 
selected for notorious and prominent participation in Nazi activities.  This number 
must be in the hundreds and not thousands.  Our directive should make this possible 
and should recognize that mass trials will be conducted under the Law for Liberation 
from National Socialism.278  
  
 
While Clay’s remarks project an illusory aura of long-standing design, they clearly 
show that by the fall of 1946 American Military Government and German officials poised 
themselves to take on the challenge of determining complicity across a wide social spectrum.   
The “mass trials” he referred to would involve some high-ranking Nazi leaders, but be 
primarily directed at a much broader and more fundamental level.  Moreover, as repeatedly 
stressed by Clay and his closest advisers, under the Liberation Law the task of sorting 
through thousands of cases to establish individual degree of incrimination would be carried 
out by the German denazification machinery operating under OMGUS oversight.  This 
chapter traces the impact of these developments on the civilian internment program, most 
notably the transfer of camps to German authorities.  Focusing on the state of Hessen, it 
explores related coordination between state officials and the American Military Government; 
internee reactions to the prospect of the program being administered by German authorities; 
and Lagerspruchkammer (camp denazification tribunal) operations at Darmstadt.   
The transfer of enclosures to German authorities heralded an important transition in 
the relationship between occupier and occupied, one that as the previous chapter 
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demonstrated, had been incrementally underway for several months. As this chapter will 
show, civilian internment and the wider program of denazification were not only mechanisms 
aimed at changing Germany’s political culture, but coincidentally served as preliminary steps 
in the process of cultivating postwar relationships—in the first instance with the Americans, 
but more importantly, among Germans.  Close examination of the interactions between 
OMGH and Hessen officials, for example, reveals that while a framework for moving 
forward had been set in place in the form of the Liberation Law, the Americans were not 
fully comfortable with German readiness to implement the law’s provisions and effectively 
applied a standard of successive trust.  German authorities not only needed to be logistically 
able to take over, but also to actively participate.  How the program would proceed depended 
very heavily upon the ways in which the various Germans concerned—state officials, 
internees, and the public—would respond.  
 
‘Our Anger…must be Subject to the Law’:  Nürnberg’s Impact on Civilian Internment 
 “As you know, the program for turning over Civilian Internment Enclosures to the 
Germans for the detention of members of organizations found criminal at Nürnberg and as 
labor camps for those Germans sentenced to labor service by the Denazification 
Spruchkammer is just about complete.”  In a four-page internal POLAD memorandum, 
Erwin W. Wendt gave John J. Muccio a brief account of the road ahead roughly two months 
after the judgment at Nuremberg.  His high-level overview ranged from the anticipated 
follow-on trials of several hundred suspected war criminals to deliberations over how arrest 
categories should be modified in light of IMT verdicts; yet, it is the extent to which civilian 
internment had become intrinsically linked to the Nürnberg process from the perspective of 
  135
US policymakers that stands out most about Wendt’s update.279  The judgment played such a 
pivotal role in American policy that fully appreciating the changes organized around the 
trial’s outcome requires a basic understanding of the proceedings themselves.  
The IMT was part of an Allied effort to establish a uniform legal basis for prosecuting 
war criminals as well as those who, while not perpetrators themselves, had nevertheless been 
somehow complicit in Nazi brutalities.  As with many aspects of the occupation, this 
framework was successively developed and resulted from several rounds of negotiations, 
particularly after the fall of 1944 when the question of how to deal with those suspected of 
participating in atrocities under the Third Reich was discussed in greater detail within various 
policy circles.  Caught in the mêlée surrounding the Quebec Conference, planning for war 
crimes trials soon grew to be especially controversial once the realization that Allied victory 
had become more feasible was combined with increasingly specific knowledge of Nazi 
activities.  Moreover, for those who conceived of an international court to assign 
accountability, the sense of breaking new legal ground was closely intertwined with the grim 
determination not to repeat the mistakes of the post World War I Leipzig Trials.  According 
to prevailing belief, the few defendants actually brought to trial after the previous 
conflagration were judged much too lightly.280    
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Hoping to allay criticisms that the IMT had gone too far in attempting to prevent a 
recurrence of Leipzig, Henry L. Stimson wrote shortly after the main trial’s conclusion that 
the Nürnberg proceedings offered an important third way between the “unthinkable” option 
of releasing Nazi leaders and that of summary punishment.  The latter would most certainly 
have “satisfied the immediate requirements of the emotions,” he granted; yet recourse to such 
methods would have endangered the “moral position” of the Allies.  “Our anger,” he 
emphasized, “as righteous anger, must be subject to the law.”281  The main Four-Power trial 
against a select number of carefully chosen defendants and Nazi organizations was calculated 
to serve several largely representative purposes, including offering the measured opportunity 
for retribution; documenting Nazi Germany’s brutal crimes; and providing an example of the 
rule of law.282  It was followed by national proceedings in each of the zones, designed to 
punish criminality at various echelons within the Nazi administrative apparatus and in so 
doing to further unravel key institutions.283 
The 8 August 1945 Charter establishing the IMT was drafted in London following 
negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and the Provisional 
Government of the French Republic.284  Under the Charter’s provisions, the IMT was 
endowed with the power to try a cross section of Nazi leadership on the four counts of crimes 
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against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and “the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit all of these crimes.”285  It was this fourth charge that 
served as genesis for the organizational indictments described in Die Bergstrasse, which 
were announced at the same time that the identities of the twenty-four agreed upon individual 
defendants were released.286  The basis for charging the seven Nazi organizations stemmed 
from Article 9 of the Charter, which stipulated that: 
At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may 
declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that a 
group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal 
organization.287 
 
 
Significantly, Article 10 specified not only that individuals could later be tried by 
virtue of having been members, but also that any declaration of criminality against a given 
organization would be final and could not be challenged in subsequent proceedings: 
In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal the 
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring 
individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military, or occupation 
courts.  In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is 
considered proved and shall not be questioned.288 
  
In his 1992 recounting of the trials, Telford Taylor ascribed the main impetus for 
pursuing indictments against specific Nazi organizations to a member of the American 
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prosecution staff, Colonel Murray Bernays.  “His invocation of organizational responsibility 
did not broaden the concept of war crimes,” Taylor recalled, “but was a juridical device to 
eliminate the need to prove complicity of the individual members of the organizations, 
primarily the SS, which were responsible for many if not most of the crimes, by making 
membership itself sufficient proof of guilt.”289  In the view of the jurists who eventually 
implemented the Charter, however, the organizational judgments were not necessarily 
intended as a blanket establishment of individual culpability.  On the contrary, the IMT 
bounded the declaration’s applicability in two fundamental, but important ways, thereby 
establishing a basic litmus test that would be applied in later proceedings:  
Since the declaration with respect to the organizations and groups will, as has been 
pointed out, fix the criminality of its members, that definition should exclude persons 
who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those 
who were drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally 
implicated in the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as 
members of the organization.  Membership alone is not enough to come within the 
scope of these declarations.290 
 
After considering evidence that included thousands of affidavits, the IMT found four 
of the seven indicted organizations to be criminal:  the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, 
Gestapo, SD, and SS.291 The Tribunal took into account factors such as the number of 
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persons involved; the degree to which participation was voluntary; whether members 
consciously considered themselves part of a larger body arranged for a particular purpose; 
and the types of activities carried out.  Moreover, the IMT narrowed each organization down 
to those segments believed most implicated in the commission of criminal acts.  The 
Leadership Corps, for example, was defined in the judgment as leaders and chief 
administrators (Amtsleiter) at the Gau (regional), Kreis (district), and Ortsgruppe (local 
group) levels.292   The Tribunal excluded those “employed by the Gestapo for purely clerical, 
stenographic, janitorial, or similar unofficial routine tasks; and members of the border and 
customs protection (Zollgrenzschutz), which became part of the Gestapo in 1944.293   The 
bulk of the SD and SS fell under the judgment, with the exception of SD informers who were 
not also members of the SS, members of the Abwehr (intelligence service of the Wehrmacht) 
who had been transferred to the SD, and the Reiter-SS  (“so-called SS riding units,” which 
had essentially devolved into social associations).294   
While the remaining three groups were collectively exonerated, the Tribunal 
repeatedly stressed the presence within their ranks of members who should be tried 
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individually.  Owing to the Reich Cabinet’s small size and lack of organized activity after 
1937, for example, the IMT did not declare it to be criminal, but instead noted that cabinet 
members who were “involved in the conspiracy to make aggressive war…were involved as 
individuals.”  Similarly, although the Tribunal did not declare the General Staff and High 
Command of the German Armed forces to be criminal due to the small number of persons 
involved and because neither met the Charter’s definition of a “group” or “organization,” the 
IMT urged that, where warranted, those who fell in these categories nevertheless be tried.  
On the whole, the Tribunal characterized the SA as “a group of unimportant Nazi hangers-
on,” noting that the group had used a variety of violent methods to advance the Nazi Party’s 
agenda up until the mid-1934 purge, but was thereafter largely marginalized.295 
 As the above suggests, the practical effect of the Nürnberg judgments was not the 
immediate release of large numbers of internees.  Rather, it set the stage for new rounds of 
wide scale screening and eventual release of those who did not fall within one of the criminal 
organizations, provided they did not warrant continued detention on other grounds.  On 9 
October 1946, USFET issued guidance intended to further reduce the number of those being 
held in camps by prohibiting the use of the terms “security suspect” or “security threat” as a 
basis for arrests and making it clear that the terms were not to be associated with automatic 
arrest:  “Those internees now held as security suspects or threats will be immediately 
reclassified into another category and dealt with accordingly.  If no applicable category exists 
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and if there is insufficient evidence for trial under Ordinance No. 1, Military Government 
Regulations Title 23, or any pertinent law in effect, the individual will be released.”296 
 For former members of the four organizations deemed to be criminal, frustrations 
over the prospect of continued detention as civilian internees were likely overshadowed by 
questions regarding the possible sentences they might face.297  Well aware that ACC Law 
No. 10 left this issue “entirely in the discretion of the trial court even to the extent of 
inflicting the death penalty,” the Tribunal made a number of recommendations geared toward 
limiting and standardizing punishments for membership in a criminal group or organization.  
Most notably, the IMT suggested that ACC Law No. 10 be amended to align the maximum 
sentences with those put forth in the Liberation Law.298  In lieu of such a revision, however, 
the ACC adopted Directive No. 38, “The Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis 
and Militarists and the Internment, Control and Surveillance of Potentially Dangerous 
Germans.”  Echoing SHAEF and American arrest guidance, this directive distinguished 
between imprisonment for war crimes or criminal conduct “and internment of potentially 
dangerous persons who may be confined because their freedom would constitute a danger to 
the Allied cause.”  Article 1 put forth five classifications, which corresponded to those in the 
Liberation Law, to be used in determining individual degree of incrimination and imposing 
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sanctions:  Major Offenders, Offenders, Lesser Offenders, Followers and Persons 
Exonerated.299  Shortly after its promulgation, Clay described the directive to the War 
Department, indicating that it “was generally understood that it provided a uniform legal 
basis for treatment of membership cases in all zones.”300    
 Thus by the fall of 1946, an overarching direction and basic structure for the civilian 
internment program were at last in place.  For a number of months, however, a mélange of 
impulses to speed up and apply the brakes on actually implementing these policies created an 
interesting accordion effect on the program.  The Tribunal’s decision not to declare the SA, 
Reich Cabinet and General Staff and High Command of the German Armed forces as 
criminal, for example, provided the necessary grounds to effectively narrow down the 
paramilitary category and remove two of eight categories from arrest and detention guidance.  
Clay swiftly ordered the OMGUS staff to prepare a proposal for restricting the 11 February 
1946 directive to members of organizations declared criminal.  The resulting Staff Study 
languished, however, due to concerns that issuing revised guidance would prompt the 
repeated arrest of thousands who had already undergone screening and been cleared by 
German and U.S. Security Review Boards.301     
Meanwhile, in the wake of the IMT verdicts, the notion began to gain traction—not 
just among Germans, but the Americans as well—that guilt for Germany’s crimes resided at 
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the highest levels of Nazi leadership.  In mid-November, responding to a recent press 
conference in which Clay announced that acquittal of the SA “would free several thousand of 
them from detention camps,” Headquarters Third Army sent a letter to USFET strongly 
urging the same for General Staff Corps officers.  These “former professional soldiers” 
merited expedited release at least as much, the letter insisted, if not “more than the SA or any 
of the other acquitted groups.”  In support of this claim, Third Army provided a composite 
picture using statistics from CIE 74 in Ludwigsburg: 
It is evident that at the outbreak of the war, the majority of this group were young 
officers of relatively low rank who could exert little influence upon the important 
decisions of peace or war or any other question.  A high percentage, 97%, refrained 
from active political participation and membership in the Nazi Party.  Practically all 
retained membership in the church.  The above mentioned factors appear worthy of 
consideration in promulgating the policy governing the disposition of this group of 
Automatic Arrestees.302  
   
Most significantly, in the months following the trials and with democratization efforts 
taking root, American policymakers had become acutely aware of the need to reduce the 
scope of civilian internment and to bring the program into the quasi-legal framework 
envisioned by the Liberation Law.  On 10 December, Warren M. Chase sent an internal 
memorandum to Donald R. Heath, Director of the U.S. Political Advisor’s Office in Berlin, 
expressing concerns about the “log-jam at USFET” over wording for the revised arrest 
directive.  “Release of persons now in arrest who are not members of organizations found 
criminal is urgently needed because of overcrowded conditions, lack of adequate shelter, and 
lack of legal justification for continued detention,” Chase cautioned.  Displaying growing 
recognition of the need to both accept and insist upon wider German involvement, he went 
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on to say, “Ministers of Political Liberation will be able to select from those eligible for 
release whom they are satisfied will voluntarily report to appropriate local authorities.”303 
  
‘A Definite Step Forward’:  American & German Preparations for the Handover 
Judging from Clay’s oft-cited stern interactions with the Länderrat in the Fall of 
1946, German-American expectations related to denazification were at first blush largely 
one-sided and one-dimensional:  each Land was to immediately begin vigorously operating 
in accordance with the Liberation Law.304  In terms of civilian internment, this meant 
assuming responsibility for camps using the varying resources that were allocated or could be 
cobbled together and taking, in the words of one OMGH official, “a definite step forward” by 
bringing individual internees to trial.305  Wider examination, however, reveals that as the 
target date for transfer crystallized, a range of expectations had begun to develop and that 
officials from both sides had already had a number of important opportunities to 
communicate them.  In general, American authorities were torn between misgivings about 
German capabilities to run the camps and the overarching desire to pull back from the front 
lines of denazification.  Although the German agenda was dominated by American guidance, 
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state officials had already managed to put their stamps on at least some aspects of the 
program, a point aptly demonstrated by the Hessian cabinet’s decision to place civilian 
internment and labor camps under Minister for Political Liberation Gottlob Binder rather 
than the Ministry for Justice as suggested by OMGH.306       
 Throughout the late summer and early fall of 1946, a number of salient lines of 
communication were established through which issues related to civilian internment were 
discussed beyond the more high level exchanges between Clay or Pollock and the Minister 
Presidents in Stuttgart.  Within OMGUS, Colonel O.W. Wilson’s Public Safety Branch, 
which fell organizationally under the Internal Affairs and Communication (IA & C) Division, 
had overall responsibility for brokering the transfer from Third Army to German officials in 
each respective state.307  The list of logistical details to be worked out began with nailing 
down precisely which camps were to be designated as German enclosures.  The actual date to 
begin the handover was a moving target and depended heavily on when German authorities 
could ensure that internees would be adequately fed, sufficiently housed, and effectively 
guarded.308  The number of internees to be transferred was also in flux, owing partly to a 
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concerted Third Army push to expedite the review board process, which had thus far led to 
the cumulative release of over 45,000 internees, but proved much slower than anticipated.309 
  Third Army reluctance to relinquish responsibility for operating camps to German 
officials is a prominent motif in related message traffic and manifested itself in a number of 
ways.  Beyond this however, apprehensions expressed at various levels reflect the field 
organization’s proximity to the civilian internment program as well as a hard earned 
appreciation for its size and complexities.  In June, Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes, who 
had recently taken over Third Army and commanded the Seventh during much of the 
struggle to cope with the massive influx of arrestees, voiced several concerns to Joseph T. 
McNarney, Commanding General of USFET.  The plan to transfer enclosures on or about 1 
August, he wrote, “does not appear to have been based on adequate consideration in some 
instances of the administrative and security factors involved.”  Keyes was well aware, for 
example, of the effort that would be required to ramp up the vast and intricate machinery 
needed to screen internees.  Simply making available to German authorities classified 
documents that were used by Third Army for multiple purposes would in itself require time.  
With reviews of roughly 26,000 applications for release ongoing, a rush toward transfer 
could create unintended consequences.  “In the event that these cases being processed are 
turned over to German authorities,” he cautioned, “the unavoidable administrative confusion 
resulting will unnecessarily delay any action for several months.”310 
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  “Summary of Civilian Internee Processing,” Annex 1 to Third Army G-2 Weekly Summary Report No. 79, 
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 Third Army Letter, Keyes to Commanding General, USFET, “Transfer of Civilian Internment Enclosures to 
German Authorities,” 17 Jun 46, NARA RG 338, Records of the Third Army Adjutant General, General 
Correspondence, Box 233, F:  383.6 Correspondence Dec 46. 
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 In addition to the likelihood of administrative stoppages, Keyes highlighted a 
development with the potential to substantially alter the prevailing tenor inside camps.  The 
projected discharge of some 80,000 SS POWs and subsequent re-arrest of roughly 65,000 
who fell under automatic arrest criteria, he warned, “creates a dominant element in the 
civilian internee population which presents a security threat of some magnitude in the event 
the German authorities are charged with the maintenance of security in Civilian Internment 
Enclosures.”  Keyes recommended to McNarney that U.S. military personnel who were well 
versed in civilian internee processing procedures be kept on in camps—to provide 
information to German authorities from files that could not be released and to supervise 
security measures.  Moreover, he suggested that local military commanders retain 
responsibility for the security of enclosures in their respective areas “until German authorities 
are adequately organized and equipped to ensure control over the internee population.”311         
In the view of at least one Land Military Government Office, an undue Third Army 
delay in identifying camps earmarked for turnover created unnecessary complications.  
OMGB wrote on 12 July 1946 in response to repeated OMGUS Public Safety queries that 
Bavarian officials would be able to take one camp within roughly three days, but needed 
details (size, location, condition) on other enclosures before setting subsequent dates.  
Twelve days later, OMGB made the point much more explicit:  “The German denazification 
authorities are ready to accept civilian internment enclosures as soon as informed as to 
localities of camps to be turned over.  Until this information is available program of 
recruiting guards cannot be initiated.  These guards must be obtained from vicinity of 
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 Ibid.  The SS POW release was projected for 1 July.  Keyes also recommended that the cases of all civilian 
internees “eligible for release under current directives be processed under the present review Board procedure.”   
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proposed labor camps.  To date, 3rd Army HQ has been unable to give us the names, dates, 
or other necessary information on the camps they intend to turn over.”312   
While also symptomatic of the push-and-pull between OMGUS and Third Army on 
the issue of the handover, the determination of which camps to transfer was part of the larger 
mosaic of determining how scarce and coveted space would be allocated.313  This sort of 
territorial haggling was especially consequential in Greater Hesse where CIE 91, the state’s 
only civilian internment enclosure, was designated to remain under Army control.  
Correspondence on the subject not only highlights the military government’s role as 
intermediary between the Ministry for Political Liberation and Third Army, but also 
illustrates that neither Ministry nor OMGH officials were pleased with the outcome of 
negotiations.  Comparison of OMGH and Ministry files also reveals that, while they did not 
always agree with each other, multiple communication channels between them were actively 
used and frequently quite frank.  Moreover, whereas military government endeavored to 
ensure German officials could take responsibility for civilian internment as quickly as 
possible, a number of exchanges show the extent to which Army authorities effectively 
sought to restrict the administrators who went into the camp.314    
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an officer at the camp.  On this, see Letter, Yakoubian to Director of OMGH, “Internment Camp Darmstadt and 
Status of Spruchkammer,” 17 Sep 46, NARA RG 260 OMGUS, OMGH Civil Administration Division, Rpts 
and OTR Recs of the Denazification Branch 1946-48, Box 1116, F:  Internment Camps I.    
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 By OMGH’s own assessment, American handling of related details created 
uncertainty for Ministry officials, particularly in terms of bringing internee cases before 
denazification tribunals, which was expected to begin without delay.  Early signs that the 
Lagerspruchkammern would be smoothly and cooperatively established soon dissipated.  On 
11 June 1946, for example, after Special Branch Lieutenant Roger E. Reynolds escorted 
Ministry representatives to the camp at Darmstadt, he characterized the trip as a success.  He 
reported to Denazification Division Chief Hubert I. Teitelbaum that verbal agreements had 
been reached as to how the Meldebogen required by the Liberation Law would be distributed 
and, more importantly, that a building within the enclosure would be made available for 
Spruchkammern.315  Less than two weeks later, the Branch staffed a TWX message through 
Newman apprising OMGUS of the latest developments. “Only civilian internment enclosure 
in Greater Hesse is at Darmstadt,” the message began, reminding Public Safety that the camp 
was not contemplated for handover to German authorities.  “To date U.S. Army authorities 
have refused to permit tribunals to operate in enclosure at Darmstadt and consider contents of 
Meldebogen from enclosure to be classified material.”316 
On 2 July 1946, Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Stewart, OMGH Executive Officer, 
pressed the Meldebogen issue with OMGUS, emphasizing Ministry concerns that lack of 
access to information would hinder disposition of tribunal cases.  In addition, he relayed 
“Ministry plans to construct, as they become necessary, small labor internment camps located 
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 OMGH Letter, Reynolds to Teitelbaum, “Discussion of Lt. Lownd of C.I.E. Camp, Darmstadt, Mr. Grimke, 
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 OMGH TWX, Newman to OMGUS Public Safety, 24 Jun 46, NARA RG 260 OMGUS, OMGH Civil 
Administration Division, Rpts and OTR Recs of the Denazification Branch 1946-48, Box 1116, F:  Internment 
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near the large cities so that the internees may be used on necessary work projects.”317   
Meanwhile, in spite of confusion over CIE 91’s disposition, the Hessian administrator slated 
to take charge of civilian internment, Landesamtdirektor Jakob Weyand, and his staff put 
necessary pieces in place to assume responsibility for the camp.  On 6 August, Weyand sent a 
letter to Major Hugh W. Caldwell introducing the members of his nine-person information 
gathering team (Informationsstab) and assuring him that these carefully selected men had 
been informed of the importance of discretion in carrying out their tasks.  Along with 
pledging to safeguard anything learned in the course of their duties, Weyand’s team agreed 
not to participate in black market activities or bring any form of communication into and out 
of the camp.  Interactions with internees were to be both minimized and confined to official 
business.  Staff members also acknowledged guards’ strict orders to fire upon anyone 
approaching the designated “dead man’s zone,” regardless of position or authority.318 
From the outset, Weyand found ways to emphatically express a number of misgivings 
to a variety of audiences.  He and several Informationsstab members, for example, conducted 
office calls with representatives of other ministries seeking support in procuring the most 
immediate needs related to taking over the enclosure.319   In repeated dealings with OMGH, 
he sought to clarify several issues, including a specific date for taking over the camp; the 
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procure medical equipment, medicines, and funds for items such as vehicles, fuel, and office supplies:  “Bericht 
über Besprechung beim Innenministerium, Wiesbaden am 30.8., nachmittags, betr. Bereitstellung von 
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continued provision of food by UNRRA; and American support in the form of vehicles, 
uniforms, and weapons for roughly 400 German guards.  Weyand was especially troubled by 
the question of whether Third Army would actually turn over the enclosure.  Under an 
emerging plan, Hessian officials would be allocated the majority of square footage within 
CIE 91; however, the portion containing most of the permanent structures and all of the 
workshops would remain under American control.  On 15 August Weyand elevated the issue 
to Minister President Geiler, asking him to broach the subject with Newman.  The Army 
“scheme” to section off facilities such as the hospitals, water and electric plants, and 
workshops—to leave the German administration a “gutted camp” (Rumpflager) as he put it—
posed a very real danger to Landesamt ability to care for internees.320   
 On 14 August, Headquarters Third Army sent a message to First and Ninth Infantry 
Divisions notifying them of eleven civilian internment enclosures—including CIE 91—and 
one hospital that had been earmarked as German facilities.  The message directed the 
intermediate headquarters to take necessary measures to ensure that “no other disposition” 
was made of the camps.  Third Army also made it clear that plans had already been made for 
“all other facilities presently used as civilian internment enclosures.”321  In spite of this, the 
transfer list was still in a substantial degree of flux and behind-the-scenes negotiations 
between Third Army and OMGUS very much underway.  In a revision distributed two weeks 
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later, for example, Third Army removed three enclosures and added a qualification in the 
case of Greater Hessen, indicating that CIE 91 would be handed over “less US 
compound.”322  With the understanding that at least some portion of the enclosure would be 
turned over, the Informationsstab, working closely with OMGH liaison Captain Orson P. 
Jones, continued efforts to make the transition as smooth as possible.323  
 Among a host of other security concerns, OMGUS Public Safety sought to develop a 
viable plan for arming guards, an endeavor made more difficult by prohibitions against the 
issue of German manufactured or automatic weapons.  On 19 August, Clay nevertheless 
signed a cable to the OMG Directors of Bavaria, Greater Hessen and Württemberg-Baden 
authorizing “the arming of guards at German civilian internment enclosures.”324  Roughly 
two weeks later, Wilson formally requested that USFET provide weapons and munitions to 
the Ministers for Political Liberation of Greater Hessen and Bavaria, indicating that a 
separate request for Württemberg-Baden would follow.325  In September, OMGUS IA & C 
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notified the Directors of OMG Bavaria, Greater Hessen, and Württemberg-Baden that 
transfers were to be made only after each enclosure had been inspected and security measures 
deemed adequate.  Follow-on inspections were to be made at least twice monthly.326 
Although security issues received heavy emphasis, they were in many ways eclipsed 
by anxieties over ensuring internees would be adequately fed.  In the Hessian case, 
interactions on the subject between various agencies illustrate state officials’ early attempts 
to mediate between their own concerns, perceptions of public expectations, and Military 
Government guidance.  As the handover neared, signs of undernourishment—within CIE 91 
in particular—had troubled American authorities for quite some time.327  On top of this, an 
OMGUS Public Health study of conditions at Darmstadt had revealed that calorie intake 
alone was not an adequate predictor of nutritional status.  At roughly 1750-1780 calories per 
day, non-working internee rations were well above those of civilians outside the camp; in 
spite of this, Public Health officials determined that “weight loss among free Germans was 
relatively insignificant in comparison with the serious under weight condition among the 
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shotguns with 6,000 rounds loaded with buckshot.”  
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non-working internees.”  American camp administrators had turned to various ruses, such as 
“over-classification of internees as workers,” in an attempt to improve the situation.328   
 The severity of conditions on both sides of the barbed wire is illustrated by the fact 
that even as they expressed significant concerns over the local community’s ability to 
generate sufficient food for the camp and probed into the possibility of continued UNRRA 
support, Informationsstab members were repeatedly reminded not to take food out of the 
camp.  Weyand’s team made a concerted effort to convince other German officials of the 
deleterious impacts that nutritional deficiencies and long-term internment had begun to have 
on the camp’s population.  After a weigh-in of 14,793 internees, for example, 2,202 were 
found to be at least 20% underweight.  Moreover, of 1,128 persons examined, 173 showed 
significant signs of edema, 488 of paresthesia, 114 with a pulse under 60, and 221 with a 
systolic blood pressure under 100.329 
On 30 August 1946, Weyand and four members of the liaison team met with 
Ministerialrat Dietz of the Hessian Food Ministry at the OMGH offices in Wiesbaden and 
pleaded the case for maintaining rations at UNRRA-supported levels.  The Military 
Government made its wish known that the indicated calorie levels be maintained, but stopped 
short of giving authoritative guidance.  Weyand and his staff emphasized factors such as the 
camp’s generally poor living conditions, potential for spread of disease among the 
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undernourished, internees’ lack of access to supplemental foodstuffs from small gardens, 
neighbors or relatives, and in what would become a frequently invoked phrase, the need to 
ensure there were “no new concentration camps.”  According to the Landesamt record, Dietz 
declared that the Ernährungsminister would not agree to exceed the civilian sector’s roughly 
1200 calories “because the general public would rightly not be able to understand a higher 
calorie level for camp inmates.”  Ironically and in a development that did not escape 
Landesamt notice, the approximately 3000 foreign national and heavily incriminated 
internees thus far identified to remain in U.S. custody in the American section of Darmstadt 
were already slated to continue receiving UNRRA support at the 1700-calorie level.330  
Roughly three weeks later, Third Army promulgated the list of enclosures to be 
transferred (Table 6) in an eight-page directive that encapsulated the main contours of 
American expectations.  Tellingly, the document described the handover of facilities and 
internees as separate transactions to be effected simultaneously.  As such, German authorities 
would not only sign receipts for items such as supplies and equipment, but also collectively 
for internees.331  The handover was not to begin any earlier than 1 October 1946 and would 
not take place until Division Commanders and Military Government had mutually agreed 
that German authorities were prepared to assume control.  During the ongoing transition 
period, American camp commanders would retain full responsibility for the operation of their 
respective enclosures.  Moreover, the Commanding Generals of the First and Ninth Infantry 
Divisions and Nuremberg-Furth enclave were to oversee a large-scale sorting process to 
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separate internees who met the criteria for remaining in US custody from those to be 
transferred.  As part of this endeavor, all non-German internees (with the exception of those 
believed to have witnessed or been involved in the commission of war crimes) would be 
moved to CIE 91 at Darmstadt.  All other internees designated to remain in US custody were 
to be transferred to CIE 74 at Ludwigsburg.332 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Enclosures/Medical Facilities Designated for Handover 
Land Enclosure/Facility Remarks 
Hessen 
 
CIE 91 Darmstadt 
Including Hospital 726; 
Minus U.S. Compound333 
 
Württemberg-Baden334 
CIE 72 Ludwigsburg 
Including Artillery Kaserne 
formerly known as CIE 77 
CIE 75 Kornwestheim Including Hospital 731 
CIE 76 Hohen-Asperg  
CIE 77 Ludwigsburg  
Hospital 2 Karlsruhe  
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Land Enclosure/Facility Remarks 
Bavaria335 
CIE 6 Moosburg Including Hospital 6 
CIE 22 Regensburg  
Hospital 345 P Regensburg  
Hospital 345 T Regensburg  
CIE 317 Augsburg  
CIE 409 Nürnberg Compound for 4000 only 
Source:  HQ Third Army Letter to Commanding Generals 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions and Nurnberg-Furth Enclave, 
“Disposition of Internees Held in Civilian Internment Enclosures,” 21 September 1946, NARA RG 260 OMGUS, Records 
of CA Division, Public Safety Branch, Records Relating to Denazification, 1945-49, Box 329, F:  Denazification. 
 
According to the 21 September 1946 directive, reduced Counter Intelligence Staffs 
would remain in enclosures and, after the transfer, be charged with downgrading records and 
extracting information from classified files that could not be handed over; assisting German 
Public Prosecutors by serving as a conduit of information from Third Army G-2; and keeping 
Third Army officials abreast of developments within enclosures.  The directive made it clear 
that state Ministers for Political Liberation were authorized to begin operating camp tribunals 
immediately.  Moreover, it gave Public Prosecutors approval to require internees to provide 
completed Meldebogen and to carry out necessary investigations.  Camp commanders and CI 
staffs were to afford German authorities the “utmost consideration and assistance” in getting 
trials underway and in completing them as quickly and efficiently as possible.  Although 
German officials were not to grant any releases during the transition period, once enclosures 
had been transferred, the respective Minister for Political Liberation would assume 
responsibility for the disposition of all internees therein.  Any newly detained individuals 
meeting the February 1946 arrest guidance were to be sent to a German enclosure, where CI 
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personnel would immediately interrogate and classify them.  This process included 
forwarding a recommendation to Third Army G-2 indicating whether the individual should 
be transferred to US custody “for reasons of security, further interrogation and exploitation, 
or otherwise.”336 
In addition to reiterating the now long held stipulation that POWs deemed to fall 
under automatic arrest criteria be discharged and promptly rearrested as civilian internees, 
the directive made specific provision for former General Staff Corps officers: 
All former German General Staff Corps Officers, not wanted as war criminal 
suspects or witnesses to war crimes, now or hereafter held as prisoners of war, will be 
discharged from their PW status and transferred to the US Civilian Internment 
Enclosure No. 74.  The Counter Intelligence Staff shall proceed promptly to process 
these former officers as new arrestees as outlined in paragraph 9, above.  Those 
former General Staff Corps Officers to be detained in German Enclosures and whose 
domicile is in the US Zone of Occupation will be transferred to a German Enclosure 
for prosecution under the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and 
Militarism.  Those former General Staff Corps Officers to be detained in German 
Enclosures whose domicile is outside the US Zone of Occupation will be offered to 
the appropriate occupying power through this headquarters for disposition and, if not 
accepted, they will be transferred to German Enclosures for prosecution under the 
Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism.337   
 
As a target date of 1 October 1946 materialized to begin ceding control of camps to 
OMGUS and administrative responsibility to German authorities, Third Army officials 
voiced concerns to Clay over a potential internee backlash: 
It is possible that this transfer may be complicated by disturbances within the 
enclosures.  It is known that unrest and resentment exists on the part of internees at 
being transferred to German government authorities.  The transfer will occur at 
approximately the same time that the sentences of the Nurnberg trials are announced 
and these sentences will probably be accepted with great mental shock and 
demonstration within the enclosures.338 
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Third Army Headquarters took several concrete measures in preparation for the 
handover, including directing the improved fortification of physical barriers and placing the 
Constabulary on alert.  Spurred in particular by the fact that the incoming cadres of German 
guards were to be “denied the use of automatic weapons now being used,” Army officials 
also made a number of general recommendations to Clay dealing with four key areas:  guard 
readiness, alert plans, internal security procedures, and maintaining control over work details.  
This included suggesting, for example, that guards establish and maintain a direct line to the 
nearest constabulary unit in the event of an emergency and that relief guards be physically 
present in each camp.  In addition, based upon a self-ascribed “intimate and long standing 
knowledge of the particular problems and conditions in each individual enclosure,” Third 
Army provided camp-specific recommendations.  In the case of Darmstadt this included: 
manning all 28 perimeter towers with one guard apiece; employing a two-man walking post 
between towers during low visibility periods; maintaining a 4-man gate guard; and continued 
use of civilian internees for interior guard duties.339  
Because it involved issues that had not been fully anticipated by those who drew up 
the agreements, the status of civilian internees under the Geneva Convention proved to be 
problematic.  A meeting between International Red Cross (IRC) representatives Dr. Ernest 
Lindt and Mr. Ernst Meyer, and USFET Deputy Chief of Staff Major General M. G. White 
shows that the IRC began requesting access as early as September 1946—while the 
enclosures were still under American administration.  Although “not actually covered by the 
Geneva Convention,” because civilian internees were “enemy ex-nationals, held in arrest by 
one of the occupying powers,” the IRC’s stance was that “they might technically be regarded 
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as prisoners of war.”  Lindt not only mentioned that the British and French had already 
agreed to grant access in their zones, but according to White’s record of the meeting, also 
brought up “criticism of conditions in the camps” and stressed the benefits of allowing visits 
“by a neutral and international agency such as the IRC.”  White acknowledged the IRC 
position and did not close the door to future possibilities but declined access explaining that, 
“neither General McNarney nor General Clay was willing to accede that the IRC had any 
responsibility or obligation in connection with the civilian internees.” 340   
So as to dissuade the IRC from pursuing the issue, White indicated that American 
authorities were in the process of re-screening those being held in the CIEs and that some 
internees were being released.  With the transfer to German authorities, those who remained 
in the camps would be held for trial under the Liberation Law.  Moreover, American 
authorities “hope[d] to accomplish the turn-over or releases very rapidly during the next six 
weeks.”  Lindt expressed particular concern that the decision to discharge and immediately 
re-detain those POWs who met automatic arrest as civilian internees violated the “provision 
of the Geneva Convention which obligates the capturing power to maintain a prisoner of war 
with all the rights, privileges, and benefits fixed by the Convention until such time as he was 
returned to his home and released.”  Rather than being reclassified, if such individuals “were 
to be held for trial, they were entitled to be held in prisoner of war status,” with all the 
commensurate benefits.  White disagreed, on the basis of the progress made thus far by 
American authorities in the repatriation and discharge of POWs; and that those re-arrested 
were screened and deemed to meet automatic arrest criteria.  “And while perhaps under a 
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very strict interpretation of the Geneva Convention we should discharge the prisoner and let 
him walk away as a free man in civilian status,” he continued, “we would have to re-arrest 
him on the next corner as a civilian in one of the mandatory arrest categories.”341     
Reactions to the still unresolved calorie allotment issue suggest that the IMT verdicts 
were also cause for at least some degree of reflection among the incoming German 
administration at Darmstadt.342  After deliberating over initial stores to be provided at 
handover, USFET and OMGUS officials agreed that 14 days worth of food from military 
government stocks would be released to German authorities at the transfer of any civilian 
internee enclosure.343  As this information was passed within OMGUS channels, three 
members of the Informationsstab submitted a statement to Weyand emphasizing that a 
consistent intake of 1800 calories was necessary to maintain adequate health; yet, they 
documented, the Food Office of Greater Hessen (Grosshessischen Ernährungsamt) was not 
expected to agree to more than 1200 calories and American stocks could not be relied upon 
to offset the difference.  They stressed that in view of the heavy toll exacted upon internees’ 
health by six years of war and one-and-a-half years of detention, they had done everything in 
their power to deal with the situation.  “We feel especially compelled to provide this 
statement,” they concluded, “because of the Nürnberg Judgment finding that knowledge of 
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potentially harmful activities is sufficient grounds to be held criminally responsible under the 
law unless everything humanly possible has been done to try to rectify the situation.”344 
 
‘Like Cutting an Egg in Two’:  Transfer of Lager Darmstadt to German Administration 
The handover of camps began in Bavaria on 10 October 1946, with a signing 
ceremony transferring CIE 6 at Moosburg along with its population of roughly 7,000 
internees to Bavarian Denazification Minister Anton Pfeiffer and Minister-President Wilhelm 
Hoegner.345  In Hessen, the weeks surrounding Moosburg’s handover were filled with a 
flurry of last minute activities that, while characterized by some progress, nevertheless reveal 
substantial unresolved issues.  Roughly three weeks earlier, OMGH had grudgingly accepted 
Third Army plans to carve out a separate compound and begun pressing for transfer.  In spite 
of military government pressure to move forward, however, Ninth Infantry Division refused 
to relinquish CIE 91 until 1 November, when construction to fully segregate the American 
section from the rest of the enclosure would be complete.  This entailed a major effort to 
clear space, divide property, establish communications systems, and most visibly, to erect 
interior fences and guard towers ringing the newly designated US camp.  In the meantime, 
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German authorities had placed six prosecutors in the camp, projected the first tribunal 
hearing for 23 September, and begun to set up administration offices.346   
On the logistical front, OMGH had already taken steps to provide the incoming 
administration with weapons, ammunition and at least some vehicles.  Assistant Executive 
Officer Captain Robert Wallach notified OMGUS that Ninth Infantry Division would be 
responsible for furnishing all other equipment as well as emergency stores, including: a 7 day 
supply of food, 15 day supply of disinfectants and sanitary materials, and 30 days worth of 
medical supplies.  In addition to a small stock of clothing to be transferred to the German 
staff at handover, each internee was to be supplied with one sleeping bag and at least three 
blankets.  Wallach also reported, however, that German and American officials anticipated 
significant shortfalls.  Overcoats and warm winter clothing were not available.  Soap and 
toilet paper could not be obtained locally.  Moreover, the present gasoline and lubricant 
allotments were insufficient.  With the issue of a basic caloric ration for confined individuals 
still being discussed at the Länderrat, he stressed to Public Safety that the Ernährungsamt 
intended to provide a 1250-calorie ration “unless ordered otherwise.”347    
From his vantage point within the camp, Jones reported to Deputy Chief of the 
OMGH Denazification Division Arsen L. Yakoubian that the 84th Field Artillery Battalion 
had efficiently operated the enclosure, noting that electric, water, and sewage facilities were 
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provided throughout.  In his view, however, the decision to divide CIE 91 “was like cutting 
an egg in two.”  Rather than necessity, Army desire to retain art and metal shops seemed to 
be the key factor. “The shops,” Jones wrote, “have been equipped with machinery and used 
to produce articles and toys for the benefit of the military communities, U.S. organizations 
and Americans connected with the camp.”  Revealing one of his chief concerns, he explained 
that, “the worst feature is that even with the whole camp as a German enclosure middle-aged 
and old men would be spending a cold winter in tents.”348   
In his 4 October 1946 report, Jones described the relationship between American 
authorities and incoming administrators as adequate, but indicated “prejudice against the 
Germans manifests itself in many ways.”   He complained, for example, that camp leadership 
was opposing the release of clothing that could be dyed and altered for use by guards.  Jones 
also worried that American officials had been remiss in ensuring that adequate wood had 
been cut for the coming winter, particularly once they had become preoccupied with dividing 
the camp.  In an issue that will be further examined below, he commented that morale among 
internees had deteriorated, “caused by uncertainties and anxiety over their welfare under 
German administration.”349   
While Jones kept Yakoubian abreast of developments within the enclosure, the 
Informationsstab sent parallel correspondence to Weyand.  Shortly after arriving at CIE 91, 
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for example, the German administrators expressed frustrations over not being able to 
effectively coordinate the handover because the S-4 (logistics officer), Captain Vitullo, had 
declared the individual camps, workshops, and other key areas off limits, requiring his prior 
approval for entry.350   A 10 October 1946 report filled Weyand in on the previous day’s 
meeting with Jones, who had again taken up the issues of supplying the camp with wood, 
clothing and better tent lighting with representatives of Third Army and Ninth Infantry 
Division.  “No one seems to have any real solution for the especially challenging wood 
situation,” the update indicated, relaying Jones’ suggestion that German officials would 
simply have to trust in American promises to provide the agreed upon amount of wood at 
transfer.  The staff likewise had nothing new to report on the subject of guard uniforms; 
however, in a development symptomatic of the high degree of turnover on the Army side, 
advised Weyand that a new artillery unit would be taking charge of the camp at midnight.351     
On 15 October 1946, Binder’s Deputy, Ministerialdirektor Heinrich Knappstein, 
notified department heads in the Ministry for Political Liberation that handover of the 
German portion of the enclosure was expected to take place on 1 November.352   As Hessian 
officials awaited the transfer, Weyand paid an official visit to Moosburg to see firsthand how 
that camp had been operating since the Bavarian Ministry’s takeover.  His trip report 
provided him with a vehicle to once again express significant concerns over circumstances at 
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Darmstadt, particularly with regard to resources and the pervading mood in the enclosure.  In 
contrast to the dilapidated summer weight tents at CIE 91, for example, the camp at 
Moosburg consisted mostly of stone barracks, which were in good condition, heated, and had 
sufficient furniture.  For the most part, the same could be said for the few wooden barracks in 
the compound; those that had sustained damage had either been repaired or were not in use.  
Owing to the high number of older Ortsgruppenleiter being held there, he wrote, the average 
internee age at Moosburg was 46.  Overall, health conditions appeared to be good as he did 
not observe any signs of cold-related illnesses and the cases in the hospital isolation ward 
were limited both in number and malady (to diphtheria, cancer, and tuberculosis).  Moreover, 
food rations were substantially above those provided to the civilian population at large.353    
Weyand’s description of the Bavarian camp’s atmosphere is particularly instructive.  
“The overall mood among Moosburg’s internees is substantially different from that in 
Darmstadt,” he wrote, attributing this in part to “constant contact with the outside world” to 
include “messages that were fairly regularly smuggled out.”  He went on to say that there 
were no visible signs of any real prison psychosis; the internees themselves had helped 
prevent those suffering from depression, above all intellectuals such as artists and scholars, 
from worsening through the use of small discussion groups.  Weyand was especially struck 
by the positive influence that the internee self-administration seemed to have over the camp’s 
pervading tone.  The Bavarian Political Liberation Ministry’s immediate release of the first 
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two tribunal cases—one judged to be a Lesser Offender, the other a Follower—had also had 
a very positive effect on the internees’ states of mind.354 
Shortly after his visit to Moosburg, Weyand wrote to the Bavarian Ministry for 
Special Affairs (Sonderaufgaben) asking whether the southern state might be able to assist 
his security department in procuring day-to-day necessities (Bedarfgegenstände).  Equipping 
the sizeable number of guard personnel with items such as uniforms, winter coats and 
identification armbands had proven particularly difficult for Gross-Hessen, he emphasized, 
because of the comparatively limited opportunities to draw upon the stocks of now defunct 
military units.355  At roughly the same time that Weyand made this request, Jones stressed to 
Yakoubian that the procurement of guard uniforms was the chief “obstacle to overcome 
before turnover of the camp.”   Ironically, Jones was caught in a logistical quagmire of sorts, 
trying to locate 500 full Wehrmacht uniforms that had been approved by both USFET and 
Third Army for use at the camp, but had somehow reportedly gotten lost between the 
quartermaster and the facility that was supposed to dye them prior to delivery.356          
 With the handover approximately one week away, Jones notified Yakoubian of 
significant security concerns. “The personnel who have been selected for guards are of 
mediocre qualification,” he began, indicating “actually, about 5% would meet the ideal 
requirements for a German policeman under the age of 28 years.”  Jones went on to explain 
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that the average age among guards was 35 and that the living conditions in Darmstadt had 
made recruitment difficult.  Although he did not say as much directly, the pool of candidates 
was also limited by efforts to exclude potentially incriminated applicants.  Nearly all of those 
recruited had served at some point in the Wehrmacht, however political screening indicated 
that, with the exception of one officer, none had held rank higher than Staff Sergeant.  
Furthermore, Jones wrote, “No former members of the SA, SS, or NSDAP have been 
employed, nor has any person holding rank in affiliated organizations been employed.”  New 
hires had received basic training on the carbine, consisting of firing a handful of shots from 
the standing position at 100 meters and procedures for clearing stoppages.  The men’s 
physical abilities had been only visually assessed, although thorough physical examinations 
by camp physicians were planned.  By this time, German security guards supervised by 
American soldiers manned the main gate to Internierungslager Darmstadt, an entrance that 
had just been constructed midway along the Rheinstrasse side of the compound.357    
 Once the large, rectangular American sector had been carved out and segregated by 
an interior “no man’s zone,” the German enclosure resembled the open head of a pipe 
wrench.  Most of the few remaining stone buildings—used to house the camp administration, 
hospital, and Spruchkammern—were clustered along Rheinstrasse within the top, thinner 
jaw.  The connecting side as well as the bottom, thicker jaw of the wrench consisted mostly 
of tents, interspersed with semi-permanent support facilities such as kitchens, showers and 
latrines.  The workshops, supply buildings, motor pool, sports field, one of the theaters, and 
steel huts in which the university had been housed, were now off-limits to German 
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authorities, part of the gap between the two jaws.   A second gate off of Rheinstrasse 
permitted access to the Spruchkammer building for those coming from outside the camp.  
Internee access to the tribunal facility was through an internal entry point past strands of 
barbed wire that isolated the building from the rest of the enclosure.358 
 The handover of 11,001 internees took place in a signing ceremony at the theater 
following a largely symbolic two-vehicle inspection of the camp.  Official participants 
included Binder, Weyand, Yakoubian, Jones, Third Army Provost Marshall Colonel Clayton, 
and CIE 91 commander Lieutenant Colonel Burdge.  According to the New York Times, in 
conjunction with the handover the Army provided “fifty trucks, a supply of firewood, 1,000 
blankets, and a two-week food supply to the German administration.”359  Local press 
coverage included a brief article in the Wetzlarer Neue Zeitung that carried a DANA picture 
of Binder signing the handover document.360  Meanwhile, with the transfer of enclosures now 
fully underway, representatives from the IRC again called on USFET Deputy Chief of Staff 
Major General M.G. White to discuss the issue of access to civilian internment camps in the 
American zone.  White’s record suggests that this time the IRC sought to press the issue 
more forcefully.  “Mr. Rickli and Mr. Frank, representing the International Red Cross, called 
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to state that the Executive Committee of the IRC felt it wise to insist that they be given the 
privilege of visiting and inspecting Civilian Internee camps.”361   
White replied, in his words “politely but firmly,” that this would not be allowed, 
because the status of civilian internees being held by German authorities was analogous to 
that of individuals held in prisons in other countries.  The “IRC has no more right to demand 
visiting privileges than they would to demand of the United States the right to visit and 
inspect Federal penitentiaries,” he wrote. “Military Government is attempting to strengthen 
the local German governments and will not submit their installations for inspection by IRC or 
any similar agency.”  Additionally, granting IRC access to inspect the camps would amount 
to agreeing that civilian internees fell within the provisions of the Geneva Convention, a 
point that White noted, American authorities would “not concede.”   White came away from 
the meeting with the understanding that Rickli and Frank understood the American position.  
He noted that criticism for failing “to make similar visits and inspections of German 
concentration camps during the war” had led the IRC to believe “that it must protect itself by 
going on record that they had asked for permission to make the visits.”  In addition to 
inquiring with whom they should correspond in order to make the IRC position a matter of 
record, the two men asked whether American officials would object “if they arranged directly 
with German civil authorities to visit Civilian Internee camps operated by the Germans.362 
Roughly three-and-a-half weeks after the transfer, as the lines of coordination among 
Hessian and OMGH authorities continued to jell, Yakoubian formally requested that the 
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Ministry include with all future correspondence an English translation and, whenever 
possible, duplicate copies.363  Captain Raymond O. Didlo, who had recently taken over from 
Jones as OMGH Camp Liaison Officer, noted continual improvement among the guard 
personnel in his weekly report.  Although 25 had just been let go, 81 new hires brought the 
present strength to 580.  Didlo approvingly reported not only that each tower was connected 
telephonically to a main switchboard, but also that the camp security force was able to 
contact tactical units directly if needed.   He attributed the one escape that had taken place 
from a wood cutting detail during the last week to the fact that the internee was wearing dyed 
clothes similar to those of the guards.  Plans were underway to procure green uniforms for 
the guards, but in the meantime, they would be issued distinctive armbands.  In addition, a 
request had been forwarded to the Ministry “to borrow members of regular police forces for 
the camp to instruct guards and also to be members of the guard.”364  
The quality of the camp guard was a persistent, troubling concern that, on the whole, 
Hessian officials openly discussed and actively sought to remedy.365  Knappstein wrote to 
Teitelbaum after a late November military government inspection, for example, in a clear 
attempt to manage American expectations.  He flatly described guard readiness as deficient, 
explaining: “The reason for this fact is that no suitable police official exists to carry out the 
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training.  According to my observations and to the reports, continuously coming in, many 
guards are very untrustworthy and have the tendency to criminal actions.”  Knappstein went 
on to say that over 80 guards had been let go because of disciplinary issues and that several 
had been referred to the public prosecutor (Staatsanwaltschaft) for trial.  Echoing Didlo’s 
report, Knappstein indicated that the Chief of the State Police (Landespolizei), Dr. 
Hamberger, had meanwhile agreed to provide 40 experienced police officials to train camp 
security forces.  Moreover, Knappstein reported that he had appointed an “experienced police 
specialist” on a probationary basis to organize and train Hessian guards.366 
The inspection that precipitated Knappstein’s letter was one of several conducted in 
the weeks immediately after transfer of Internierungslager Darmstadt to Hessian 
administration.  In addition to continued efforts to cope with logistical shortfalls, ministerial 
and OMGH correspondence surrounding the handover reflects clear and growing concerns 
about the camp’s deteriorating atmosphere.  As the following section will demonstrate, along 
with the onset of what would prove to be a particularly severe winter, several factors 
combined to precipitate this change, including announcement of the Nuremberg decisions as 
well as loss of the portion of the compound containing most of the permanent structures and 
all of the workshops.  The records also clearly indicate, however, that the slowness and 
stringency of initial Spruchkammer operations were particularly decisive contributors to the 
camp’s visibly plummeting morale.  Moreover, various internee writings suggest that those 
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held in Internierungslager Darmstadt were well aware of officials’ concerns and that they 
were following developments related to the handover with a great deal of interest. 
 
‘The Collapse of Hope’:  Darmstadt Camp Tribunals in Operation 
“Camp III Clobbers Camp V 3:0 (1:0)”—along with items such as the review of a 
brief interlude in the CIE Theater featuring chamber music and poetry, this sports update 
from the 25 August edition of Die Bergstrasse offers an interesting snapshot of daily life 
before the handover.  As the main Nuremberg trial was winding down, there was a palpable 
element of what could almost be described as vibrancy.  The education program was in full 
swing, the newspaper very active, internee productions were being held in theaters, and 
organized sporting events carried out between camps.367  In addition, Third Army screening 
processes had begun to visibly reduce the internee population.  Just before the German 
administration took over, however, there was a distinct change in atmosphere as glimpses of 
the life being reconstructed outside the barbed wire were interspersed with news that IMT 
proceedings would be followed by additional war crimes trials in each zone and that, for a 
great many of those still in the enclosure, the path out would lead through the 
Lagerspruchkammern.  
In spite of the clear presumption that proceedings held within the camp would involve 
some of the most politically incriminated participants of the Nazi regime, for the most part 
the Lagerspruchkammern mirrored the myriad of tribunals set up throughout the American 
zone.  Indeed, they were part of an intricate and extensive Ministry apparatus that took 
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several months to put in place and that in Hesse included 110 tribunals.  While each panel 
consisted of at least three lay judges, the responsibility for rendering judgments rested with 
the chairperson.  In the cases of those determined to be subject to the Liberation Law’s 
provisions, prosecutors had little-to-no leeway.  The law specified procedure to such a degree 
that it indicated the extent to which an individual’s case was to be investigated, the charges to 
be filed, and depending upon judgment, what sanctions were to be applied.  Those appearing 
before the panel were permitted to represent themselves or hire legal counsel, and bore the 
burden of making the case for mitigating circumstances or reduction of charges.368   
Given the need to regularly liaise with Military Government and deal with several 
high profile cases, the Ministry selected Hans Quambusch, former senior public prosecutor of 
the Wiesbaden District Court (Landgericht) to oversee the Lagerspruchkammern.369  The 
tribunal operations that began in the enclosure on 23 September 1946 were limited in 
number; however, they drew a significant amount of attention—and not just among internees.  
With efforts to construct five separate hearing chambers not quite complete, Jones reported 
that by midday on 27 September eleven cases had already been decided.  Of these, one was 
classified as a Major Offender (Group I) and three as Lesser Offenders (Group III).  The 
remaining seven were deemed to be Offenders (Group II).  Jones noted that the American 
and German authorities with whom he came in contact generally viewed the sanctions meted 
out—which included four labor camp sentences, substantial fines and forfeiture of 
property—as harsh.  “There has been a marked effect on the morale of the internees,” he also 
informed Yakoubian, “especially those who fancied Spruchkammer as a farce.  The state of 
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mind of the internees caused by the Spruchkammer and anticipation of hard treatment under 
the German administration is creating a serious security problem.”370 
Although he cited different rationale, Jones was, in effect, echoing Third Army 
concerns regarding the increasing potential for agitation within enclosures as the handover 
drew closer.  These predictions seemed to be realized on 10 October 1946, when US 
Constabulary troops in 3 M-8 armored cars responded to a disturbance at CIE 91 “involving 
four or five hundred persons.”  According to First Brigade’s account, the situation was 
brought quickly under control.  It developed from a much smaller commotion involving a 
group of internees who had begun removing posts from an internal fence in order to use them 
as firewood to heat their tents.371  An internee report to the Bürgermeister of Camp I 
described the incident similarly, indicating that it had escalated after the 5 p.m. headcount 
when several internees tried to pull up posts between gates 1C and 1B.  This report described 
the atmosphere in the camp as “disastrous” (verheerend) due to frustrations over lack of 
plans to cope with the looming winter.  Moreover, the originator suggested that because they 
lived in stone buildings, the members of Lagerselbstverwaltung were out of touch with the 
hardships being endured by those who lived in the tents.372 
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A feature in the 26 August 1946 edition of the camp newspaper titled “Aus der 
Zeltstadt” (From the Tent City) suggests the possibility that even before the deteriorating 
weather a communal bond had formed separating those who lived in tents from the 
Lagerselbstverwaltung.373  On 25 October 1946, one week before the handover and just over 
a month after tribunals had started operating, Weyand forwarded a copy of an unsigned 
three-page document to Binder that, among other things, indicated internees had “lost 
confidence” in the self-administration.  The contents are also quite instructive as an example 
of the sort of rhetorical strategies employed by internees, including an unmistakable appeal to 
emerging ideological differences between east and west.  The document characterized many 
internees, for example, as “receptive to Communist, or better said, nihilistic ideas because 
life had lost meaning.”  For American and German authorities alike, such statements raised 
the dilemma of determining the extent to which they were accurate.  The document clearly 
conveyed a distinct change in internee perceptions of their circumstances following 
announcement of the IMT verdicts and beginning of camp tribunal proceedings.  Contrasting 
prior expectations with the “collapse of hope” that had since set in, it described judgments at 
CIE 91 as “harsh in general, as well as in comparison with tribunals in other camps.”374  
From the outset of tribunal operations American officials struggled with the 
recognition that, in spite of successive efforts to narrow the pool of internees to those they 
believed most incriminated, camp tribunals were already impossibly backlogged.  In mid-
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November 1946 Captain Donovan C. Senter at OMGUS Public Safety issued a series of 
questions geared toward determining Spruchkammer capacity at Darmstadt.  According to 
the responses, the average number of cases handled per week had increased steadily from 
1.19 to 5.45.  Moreover, it took Public Prosecutors roughly six weeks to prepare a case.  
When asked to project how many cases each tribunal could “handle thoroughly per week,” 
the Public Prosecutor replied 15, perhaps 20 “if they work hard.”  Jones, on the other hand, 
advised Senter that this was optimistic and decreased the estimate to 10.  Captain Senter also 
asked:  “At the rate given in question four, how long will it take to finish the cases of people 
whose normal residence is in Greater Hessen who are now interned in the American Zone – 
estimated at 13,314?”  The response was 10 years, with the caveat that “many internees are 
crippled, old and sick and will probably be returned to homes for trial.”375 
In Internierungslager Darmstadt as elsewhere, the primary mechanism used to both 
supervise and exert influence over tribunals was a system of Delinquency and Error (D&E) 
reports, which was officially put in place in November 1946.376  In what he described as a 
“demoralizing” process, Yakoubian later wrote that it “could and often did result in the 
indefinite prolongation of a case, cluttering of tribunal dockets, and endless repetition of 
work.”   He further asserted that D&E reports played a pivotal role in undercutting the 
denazification program in the view of the German public: 
These maintained a minute check on every case at each step of the procedure from 
the time the prosecutor first began his investigation to the time the tribunal rendered 
its decision.  At any stage, Military Government could nullify all preceding work 
done by the Germans.  In fact, if the decision of the supposedly independent tribunal 
appeared to be too lenient or erroneous, the submission of such a Delinquency and 
Error Report to the Ministry for Political Liberation meant the overruling of the 
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decision.  It forced the reopening of the case for a second trial which was again 
checked minutely by Military Government.377 
 
Close supervision of tribunal operations within each Land began before 
implementation of the D & E reports.  Moreover, on the whole, the scrutiny was particularly 
intense from the beginning of Spruchkammer activities until roughly the middle of 1947.378  
On 21 August 1946 for example, as efforts to establish the tribunals in the camp at Darmstadt 
were still ongoing, Yakoubian forwarded to the Ministry 49 cases from tribunals at Hünefeld, 
Darmstadt, Büdingen, Kassel and Friedberg.  Based on reports from the applicable Liaison 
and Security offices, he suggested that these cases be further reviewed.379  On 26 September 
1946, Yakoubian forwarded 31 letters from Liaison and Security Office Darmstadt regarding 
decisions made by various tribunals in Stadt- and Landkreis Darmstadt.  “You’ll notice that 
most of the complaints,” he indicated, “deal with unwarranted downgrading of defendants.”  
He requested that the ministry investigate the cases and issue the necessary instructions for 
correcting errors.  “You will submit to this office,” he continued, “a written report as to what 
final decision has been made.”380    
On 6 December 1946, Captain Donovan Senter notified O.W. Wilson that 
Internierungslager Darmstadt lacked sufficient Military Government personnel to supervise 
the camp and Spruchkammern.  Didlo, who had been assigned to the camp for three weeks, 
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indicated that his predecessor Jones “had been too concerned with camp administration to set 
up any Spruchkammer supervision.”381  As of 17 December 1946, Didlo reported that 130 
individuals had been sentenced to labor camps and placed in a segregated area of the 
enclosure.  Meanwhile, preparations were underway to ready a labor camp at Kassel.382  In 
January 1947, Teitelbaum wrote to Binder, expressing concern over a report from Didlo that 
there were only eight tribunals operating at Darmstadt and that the camp was lacking a Chief 
Prosecutor.  Not only did plans call for two additional tribunals, Teitelbaum crisply pointed 
out, but based on information the Denazification Administration had received from the 
Ministry, he had already notified OMGUS that all ten were in operation.  Both issues were to 
be rectified immediately.383 
As efforts were underway to increase tribunal capabilities, in mid-December 1946 a 
small contingent from the Interior Ministry’s medical branch (Medizinalabteilung) surveyed 
the camp in conjunction with an effort to gauge the nutritional status of healthcare personnel 
(Heilpersonal).  The head of the branch, Professor von Drigalski, summarized the most 
worrisome findings—nearly all of which had to do with inability to mitigate the extreme 
cold—in a cautionary one-page letter to Binder that was countersigned by Interior Minister 
Heinrich Zinnkann.  Temperature readings taken inside tents at 10:00 a.m., for example, 
indicated 5-6˚ Centigrade (roughly 40-42˚ Fahrenheit).  The group found ice on interior tent 
                                                 
381
 Letter, Senter to O.W. Wilson, “Deficiency of MG Personnel at Darmstadt Enclosure,” NARA RG 260 
OMGUS, Records of CAD, PS Branch, Records Related to Denazification, 1945-1949, Box 336, F:  57 Civilian 
Internment Enclosure No. 91 Darmstadt – II. 
 
382
 Letter, Senter to O.W. Wilson, Labor Camp at Kassel, 17 Dec 46, NARA RG 260 OMGUS, Records of 
CAD, PS Branch, Records Related to Denazification, 1945-1949, Box 336, F:  57 Civilian Internment 
Enclosure No. 91 Darmstadt – II. 
 
383
 Letter, Teitelbaum to Minister for Political Liberation, Hesse, “Tribunals in Internment Camp,” 6 Jan 47, 
NARA RG 260 OMGUS, OMGH Civil Administration Division, Rpts and OTR Recs of the Denazification 
Branch 1946-48, Box 1116, F:  Internment Camps I. 
  180
walls, medicine that had frozen, and iced water pipes in wash facilities and latrines.  Contrary 
to Wallach’s earlier statement to OMGUS, internees on average possessed two light blankets 
and a sleeping bag with which to combat the cold.  Moreover, only about half of them had 
straw to insulate their plank beds.384 
The head of the branch’s Hygiene Department, Dr Krey, documented his conclusions 
in a succinct report highlighting key points that he also planned to brief to Binder.  After a 
two-day visit, his general impressions of the enclosure were of good discipline, organization, 
and cleanliness.  He was nevertheless struck by disparities between the small number of 
solidly constructed buildings and what he described as a horseshoe shaped tent camp 
(Zeltlager).  Although the Lagerselbstverwaltung, hospital workers, and patients were housed 
in the permanent structures, the vast majority of internees—by Krey’s count roughly 8,200—
lived in tents.  By design, the poorly lit summer weight tents were heated by one stove, 
however, in some cases Krey found field-style improvised ovens that resembled gasoline 
drums.  In a pointed statement encapsulating the impacts of wood shortages on internees, he 
wrote that tents were only heated for a few hours each day.  Moreover, with winter clothing 
in short supply, one third of the internees were without coats.  Because of cold living 
conditions, many internees in Camps II and III had not undressed in five weeks, prompting 
concerns over increased potential for the spread of infection.  Some 4-600 internees had 
already developed various types of skin disease and the camp physician had noted signs of 
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decreased resistance and widespread apathy.  Of particular concern, sporadic cases of lice 
and scabies had recently even been discovered among guard personnel.385 
In addition to documenting the ill effects of extreme cold, the Medizinalabteilung 
inspections corroborated Landesamt anxieties concerning calorie intake.  According to Krey, 
internees received 1700 gross (1300-1500 net) calories daily, consisting of only 14-17 grams 
of fat and 18 grams of animal protein.  Furthermore, the persistence of edema among the 
camp’s population, by now at a total of 978 cases, had just been reviewed at a 20 December 
1946 medical conference.  On average, Krey noted, 150 to 200 internees reported to sick call 
each day.  Dr. K.H. Böhler’s public health report focused especially on medical capabilities 
and, like Krey’s account, emphasized that they were already strained to capacity.  According 
to Böhler, each of the enclosure’s three camps had District and Community doctors to 
provide first aid and consultations, two dentists, and a poorly heated infirmary.  He described 
the occurrence of dental illnesses as “disproportionally high” (unverhältnismäßig hoch).  The 
Lagerhospital, housed in former stone barracks, had 2,800 beds, 47 doctors and 120 nurses.  
Because the number of internees requiring hospitalization had outpaced available beds, 
roughly 500-600 could not be admitted and instead had to remain in their tents.386 
After the Public Health Division forwarded him a copy of the recent Hessian medical 
branch inspection report, Teitelbaum wrote that inadequate living conditions remained a 
problem at Darmstadt because Third Army had been unwilling to release the American 
portion of the camp to the Ministry for Political Liberation:  
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The facts as set forth in the report of Dr. von Drigalski have been called to the 
attention of 3rd Army and also OMGUS, Berlin, since permanent buildings for living 
quarters are generally in that area.  To date the results have been negative, but I am 
still in hope that we will be able to obtain this area and thus correct some of the worst 
features of the present enclosure…It is my understanding the Chief of Staff of 3rd 
Army has decided to use the American enclosure as work shops for an ordnance-
organization.  OMGUS officials and USFET officials have stated that they will bring 
further pressure to bear on 3rd Army in this matter.387 
 
On 21 January 1947, USFET directed that Third Army hand the area at Darmstadt 
designated as a US compound, along with any equipment deemed essential for operation of 
the enclosure, over to Military Government, thus beginning the process that would eventually 
result in transfer of more of the permanent structures to German control.388 
 
Conclusion 
As an Associated Press report dated 1 November 1946 illustrates, American and 
German authorities had arguably covered a great deal of territory by the beginning of 1947.  
This point comes across quite aptly, in fact, in the following day’s edition of the Chicago 
Daily Tribune.  “The three German states in the American occupation zone will become 
virtually self-governing not later than Dec. 8 after voters have given final approval to their 
constitutions and legislative assemblies,” the article proclaimed.  Describing the incremental 
change in relationship between occupier and occupied, the announcement went on to clarify, 
for example, that following the early December voting “such activities as demilitarization 
and reparations will be directly administered by the military government, since they are 
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responsibilities which cannot be entirely assumed by the German civil government.”  
Moreover, in addition to “observing, inspecting, and advising,” Military Government would 
retain authority “to veto any action which clearly violates military objectives and to remove 
German public officials who violate its policies.”389  Significantly, the handover of 
Internierungslager Darmstadt was the occasion for the release. “This step was regarded,” the 
article explained, “as giving German authorities complete responsibility for denazification in 
Greater Hesse…The camp will now serve as a processing center from which Nazis sentenced 
to labor terms will be distributed to labor camps.”390   
At the zone-wide policy level, announcement of the IMT verdicts and enactment of 
the Liberation Law represented important and decisive efforts to come to terms with the Nazi 
past.  During this period, as Ziemke indicated, OMGUS moved away from a policy based on 
the concept of collective guilt toward attempting to determine individual degree of political 
incrimination and involvement in activities carried out under the Nazi regime.  Detailed 
examination of civilian internment suggests that this transition was neither clear cut, nor 
immediate.  Albeit scaled back, the continued application of a collective approach is evident, 
for example, in the decision to continue detaining members of organizations found to be 
criminal by the IMT.  Moreover, although the Liberation Law provided a framework for 
moving forward, it was a very complex one—in which German officials had little leeway and 
over which American authorities exerted significant influence.391  
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In terms of actually implementing the denazification program, in many ways, the 
most daunting issues lay ahead.  Even as German officials endeavored to put denazification 
machinery in place, the challenge of sorting through thousands of cases to establish 
individual degree of incrimination had already become quite apparent.392  Differing degrees 
of leniency on the part of tribunal officials, coupled with Military Government reactions to 
them, exacerbated these difficulties.   Although Military Government sought to switch from a 
past-looking punitive occupation strategy to one that was forward looking and rehabilitative, 
the tension between these two goals persisted within the denazification program.  Moreover, 
the presumption of guilt, while successively applied to fewer categories, was nevertheless 
consistently present.  As the next chapter will illustrate, the more indiscriminate and unfair 
application of the program seemed, the more it came across as ineffectual and bred 
resentment among the German public.  For Hessian officials, like their counterparts in other 
Länder, the difficult task of mediating between American guidance, public expectations, and 
their own views regarding how to move forward was well underway.  
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Chapter 4:   
 
‘THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE’:  INTERNIERUNGSLAGER DARMSTADT  
AND THE POLITICS OF DENAZIFICATION, JANUARY-MARCH 1947  
 
“German authorities of the new government of the Land of Greater Hesse are 
preparing for winter at the largest internment camp of the American zone, a tent city 
surrounded by barbed wire on the outskirts of this city.”  Accompanied by James R. 
Newman, the senior American Military Government official in Hesse, correspondent Dana 
Adams Schmidt toured Internierungslager Darmstadt some ten days after the camp’s 
transfer to see how Hessian administrators had been “getting on” since assuming 
responsibility for the state’s roughly 11,000 civilian internees.  Schmidt detailed the visit in 
a New York Times article that briefly mentioned the immediate threat posed by rapidly 
deteriorating weather, but effectively downplayed concerns over a shortage of wood to heat 
the massive tent city.  Instead of focusing on these pressing problems, he deftly interspersed 
reflections on internees’ Nazi pasts and Germany’s democratic future with a rundown of the 
work thus far completed by denazification tribunals.393  
Clearly calculated to assuage multiple strands of public opinion on both sides of the 
Atlantic, the article’s tone conveys an aura of competence and progress indicative of an 
overarching mutual desire for tangible forward movement toward Germany’s rehabilitation.  
Importantly however, Schmidt’s account also acknowledged that particularly from the 
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German perspective, determining how to successfully root out Nazism and move toward a 
democratic future would by no means be a straightforward process.  “Since maintaining 
internment camps—that is confining people who have not been tried—is at best an awkward 
business for a democracy and especially one that is new and uncertain,” he wrote, “German 
officials were less pleased to receive their new charges than the Americans were to get rid of 
them.”  Hessian authorities’ focus, according to Schmidt, “was to liquidate the camp as soon 
as possible, by trials and releases, and meanwhile to run it as humanely as possible.”  
Countering widespread comparisons, he quoted the administrator who had recently taken 
responsibility for the enclosure, Landesamtdirektor Jakob Weyand, “This is no 
concentration camp—nothing like what the Nazis ran.”  On the contrary, because the 
German administration had been able to maintain the American mandated daily requirement 
of 1700 calories, Schmidt remarked, the “internees looked better fed than their guards.”394  
Four months later, Buchenwald survivor and liberal Catholic journalist Eugen Kogon 
featured Internierungslager Darmstadt to illustrate the practical difficulties inherent in 
confronting the Nazi past as part of the process of nurturing an enduring democracy.  Kogon 
had recently inspected the camp at the request of the Hessian Ministry for Political 
Liberation, the administrative apparatus headed by Denazification Minister Gottlob Binder.  
Caught between Military Government authorities who were bent on a thoroughgoing 
approach to denazification, and a public that had already grown weary of the program, 
officials in the Ministry had become particularly concerned by a recent bevy of media 
allegations directed at the civilian internment enclosure. 
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Kogon described his impressions of the camp in an article titled “Der Kampf um 
Gerechtigkeit” (“The Struggle for Justice”).  Writing to a German public that he depicted as 
clamoring for justice, he asked quite pointedly,  “Do we know what we would do with it and 
what that means?”  Kogon engaged very directly issues such as collective responsibility, 
which he differentiated from the notion of guilt, and the challenge of effecting 
democratization on an individual basis.  “Hardly any National Socialist will become a 
democrat in an internment camp,” he argued.  “Most,” he continued, “are going to view 
detention as a desire for destruction and revenge.”  Kogon, who had been a political prisoner 
in Buchenwald from 1939 to 1945, went to great lengths to distinguish conditions at 
Darmstadt from those in Nazi concentration camps.  Nevertheless, he also actively probed 
the inherent contradictions between internment and democracy.395 
Appearing just months apart, the contrasting perspectives offered by Schmidt and 
Kogon offer important glimpses into key differences in the way American and German 
authorities conceptualized the civilian internment program.  Schmidt’s account, written in 
late 1946 on the occasion of the transfer of Internierungslager Darmstadt to Hessian 
authorities, still largely represented the program as an expedient.  He intertwined the 
overriding presumption that those in the camps had been equally steadfast in supporting 
Nazism with anxieties over what might happen after their release.396  As this chapter will 
show, Kogon’s commentary reflected German concerns over the length of time that would 
be needed to process such a large number of cases, and the view that the camps held too 
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many lesser-incriminated individuals alongside diehard Nazis.  His remarks were part of a 
broader discourse among state and local notables and Hessian leaders, as well as with 
authorities in the other Länder, about when and how to reconstitute German society. 
Focusing on developments in the state of Hesse in the period between the transfer of 
camps and Kogon’s inspection, this chapter examines German officials’ attempts to mediate 
American guidance, their own views regarding denazification, and public expectations.  
Drawing on media commentary, official correspondence, and political debate, it traces the 
growth of German frustrations with the denazification program and seeks to explain why 
public scrutiny turned toward the internment camp.  In order to better understand how 
American and German officials sought to negotiate the paradox of detaining a significant 
segment of the population while initiating democratic reforms, the chapter also asks how 
Military Government and Hessian authorities reacted to the ensuing criticisms.   
The case of Hesse illustrates that public interest in internment camps became 
especially active among Germans in the spring of 1947, quickly enveloping the Ministry for 
Political Liberation and placing its activities under a microscope.  Events that transpired in 
Hesse also demonstrate that, albeit very briefly, Internierungslager Darmstadt served as a 
lightning rod for early discussions of what constituted democracy, as well as efforts to come 
to terms with the notions of individual versus collective guilt.  From the outset, German 
authorities were keenly aware of the need to avoid association with the activities of the 
Third Reich.  Hessian officials’ actions also demonstrate that they felt particularly 
accountable to the public—and to the internees—for implementing tribunals in a way that 
was consistent with democratic justice.  While at various points Office of Military 
Government for Hesse (OMGH) personnel from Newman to Denazification Division Chief 
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Hubert I. Teitelbaum attempted to shape public discourse in Hesse, the brief but relatively 
intense conversation about the camps was a decidedly German one.  Moreover, it was 
framed and animated by a simmering popular disapproval of denazification. 
 
‘Leave the Fellow Travelers in Peace’:  The Burgeoning Discourse on Denazification 
Much as Schmidt had done in his article about Internierungslager Darmstadt, local 
media outlets such as the Frankfurter Neue Presse also cited Jakob Weyand emphatically 
rejecting comparisons with concentration camps.397  Attention of this sort was not unique to 
Hesse.  The handover spurred a zone-wide desire to scrutinize civilian internment in general 
and the camps in particular.  This push to know more was intrinsically linked to a 
burgeoning debate on denazification that had been energized by several waves of arrests, 
widespread removals from office and, more recently, implementation of the Law for 
Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism.  The most prominent feature of this 
broader discussion was a mounting German dissatisfaction perceptibly directed at American 
policies as early as the fall of 1945.398  In a series of developments that have since been well 
documented by scholars, reactions to the Liberation Law’s intricate, expansive, quasi-legal 
framework quickly led these undercurrents to coalesce into the palpable sense that the 
denazification program was not only ineffective, but an obstacle to moving forward.399 
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As this narrative took shape, propaganda launched across the fault line forming with 
the east played upon widely varying views of denazification’s failings.  Civilian internment 
was understood to be at the heart of this Gordian knot and frequently a catalyst for debate.  
In February 1946, for example, Raymond Daniell of the New York Times wrote: “There is a 
widespread feeling that the Russians do not care so much about the political history of the 
individual as they do about his present convictions and usefulness.  Travelers from the 
Russian zone say there are no internment camps there similar to the ones in the American 
zone, where 200,000 or more dangerous Nazis are incarcerated.”400  Four months later the 
US Embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviet press had reprinted Clay’s announcement 
about the camps’ transfer and asserted that he intended to “free 58,000 Hitlerites.”  This 
decision had “aroused great interest among circles of bankers, financiers, and industrialists 
whose guilt of cooperation with the Nazis still had not been determined.”  The suggestion of 
selective leniency prompted Political Advisor Robert Murphy to assure the State Department 
that the “26 most important” of these individuals would appear before the War Crimes 
Tribunal.   The remainder of those “who cooperated and profited by Nazi schemes,” he 
stressed, were “subject to the provisions of the German Denazification Law of March 5.”401  
 The exaggerated claims cited in Daniell’s article and the telegram from Moscow 
illustrate key strands of what can best be described as a loud chorus of criticisms directed at 
                                                 
West German Elites:  Higher Civil Servants, Business Leaders, and Physicians in Hesse Between Nazism and 
Democracy, 1945-1955 (New York, 2003), Chapter 4, 140-208. 
 
400
 Raymond Daniell, “U.S. is Said to Lose Grasp on Germans,” NYT, 27 Feb 46, 14.  Studies by Vogt and 
Naimark have debunked a number of misconceptions regarding denazification and civilian internment in the 
Soviet zone.  Timothy Vogt, Denazification in Soviet Occupied Germany:  Brandenburg, 1945-1948 
(Cambridge, MA, 2000); and Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany:  A History of the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA, 1995). 
 
401
 Ltr No. 5745, Murphy to Secretary of State, “Press Reports U.S. Policy on the Transfer of Internment 
Camps to German Administration,” 31 Jul 46, and attachment, Telegram No. 185, US Embassy Moscow, 23 
Jul 46, NARA RG 84 POLAD Classified General Correspondence, 1945-1949, Box 122, F: Jul-Aug (891 
Public Press).  According to Murphy, 26 individuals from these groups were “being singled out as defendants.” 
   
 
 191
the American denazification program.  Disapproval emanated from both sides of the 
political spectrum—with critiques ranging from accusations that, on the one hand, the 
program was too ambitious in attempting to engineer a social revolution; and on the other, 
not ambitious enough.  In practice, immediate tensions between the ideal of thoroughgoing 
denazification and the realities associated with undergirding democratic reforms frequently 
led American policy to alternate indiscriminately between these extremes.  The resulting 
shared sense of dissatisfaction, though voiced by individuals with quite disparate 
viewpoints, was buffered by a popular weariness over the program’s increasingly 
cumbersome and inequitable implementation.  Most notably, the unifying belief emerged 
that the program had been too broadly based and was therefore largely misdirected.  Rather 
than focusing on high-level Nazis, it was widely held that the cleansing effort had netted too 
many of those who had simply “gone along” with activities of the Third Reich. 
For Germans on the far right, deploying this claim offered a way to portray 
denazification and civilian internment as unduly harsh forms of victors’ justice.  On the left, 
the KPD not only decried instances of leniency in cases against higher-ranking Nazis, but 
also argued that the programs were failing to effect meaningful socioeconomic change.402 
Imposed from without and caught between the radical push toward revolution and 
conservative pull toward restoration of the (pre-1933) status quo, the denazification program 
quickly became a highly visible platform for contention between political parties.  As 
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historian Michael Hayse has shown, the process at times provided a forum for waging 
personal and professional battles.  On the whole, however, those who sought to use the 
process to effect sweeping change constituted a persistent and initially very active minority 
that, as Gimbel found in his case study of Marburg, was already becoming disillusioned and 
marginalized in 1946.  Moreover, as social theorist John D. Montgomery noted in his 
comparative investigation of postwar institutional change, after German tribunals began 
operating under the Liberation Law, even the once moderately supportive Social Democrats 
openly attacked denazification, in part to make gains against Christian Democrats.403 
Public responses to campaign speeches by Christian Democratic Union leader 
Konrad Adenauer not only demonstrate the prominence of the view that denazification was 
misdirected, but also show that this belief transcended zonal boundaries.  A collective desire 
to move forward began to take hold in the British Zone as early as March 1946.  Adenauer 
repeatedly announced that it was time to leave the so-called Mitläufer (fellow travelers)—
those Germans who “had not oppressed others, had not enriched themselves, had not 
committed any punishable offenses,”—in peace.  The frequency with which he invoked this 
message has led historian Jeffrey Herf to refer to it as “his stock speech.”  In one of the more 
oft cited instances, Adenauer declared in Wuppertal on 5 May 1946 to very loud applause:  
“For a while I was in a concentration camp.  I know what that is all about.  But injustice plus 
injustice will never equal justice.  And today we do not want to imitate what was done then.  
                                                 
403
 Gimbel, Marburg, 156-157; Hayse, 156-160; Montgomery, 59-61. See also Joseph F. Napoli, 
“Denazification from an American’s Viewpoint,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 264, (1949), 122.  
   
 
 193
Punish the guilty, forgiveness and reintegration for the misled or fellow travelers who did 
not do anything evil.”404   
Political leaders who advocated such a selective approach to confronting the past did 
so largely as a means of appealing to voters preoccupied by the present and increasingly 
concerned about the future.405  In addition, however, Adenauer was influenced by the post 
World War I Weimar Republic’s inability to establish legitimacy and to overcome 
frustrations channeled toward the government in the wake of what was widely regarded by 
Germans as a heavy-handed peace settlement.  He worried that—too broadly applied—
denazification might provoke a Nazi resurgence or some other form of Nationalist backlash 
similar to the way that the Dolchstoßlegende (Stab-in-the Back Legend) had capitalized on 
popular frustrations over the Treaty of Versailles.406  Propagated especially by former chief 
of staff Erich Ludendorff, the notion that left-wing civilian politicians had betrayed the 
military resounded with a public that chafed over provisions of the armistice such as the 
requirement to accept responsibility for the conflict via the so-called “War Guilt” clause.407 
 Though an exculpatory construction, the existence of Mitläufer was nevertheless 
also a pervasive reality on the local level.  OMGH Deputy Director of Denazification Arsen 
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L. Yakoubian later conceded that frustrations the program was misdirected quickly 
overshadowed approval of denazification efforts.  Rather than the upper segments of society, 
however, it was the local elite that “the average German” worried would slip away:   
The industrial magnates, the judges of the Nazi high courts, or the officials of the 
Foreign Office in the Third Reich are too distant from the daily life of the average 
German to have much meaning to him.  What he has seen of denazification is 
something very different from what the Allied policy and program makers have 
seen.  He literally had to ‘sweat’ his way out of the maze of legal red tape to get his 
clearance even though he may never have been a Nazi party member.  This was 
more important to him than the trials of a hundred Schachts or von Papens, and it 
prejudiced his feelings toward American Military Government accordingly.   
 
For the citizens of small cities, towns, and villages, Yakoubian wrote, the face of the Nazi 
regime had belonged to “the activists in their own small localities.  The innkeeper, the 
butcher, the county lawyer, or the village mayor who was a rabid Nazi and who had 
dominated the browbeaten people with arrogance and threats.”408 
Faced with such a complex array of experiences and expectations, yet still 
determined to vigorously pursue denazification, American officials were also troubled about 
the possibility of inciting adverse reactions.  Thus, even as the Office of Military 
Government, United States (OMGUS) pressed state officials to put the Liberation Law in 
motion during the summer and fall of 1946, officials had long since begun to monitor 
German responses to denazification policies and to look for ways to actively shape public 
opinion.409  In Hesse, these efforts were frequently out of step with Liberation Ministry 
exertions to catch up to the pace of events.  Within days of transferring the camp at 
Darmstadt, for example, Teitelbaum queried Binder about plans to educate the public on 
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“the relationship of the Denazification Law to the development of democratic procedures in 
Germany and to popularize service as public prosecutors and members of tribunals.”  He 
asked that leading officials such as mayors offer speeches within local communities.  
Moreover, Teitelbaum requested to know more about Information und Erziehung 
(Information and Education), the department that would be responsible for such matters.410  
Binder had meanwhile already begun to publicly acknowledge difficulties in administering 
the Liberation Law’s sweeping provisions—first in a report to the Länderrat and 
subsequently in a radio address.411   
While Teitelbaum pushed the Liberation Ministry for plans to popularize the 
denazification program, letters and petitions from inside the camp at Darmstadt sought in 
various ways to ameliorate internees’ circumstances. An 8-page appeal by the 
Lagerselbstverwaltung (camp self-administration) to Binder one week before the handover, 
for example, illustrates the extent to which those waiting to appear before the tribunals had 
already delved into the Liberation Law’s provisions and intended to communicate their 
interpretations of what constituted fair and just procedure.  Among other things the letter, 
cosigned by the internee Bürgermeister and Stadtrat Chairman, objected to the practice of 
continuing proceedings in spite of internees’ lack of ready access to defense counsel.  This 
issue was compounded by frequent difficulties in getting witnesses to the camp to speak on 
respondents’ behalf.  As a result, the two men asserted, sentences were much more stringent 
than those passed outside the camp.  Furthermore, such a “schematic” approach neither met 
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the provisions of the Liberation Law, nor made an earnest attempt to ascertain the degree to 
which a given individual had actually supported “Nazi tyranny.”412   
Written less than a month after OMGH liaison officer Orson Jones remarked that 
initial tribunal results had visibly shaken internee morale, the appeal directly compared two 
local cases with the first two sentences at Moosburg to argue that Lagerspruchkammer 
proceedings at Darmstadt were being disproportionately severe.  Whereas at Darmstadt both 
respondents were found to be Class II (Activists), in the Bavarian enclosure the internees 
were not only deemed Minor Offenders, but also released during the camp’s handover 
ceremony.413 
An anonymous petition from inside the camp at Darmstadt to the Landtagsfraktion 
der Sozialdemokratischen Partei (Social Democratic representatives in the state parliament) 
invoked several key elements of public frustration with denazification.  Dated 24 December 
1946, on the one hand the letter emphasized internees’ willingness to make atonement in the 
name of reconstruction and to participate in building a democracy.  “On the other hand,” it 
insisted, “we want to be treated as human beings.”  The petition described austere, 
overcrowded conditions and brusque treatment in the area recently designated as a labor 
camp (Arbeitslager), characterizing it as nothing more than a Nazi concentration camp under 
a different label.  Rather than industrialists, profiteers and intellectual elites who had held 
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leadership positions in the Third Reich, the letter claimed that inmates were workers, small 
shop owners, farmers, and civil servants:  “They hang the little guy and the bigwigs can use 
their money to remove their brown color.” 414  
The implication that improperly confronting the past would endanger the future 
permeates the document through questions such as:  “Are the human rights envisioned in the 
new constitution only paper guarantees?” and “are we falling right into our old mistakes?”  
Moreover, the statement “We are urgently requesting relief, regardless of which party 
wishes to honestly and fairly address these matters” indicates an astute desire to tap into the 
universal frustrations underlying differing agendas.   In closing, the appeal asked that the 
entire Landtag be informed of conditions in the Arbeitslager “in order to finally put an end 
to the political atmosphere.”415 
This petition reinforces the point that within less than a year of the Liberation Law’s 
enactment the denazification program had already become highly politicized.  Moreover, it 
illustrates that civilian internees were actively deploying rhetorical strategies and attempting 
to take part in developing conversations related to democracy.  As 1946 came to a close, 
rather than a framework for moving forward, the apparatus set up under the law was 
generally regarded, not without reason, as a logistical quagmire.  With the exception of 
Communists, who at this point still comprised a relatively high proportion of tribunal staffs, 
political leaders of various ideological bents had recognized the benefits of simultaneously 
distancing themselves from the denazification process while taking advantage of rich 
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opportunities to actively critique it.  As the following will demonstrate, against the backdrop 
of deteriorating Four Power relations and disagreements among German and American 
officials over how best to lay the foundation for democratization efforts, public 
dissatisfaction with denazification intensified over the course of 1947.  
 
Contention Reaches its Peak:  The Divergence in American and German Perspectives 
 “Deputy Military Governor Lieut. Gen. Lucius D. Clay will announce next week his 
verdict on his sixty-day trial of German handling of denazification.  He will make the 
announcement during the first meeting of the recently elected Minister-Presidents in the 
three States in the United States zone.”  Less than two months after his tour of 
Internierungslager Darmstadt, Dana Adams Schmidt posted a survey of major 
developments related to denazification since the handover to German officials.  In contrast 
to his earlier article, this account was permeated by a clearly discernible pessimism and, 
albeit from an American perspective, offered a much clearer depiction of the pervasive 
atmosphere of disagreement and doubt that had quickly surrounded efforts to expunge 
Nazism from German society.  He wrote, for example, that in the view of American 
authorities the entire program was “extremely sick.”  Largely because the military 
government lacked sufficient personnel to reassume primary responsibility for 
denazification, however, it was likely to remain under German administration.  Schmidt also 
surmised that to support this decision Clay might draw upon Minister-President provided 
statistics showing an increase in the number of those charged as major offenders who were 
determined by tribunal to be in this category.  According to Schmidt, these figures gave a 
“misleading” impression of increased stringency because, among other things, they 
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contained the “first reports from tribunals set up in internment camps, where a high 
proportion of Nazis was presumably confined.”416 
Tightly woven around a very bleak prognosis, Schmidt’s survey was replete with 
criticisms directed toward both military government and German officials.  In his view, the 
sheer magnitude of the much-too-ambitious undertaking had effectively thwarted authorities 
on both sides.  His tally of resolved tribunal and amnesty cases, rather than an 
acknowledgment of progress, thus provided a vehicle to emphasize the sheer number that 
remained: 1,740,000.  The opportunity to effect a social revolution, “of which some military 
government denazification theorists dream,” he wrote, had been lost amid the phenomenon 
of “responsible men” avoiding repercussions while Spruchkammern were “overwhelmed 
with a mass of small fry demanding to be cleared so as to resume their former employment.”  
The fact that OMGUS—prodded by German officials—had turned to successive amnesties 
to reduce the number of chargeable cases, he asserted, amounted to “an admission that the 
denazification law tried to include too many persons.”  Moreover, the recent highly 
politicized Bavarian contest to elect a Minister President demonstrated that denazification 
could be exploited to eliminate political opponents and highlighted the fact that, “except for 
complete newcomers, a high proportion of men in German public life have some kind of egg 
on their vests that can be seen when turned to the light.”417 
Beneath its criticisms, Schmidt’s account offers key insights into a defining period of 
contention characterized by substantial popular dissatisfaction with denazification policies 
as well as increasingly visible disagreements among German and American officials 
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regarding the way forward.  In particular, the article reflects significant pockets of American 
distrust over German handling of the program. Citing an unnamed source, for example, 
Schmidt quoted an OMGUS Special Branch report that had determined tribunal 
classifications “showed a tendency toward becoming milder from month to month.”  His use 
of words such as “convicted,” “penalty,” and “accused” mirrors American officials’ 
inclination to view the Spruchkammer process from a legalistic perspective, which as 
Yakoubian later described, led to German criticisms that the program was largely an ex post 
facto attempt to make “political belief a punishable crime.”418  It was during this period, as 
the denazification program became enmeshed in procedural disputes, that Ministry officials 
most visibly attempted to mediate public expectations, American guidance, and their own 
views regarding denazification.  
Signs of popular displeasure with denazification policies took numerous forms.  In 
late January 1947, for example, correspondence sent through Information Control Division 
channels reported “almost unanimous disapproval” at news that identification cards would 
record individual status under the Liberation Law.  “It can be said that 90% of the people are 
against this measure, including Nazis, anti-Nazis and concentration camp victims.”  Among 
the criticisms cited, non-party members indicated that such a step would “exacerbate 
existing political differences and split the German people” acting, in the words of a Social 
Democrat employed in the Kassel city administration, “as a barrier when we try to win the 
cooperation of former Nazis for our democratic state.”419  Roughly one month later, a local 
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Military Intelligence Service team reported negative reactions to a newsreel segment that 
showed portions of the Spruchkammer trial for Hitler’s former personal photographer, 
Heinrich Hoffmann.  After the prosecutor asked for a ten-year labor camp sentence, the 
report noted, “boos were heard throughout the audience.  And when the prosecutor stated he 
would like to have Hoffmann sentenced for life the boos increased in intensity.”420  
In one of the more highly publicized incidents, the Nuremberg office of Camille 
Sachs was bombed on 1 February 1947.  President of the denazification court trying Franz 
von Papen after his acquittal of war crimes by the IMT, Sachs was quoted as saying that the 
bombing and the case were linked.  The explosion damaged the building, which also housed 
Social Democratic Party offices, but no casualties were reported.421  In a survey of reactions 
to this and a spate of other attacks, American correspondent Delbert Clark later noted that 
the incident had “aroused a vigorous campaign in the German press” and elicited a 
multiplicity of responses.  In his view, the bombing was part of a larger pattern of individual 
“terrorist acts” that reflected the German public’s resentment of occupation policies.  
Among the several examples he offered to make this case, two at the premier of Ernst 
Toller’s play “Pastor Halle” stand out.  After noted dramatist and resistance member 
Günther Weiseborn described “the horrors of concentration camps,” Clark wrote, one 
audience member cried, “He lies, He lies!” and left.  “During the second act, which shows 
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an actual torture camp scene,” he continued, “two young persons were heard to remark, 
‘Why show us this?  Our parents are in camps now, so what’s the difference?’”422   
On 6 February 1947, Teitelbaum sent a copy of a press release to the Liberation 
Ministry suggesting that the “Publicity Department” use its talking points to generate public 
support for the denazification program.  Binder forwarded the somewhat lengthy statement 
to the head of Information und Erziehung, Robert Werner, on 24 February.  The timing of 
this press release reflects ongoing American efforts to both clarify and reconnect with the 
intent of denazification.  The substance suggests a desire to address frustrations that, 
beginning with thoroughgoing arrests and successive rounds of removals from office in mid-
to late-1945, the program had been too indiscriminately applied.423  Moreover, the military 
government sought to compensate for the fact that the program had become unwieldy and, 
particularly in the case of the internment camps, quite static.  In short, the release weaved 
together elements of reconstruction, reintegration, and justice in a clumsy effort to make 
denazification more palatable to a German public whose support was waning after nearly a 
year of practical contact with the Liberation Law.  “The original purpose of US 
denazification procedure,” the release emphasized, “was to remove active Nazis and 
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supporters of Nazism and Militarism from positions of importance in public or private life 
and replace them with believers in democratic living.”424   
According to the statement, criticisms of the Liberation Law as ex post facto 
punishment against those who might have joined the Party for a variety of reasons missed 
the legislation’s very point, which was to provide a mechanism for individual and collective 
rehabilitation:   
The ideological basis for the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and 
Militarism is twofold.  Its first purpose is to allow individual judgments of persons 
rather than purely on a category basis, so that those who were merely nominal 
members of the NSDAP may return to their place in society without restriction.  The 
second basis for this law is that individuals who were active in the Party or its 
affiliated organizations should, to the degree of their activity, contribute to the 
reconstruction of German social and economic life. 425  
 
The commonalities between the official OMGH statement and Adenauer’s “stock 
speech” are particularly striking.  Yet, whereas Adenauer invoked Germans’ collective sense 
of wartime suffering as a source of unity and, in the process, criticized denazification, the 
military government used its own version of victimization discourse in an attempt to justify 
the program.  The press release described the wide swaths of destruction clearly visible “in 
the streets of any German city,” and linked the need to rebuild “destroyed houses, factories 
and other buildings” with regaining Germany’s status as an independent nation.  According 
to the military government formulation, the pivotal question was, “Who should be called 
upon to finance such rebuilding except those who are responsible for the destruction”?   
Everyone in Germany, even anti Nazis, will bear their part of the costs through 
increased taxes and through their personal losses.  But those enthusiastic ‘heilers’ 
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who helped the Nazi tyranny to first overrun Germany and then the neighboring 
countries, should bear more than that.  Thus, the tribunals sitting in judgment of an 
individual included under the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and 
Militarism are not determining guilt for a crime nor are they punishing for a crime.  
They are actually determining how much the particular individual should be called 
upon to contribute to the rebuilding of the destruction which he has caused.  Thus, 
the nominal Nazi is required only to pay a monetary fine.  The real activist on the 
other hand has his property confiscated by the state and he himself is compelled to 
render personal service either in his home community or as a result of being 
confined in a labor camp.  It should be pointed out that these individuals are not 
placed in a prison but in a labor camp, where they will work on the removal of 
rubble and the rebuilding of the destruction for which they are responsible.426  
 
On the whole, such statements sought to reconcile denazification with democratic 
ideals by pointing to their interdependence.  Furthermore, under Binder’s leadership the 
Ministry for Political Liberation in Hesse implemented the Liberation Law with both 
sincerity and conviction.427  Binder opened his remarks at later parliamentary debates over 
denazification reforms, for example, by acknowledging the high degree of popular 
dissatisfaction with the entire program.  But he went on to say, “I am firmly convinced that 
we absolutely must purge National Socialism’s remnants, and not only as a requirement of 
the occupation, but also because a self-cleansing is necessary for the fate of our people.   
The rest of the world undoubtedly has a legitimate interest in finding out whether this time 
Germany has really done away with militarism, nationalism and National Socialism.”428  
Much like Teitelbaum’s press release, Binder also emphasized that a labor camp sentence 
was not punishment but “rather a mechanism that served the purpose of enabling heavily 
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incriminated National Socialists to make partial compensation, while during this time 
keeping them from having any public influence.”429  
This is not to suggest that Binder, or his counterparts in Bavaria and Württemberg-
Baden for that matter, agreed with the American approach to denazification.  In fact, by 
early 1947 the realization that processing cases would take much longer than originally 
anticipated had combined with a number of key sticking points between American and 
German officials to result in an unpleasant mixture of mutual frustrations.430  Mounting 
public pressure on both sides of the Atlantic exacerbated the pervading sense of crisis.431  In 
a report filed at the conclusion of his OMGH assignment, for example, Yakoubian criticized 
the influence that “the avowedly democratic parties” were able to exert upon the Ministry to 
reappoint dismissed officials who had shown “themselves to be totally unfit to carry out the 
denazification law.”  In his view, the Ministry’s susceptibility to such pressures had led to 
situations in which Military Government too often had to intervene by directly ordering that 
the individual not be reinstated.  “This resulted in the growth of a certain amount of 
resentment and the claim that Military Government was arbitrary.”432   
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In his examination of denazification and the Protestant Church, historian Clemens 
Vollnhals encapsulated the sense of urgency collectively felt by Denazification Ministers to 
revise the program at the beginning of 1947.  Highlighting their increasing awareness of the 
need to negotiate popular opinion, political reactions and American guidance, he cited an 
internal memorandum in which Württemberg-Baden’s Gottlob Kamm expressed dismay at 
rising public criticism and lackluster support from political parties.  “Based on its results,” 
Kamm wrote, “the Liberation Law no longer serves but rather hinders its original purpose, 
the democratization of the German people.”   Vollhhals also found that a Hessian Liberation 
Ministry report recorded unanimous agreement among those responsible for denazification 
that the crux of the crisis was the program’s broad scope.  German officials thus called for 
such changes as removal of the temporary employment restriction for those presumed to be 
less incriminated, and for those who joined the Party in 1933 to be treated similarly to those 
who joined in 1937.  In addition to insisting on fewer disputes of tribunal findings by 
Military Government, they also pushed for the closing of civilian internment camps.433 
Binder’s use of the phrase “self-cleansing” takes on increased resonance when 
considered in light of German denazification officials’ efforts to convince American 
authorities of the need to both scale back the program and permit more leeway in its 
implementation.  The fact that he made the reference when speaking before the Landtag 
illustrates, however, that he and like-minded ministry officials were also engaged in an 
earnest struggle to convince other Hessian leaders as well as the public of the need to see the 
program through.  Loss of ground in either one of these arenas carried the potential for 
immediate and decisive repercussions in the other.  Each report of mishandled cases, for 
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example, regardless of whether perceived or actual, reinforced the American view that 
German officials would not effectively carry out the program.  Similarly, American 
insistence on vigorous enforcement of the Delinquency and Error System as a way to press 
for greater stringency in tribunal proceedings was one of several ways that Military 
Government had begun routinely increasing Ministry and public frustrations.434   
Amid volleys over how to implement the Liberation Law—such as a bitter and 
persistent disagreement over whether Amtsträger, officials in the Nazi Party or one of its 
affiliated organizations, could be deemed Followers—several unresolved issues had 
particular ramifications for internees.435  These included, for example, the stance toward 
individuals’ claims that they were forced to join the Nazi Party or involuntarily transferred 
to the SS, and the applicability of the youth amnesty to SS members.  Meanwhile, the 
images evoked by lofty statements such as those in the OMGH press release were 
contradicted by several problems that derived especially from the circumstances under 
which Hessian officials assumed responsibility for administering the denazification 
program.  From the outset, the Ministry had to contend with persistent shortages of 
personnel who were qualified, willing, and able to operate not just the tribunals at 
Internierungslager Darmstadt, but over 100 others located at city and county levels.436   
The continual process of vetting tribunal staff members, energetically overseen by 
the Denazification Division, magnified Ministry difficulties in maintaining a suitable 
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workforce.437  The challenges of establishing viable security, coupled with the need to send 
internees outside the camp for work details contributed to a worrisome incidence of 
escapes.438  Moreover, attempts to project an image of progress in adjudicating individual 
cases following announcement of the Nuremberg verdicts were substantially undercut by the 
fact that, albeit largely due to transfers from other enclosures, by February 1947 the internee 
population had actually increased to 11,354.439  On top of this, the camp’s lack of 
winterization, a problem exacerbated by Third Army insistence on maintaining a separate 
American compound and long since a source of concern for Hessian authorities, did not go 
unnoticed by residents of surrounding areas. 
Against this backdrop, the internment camp at Darmstadt served as grist for local 
rumor mills and was increasingly perceived as a troubling emblem of the chasm between 
rhetoric and reality.440  By early 1947 OMGH and Ministry officials were fielding piercing 
questions from the media and prominent members of nearby communities.  At bottom, these 
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queries reflected the keen desire to know whether and when heavily incriminated Nazis 
would be prevented from regaining positions of influence.  An exchange between OMGH 
Director Newman and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Mainz, also demonstrates, however, 
that local criticisms had begun to include convictions similar to those expressed by 
Adenauer; namely that the time had come to consider reintegration.  On 25 January, after 
providing church services in the enclosure during the Advent season, the Most Reverend 
Albert Stohr co-signed a letter with the President of the Protestant Church in Hesse raising 
concerns about the impacts of difficult living conditions, particularly on the severely injured 
and sick.  In addition, the two alleged a breakdown in machinery for releasing those 
internees cleared by tribunals as well as others who were not subject to provisions of the 
Liberation Law.  Some, they indicated, had not even been members of the Nazi Party.  
Furthermore, a number of the internees they encountered had not only turned away from 
“fascist spirit and thoughts,” but were also ready to “participate in a new German life.”441   
While pleading for Darmstadt’s civilian internees offered a prime opportunity for 
members of the clergy to further criticize denazification, Stohr’s letter nevertheless voiced 
concerns shared by several Hessian officials.442  For the most part, Newman’s response 
reveals that Schmidt had not been completely off base when he wryly observed in his 
November 1946 New York Times article that the Americans had distanced themselves from 
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civilian internment.  Newman challenged several of the details raised in Stohr’s letter, yet 
also made it quite clear that the American Military Government had transferred the 
enclosure to Hessian authorities.   “Most of the points you raise in your letter,” Newman 
replied, “are problems of general administration which are entirely in the hands of the 
German Ministry for Political Liberation.”  Moreover, the issue of purported changes of 
heart was a matter to be handled via the Liberation Law:  “As to your statement that various 
internees have now indicated a change of mentality which liberates them from fascist spirit 
and thoughts, when they appear before tribunals to have their cases determined, any such 
matter will be given full consideration.”443   
Newman’s carefully crafted statement avoided judging the extent to which such 
professed willingness to support democracy could be believed.  Amid overarching concerns 
about circumstances in the camp, however, lay persistent doubts about that very question.  In 
the meantime, military government officials were increasingly pulled between the goals of 
closely scrutinizing Ministry handling of cases and establishing forward momentum.444  On 
21 January 1947, Teitelbaum instructed camp liaison Raymond O. Didlo to expeditiously 
authorize the release of internees “in those cases where the prosecutor has determined that 
the individuals do not fall under the law or after decision of a tribunal.”  Significantly, 
Teitelbaum acknowledged instances of internees being improperly held:  “It is my 
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understanding…that 53 individuals have been found by the public prosecutor not to fall 
under the law.  I have noted myself in the last list of persons to be transferred for reasons of 
health, that one is being interned in the camp because he entered the American zone from 
the Russian zone illegally.”  He also stressed the importance of not retaining internees after 
trial solely on the basis of procedural errors.  These, whenever possible, should be 
“corrected by a re-trial in their home communities.”445 
The chain of reactions to a 7 February 1947 letter in which the International Red 
Cross notified USFET G-5 of “unsatisfactory conditions” in Internierungslager Darmstadt 
provides several insights into diverging agendas between Military Government and Hessian 
officials with regard to civilian internment.  In the American case, the letter prompted a 
tightening of reigns that began with verbal notifications, quickly followed by a set of cables 
directing that IRC representatives not be permitted access to the enclosures.446  A later 
dissection of events by Chief of OMGUS Public Safety O.W. Wilson shows that the IRC’s 
ability to gain entry into any of the camps, which essentially contravened Clay’s guidance, 
brought to light differing conceptions regarding the boundary between American and 
German authority.  According to Wilson, after meeting with USFET Deputy Chief of Staff 
Major General M.G. White during the previous fall, IRC representatives had understood 
they were cleared to coordinate directly with German officials and did so in order to visit 
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Bavarian enclosures at Moosburg and Göggingen roughly one month later.  The following 
January, when the IRC called on Colonel Speidel at USFET G-5 to request permission to 
enter the camp at Darmstadt, he in turn contacted Teitelbaum, who “stated he had no 
objection to their visiting the enclosure if they had permission from German authorities.”447 
Beginning with the issue of authority, Gottlob Binder promptly raised several 
objections upon receiving the order to deny future IRC access to labor and civilian 
internment camps.  “The camp at Darmstadt was handed over to me on 1.11.46 with the 
instruction that the whole camp administration should be an exclusively German matter and 
that I should only receive orders from the Occupation Authorities with regard to the release 
of internees.  I must consider the prohibition for Delegates of the International Red Cross to 
enter the camp as an infringement on the German Camp Administration.”  Binder was 
undoubtedly concerned by the public attention that, stoked by rumors about conditions at 
Internierungslager Darmstadt, had begun to increasingly turn toward the camp.  IRC 
inspections, he wrote, would not only provide those outside Germany with a clearer picture 
of circumstances in the enclosure, but would enable the German public to better identify 
baseless claims.  Much as the IRC representatives had done when speaking with Major 
General White at USFET, he cautioned that the order prohibiting IRC entry would generate 
                                                 
447
 Wilson forwarded two memos for record sent to him by Chief of USFET G-5 CI Branch Colonel Wm. H. 
Speidel, detailing White’s conversation with IRC representatives. While IRC entry into the camps showed a 
breakdown in communications between USFET and OMGUS, White’s notes indicate that in addition to 
requesting permission from German authorities, he still expected a formal request to come through American 
channels as well.  Letter, O.W. Wilson to OMGUS Chief of Staff, 24 Feb 47 (with attachments), NARA RG 
260 OMGUS, Records of the Civil Affairs Division, Public Safety Branch: Records Related to Denazification, 
1945-49, Box 329, F:  Civilian Internment Enclosures 18.  
 
   
 
 213
“unreliable comparisons” to the National Socialist period “by ill-disposed elements” since it 
was widely known that the IRC was not allowed in the Nazi camps.448   
In contrast to his other points, which in many ways stemmed from ideological and 
procedural disagreements, Binder stressed a decidedly practical issue that was very likely a 
key motive behind his objections.  “Besides I also have great interest,” he wrote, “that the 
International Red Cross takes care of the Darmstädter Camp because I hope that the 
Committee may be in a position and is willing to organize relief supplies of such goods 
which are no longer at the disposal of German offices and are not furnished by the other 
side.”  His deputy, Ministerialdirektor Knappstein, later thanked the IRC Delegation in 
Frankfurt for the visit to the camp, relayed the OMGUS order prohibiting future access, and 
assured the representatives that both he and Minister Binder had duly protested.  In addition, 
Knappstein emphasized his personal interest in ensuring that the international community 
was “regularly informed of conditions in the camps,” indicating that he would make every 
effort to have the prohibition removed and that he would request the matter be placed on the 
next meeting agenda of the Denazifizierungsausschuss des Länderrates (German Ministerial 
Denazification Committee) in Stuttgart.449   
Thus, by the spring of 1947 a lively debate with both ideological and practical 
components was underway that was driven by increased public interest in the purposes and 
operation of civilian internment camps.  While on the one hand, the very process of 
negotiating the contention surrounding the problem of how to effectively root out Nazism 
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arguably contributed to democratization in several important ways; on the other, the 
resulting exchanges only buffered the belief that both the denazification and civilian 
internment programs were ineffective.   
 
‘The Brightest Light of Scrutiny’:  Efforts to Address Perceptions of Lager Darmstadt 
As head of the Ministry for Political Liberation, Gottlob Binder was especially 
attuned to the fact that Internierungslager Darmstadt was actively regarded through 
multiple, often contending, lenses.   “It is very telling,” he observed during remarks at 4 July 
1947 parliamentary debates over denazification reforms, “that accusations concerning the 
conditions in this internment camp are of an altogether contradictory nature.”  Some, he 
continued, depicted the confinement as a “stay at a primitive health resort” (primitiven 
Kuraufenthalts) in which, although internees couldn’t come and go as they pleased, they 
were relatively well cared for; others claimed that conditions were not that far from those in 
Nazi concentration camps.  “As is often the case,” Binder stressed, “the truth lies in the 
middle.”  It was in an effort to locate that middle ground that he had invited Buchenwald 
survivor Eugen Kogon to inspect the enclosure.450   
In the resulting report’s foreword, Binder emphasized that he welcomed the 
opportunity to cast “the brightest light of scrutiny on conditions in the camp at Darmstadt.”  
As such, he had requested the visit within just three months of the handover and turned to 
Kogon—author of the first systematic examination of Nazi concentration camps—instead of 
officials within his own ministry.  Furthermore, he invited the Landtag to establish a special 
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investigative committee (Sonderkommission) to verify the document’s findings.451  That he 
addressed such points in his foreword illustrates the extent to which heightened 
politicization had become a palpable feature of the landscape within which the Ministry 
operated.452  More than this, particularly when viewed in light of his previous push for 
transparency through IRC visits, Binder’s approach demonstrates that he hoped to use the 
inspection as a way to influence ongoing debates.    
In his remarks before the Landtag, Binder not only placed Internierungslager 
Darmstadt at the very center of the large collection of problems associated with 
denazification, but also explicitly addressed key chafing points such as internees’ 
comparatively high calorie rations and lack of productive work.  The emphasis he placed on 
these issues reflects the high degree of public interest in civilian internment—in the press, 
over the airwaves, and in political discourse—that became especially apparent during the 
first half of 1947.453  As Binder aptly noted, on the surface this conversation was replete 
with juxtaposed images and contrasting depictions.  Yet, within this constellation of 
differing viewpoints, discussions were clustered around a core set of fundamental questions 
with which the Ministry had already been grappling for some time; namely:  who was in the 
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camp and why; how did conditions inside compare with those outside; and what were the 
internees doing on a day-to-day basis?  Amid these concerns, one question had bubbled very 
visibly and undeniably to the surface—what was the way forward? 
A New York Times article by journalist Shepard Stone, who had experienced 
Germany during Hitler’s rise to power as a doctoral student in History and served in the US 
Army from 1942 to 1946, typified the American tendency to also concentrate on these 
questions.454  Published only two months after the transfer, the short blurb was accompanied 
by four prominent photographs depicting various facets of camp life and conveyed a 
strikingly positive tone reminiscent of Schmidt’s November 1946 account.  “With the 
amnesty proclaimed Christmas Eve for 800,000 ‘little’ Nazis in the American Zone of 
Germany,” Stone began, “it is expected that more vigorous action will be taken against the 
‘big’ fry, thousands of whom are interned in American and German civilian internment 
camps.”  He explained that internees were those suspected of war crimes or of posing a 
threat to occupation forces, along with “so-called ‘automatic arrests,’ persons who held high 
office in the Nazi hierarchy, members of the Gestapo, SS and other Nazi organizations.  
Among those detained,” he continued, “are industrialists who are expected to go on trial at 
Nuremberg next month.”  Of Darmstadt, he noted quite simply:  “There are two camps 
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here—the American controlled enclosure, with the more important Nazis and war criminals, 
and a German camp for the less important.”455   
Stone provided only the briefest of glimpses into the enclosure and offered little in 
the way of specific detail, as evidenced by his response to widespread comparisons with 
concentration camps.  “Although there have been cases of bad treatment and some innocent 
persons have been detained,” he wrote, “Camp 91 at Darmstadt is a rest home compared 
with Buchenwald and Dachau in the days of Hitler.”  His account reflects the inclination—
still exhibited especially in the American press—to depict internees as a large amorphous 
group, using phrases such as “once arrogant Nazis.”456  The conversation that surrounded 
Internierungslager Darmstadt in 1947, however, illustrates that the German public’s desire 
to know more about the camps and those held in them had outpaced such broad-brush 
depictions.  Moreover, although American and German authorities’ responses to the 
increasing scrutiny reveal different priorities in negotiating specific issues, they also reflect 
unmistakable anxiety over the incongruity between civilian internment and democratization.  
While the Military Government focused much of its attention on mechanics—finding 
ways to accelerate the processing of cases, for example, Hessian officials became 
progressively concerned about the effects of long-term internment.  They were particularly 
troubled about the atmosphere that had taken hold in the enclosure and a number of them 
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shared the belief that automatic arrest criteria had cast much too wide a net.457  In addition, 
varied assertions within the press that the Landesamt had been relying too heavily on the 
Lagerselbstverwaltung opened the door to the question of whether the internees, or even 
worse Nazi elements, had undue influence in the camp.  Beyond this, the issue of whether 
internees could be expected to support democracy was one of several on the minds of the 
public and local officials alike.  Faced with such concerns, key Ministry officials became 
acutely aware of the distance separating the postwar communities that had formed on each 
side of the barbed wire.458 
In early February, Robert Werner documented his impressions on these and other 
points following a cursory inspection of Internierungslager Darmstadt that consisted of 
visiting numerous tents and speaking with twelve internees whose credibility, he wrote, had 
been vouched for by persons known to him.  Although certainly not the only public official 
to describe conditions in the camp, his reports clearly suggest that Werner viewed speaking 
for the internees as a major component of his task.  Moreover, by virtue of his ministerial 
role as head of Information und Erziehung, in many ways Werner served as an intermediary 
between those in the enclosure and the local community.  In his report, he repeatedly 
stressed that conditions in the camp were at least as good, and in some ways better, than 
those experienced by the population at large.  He thus rejected the parallels that were 
popular among internees and in some local circles between the Internierungslager and 
concentration camps, noting:  “The provisions in the camp are clearly sufficient.  On 
                                                 
457
 See, for example, Dr. von Brentano’s remarks during the 4 July deliberations over denazification reforms in 
Kropat, Hessische Landtagsdebatten, 4 Jul 47, 269.   
 
458
 This notion of becoming aware of the separateness is reinforced by reports from various visits to the camp, 
such as from a group of SPD officials in early January.  See, “Bericht eines Besuches des Interniertenlagers in 
Darmstadt am Montag den 20. Januar 1947,” HHStAW 501/814.  
 
   
 
 219
average, the internees appear to be less undernourished than the people in our city 
streets.”459  
The shortage of clothing and footwear, Werner wrote, was something the internees 
had in common with the rest of the population.  The same could be said for medical care, 
which suffered from insufficient facilities as well as a general lack of instruments and 
medications.  While dismissing accusations that the internees were not adequately cared for, 
particularly in light of difficulties outside the barbed wire, in several cases Werner 
nevertheless also indicated that internee grievances were not baseless.  At the time of his 
writing, the camp still suffered under many of the same shortcomings described by the 
Interior Ministry’s medical branch following inspections in the previous December.  He 
noted pointedly, for example, that the use of tents as housing—an interim measure still in 
place after two years—was “utterly insufficient and questionable, especially in winter.”  
With a considerable number of buildings in the American sector now empty, he observed, 
the continued reliance on tents was even more unfathomable.  Speaking about how detainees 
were treated, Werner wrote, “I haven’t heard a single complaint in this regard, but much 
appreciation for the German administration’s efforts to eliminate shortages.”460   
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Because of widely varying comments on the subject of the Lagerselbstverwaltung, 
Werner’s impression was more ambivalent.  He found indications of what he described as a 
“ruling stratum” (herrschende Schicht), but observed that without further information it was 
not possible to say whether it stemmed from “deliberate choice according to political criteria 
or a natural selection based on abilities without conspiratorial character.”   He suggested that 
comments on the daily agenda such as “Darmstadt is firmly in the hands of the SS” didn’t 
necessarily imply the formation of dangerous cliques but might instead be “customary 
grandiloquence.”  Werner’s remarks indicate he was less alarmed by the significance of such 
statements than at what he viewed to be a much more pressing concern, the instance of 
internees being held without justification.461 
A 7-page press release forwarded by Landesamtdirektor Jakob Weyand to Binder 
unmistakably shows that by late February 1947 the enclosure at Darmstadt had become a 
magnet for substantial interest and criticism.  In an accompanying personal note, Weyand 
wrote that he had prepared the article as a response to the “latest press attacks related to 
circumstances in the Darmstadt camp,” and requested its release to Hessian newspapers.  
Indeed, the level of scrutiny had built up to the point that Weyand, in his view, needed to 
publicly set the record straight on several issues.  Moreover, members of the Landesamt 
(and in some cases the internees themselves) had begun to use the term Presseangriffe, 
which literally translates as “press attacks,” to collectively refer to the ongoing coverage.  
“The substance and form of recent varied press reports about allegedly insupportable 
circumstances in Lager Darmstadt bring me, in my responsibility as head of the Hessian 
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State Office for Internment and Labor Camps,” Weyand began the article, “to correct false 
claims and to put the facts that are unclearly represented here in their true light.”462  
Coupled with a mid-March 1947 exchange with press chief of the State Chancellery 
Fritz Bartsch, Weyand’s article provides an effective means to pinpoint the onset of 
heightened media interest in the camp.  “Recently,” he wrote to Bartsch, “the instance of 
representatives from various newspapers showing up by themselves and unannounced 
asking for entry into the camp in order to prepare reports for their publications has risen.”  
This situation was not only creating disturbances, he claimed, but also interfering with 
effective operation of the enclosure and could not be allowed to continue.  “Without wishing 
to limit freedom of the press or disclosure of camp affairs in any way, it must nevertheless 
be noted, that a minimum of three days notice needs to be given.”  Weyand appealed for 
assistance in regulating the flow of encounters with correspondents.  In his brief reply, 
Bartsch expressed understanding, suggested that media requests be referred to him, and 
agreed to contact Weyand to arrange specified times for future visits.463   
Both the tenor and language of Weyand’s writing convey a sense of feeling 
embattled by the heightened scrutiny.  “Out of the large number of attacks,” he indicated in 
the press release, he directed his comments toward what he viewed as the “most substantial” 
criticisms levied against Internierungslager Darmstadt.  The resulting list of allegations is 
unattributed and offers little explanation as to the selection criteria Weyand used.  The 
document is nonetheless quite instructive because eight of nine points he chose to rebut 
                                                 
462
 Jakob Weyand, “Das Interniertenlager Darmstadt und eine amtliche Richtigstellung,” 24 Feb 47 with cover 
letter to Binder, HHStAW 501/814 [hereafter: Weyand, “Official Correction”].  
 
463
 Letter Exchange, Weyand to Press Chief of the State Chancellery Fritz Bartsch, “Besichtigung der 
Internierten- und Arbeitslager im Lande Hessen durch Pressevertreter,” 10 Mar 47; and Pressereferent, 
Hessichen Staatsministerium an den Chef des Landesamtes für Internierungs- und Arbeitslager, 21 Mar 47, 
HHStAW 521/14.  The Landesamt files contain an unsigned copy of the State Press Office reply. 
 
   
 
 222
project an image of the internees as manipulative, obstructive, or both—suggesting that, 
particularly from Weyand’s perspective, this was one of the predominant lenses through 
which the camp was perceived.  In response to the idea that Lager Darmstadt held heavily 
incriminated activists (schwerbelastete Aktivisten) for whom any concession would be a 
weakness, for example, he explained that the internees transferred to German authorities had 
been screened by the CIC and cleared of suspicion of war crimes or perpetrating 
atrocities.464 
Several of the assertions described by Weyand derived from concerns that internees 
had undue influence over day-to-day operations inside the enclosure.  The scope of activities 
carried out by the Lagerselbstverwaltung, coupled with some of its members’ substantially 
better living conditions, only reinforced such misgivings.  Weyand dismissed claims that 
internees had access to confidential files, held the keys to gates, and carried identification 
cards.  He emphasized the sheer difficulty that would be involved in running such a large 
enclosure without the assistance of the internees; that the apparatus had been established 
when the camp was under American control; and that the Oberbürgermeister and head of 
the internee administration were appointed by German authorities while the remaining 
positions were democratically elected.  Furthermore, these elections were renewed every 
four months. Concerns that “the SS had seized the camp and exerted a complete system of 
terror,” he pointed out, had not been verified by any factual examination.  Moreover, 55.3% 
of the internee population had belonged to the SS, many after having been involuntarily 
pulled over from other organizations and holding adjusted rank (Angleichungsdientsgrad).  
It would thus be virtually impossible to bar them from participating in the self-
administration.  The “elements of the self-administration have provided ample proof of their 
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genuine cooperation since the takeover of Lager Darmstadt,” Weyand insisted, “such that I 
cannot cast doubt on either their discipline or goodwill.”465     
Weyand countered claims that news of recent violence in the Stuttgart area had been 
celebrated in the camp by pointing out that the Lagerselbstverwaltung issued a statement 
condemning this act of violence “immediately upon learning of it.”466  The resolution to 
which he referred was passed during a special session of the Stadtrat (camp council) on the 
afternoon of 13 February 1947.  In addition to expressing emphatic disapproval of the 
bombings against tribunal and other facilities, the resolution attributed such attacks to the 
type of people who acted out of the “irresponsible or pathological need for self-
aggrandizement.”  Moreover, it reiterated internees’ “genuine willingness” to do their part in 
reconstruction, insisting:  “We condemn such violent deeds even more so, as they are used 
to create the greatest possible unrest among the German population and to disrupt much-
needed rebuilding.”467  In a letter announcing the resolution to Binder, the camp 
Oberbürgermeister and Stadtrat Chairman expressed concern over the press campaign that 
had been waged against the camp and Lagerselbtsverwaltung after the attack on SPD offices 
in Nuremberg.  They suggested the press had been relying on information from former 
internees whose subjective views and descriptions, they insisted, were partly distorted and 
untrue.  Further, they declared themselves ready to provide any clarification necessary.468    
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While no doubt troubled by media allegations that implied the Landesamt was not 
fully in control of circumstances inside the enclosure, Weyand took particular issue with the 
assertion that internees were wholly unreceptive to democratic concepts.  According to this 
view, he wrote,  “anyone [in the camp] who dares to utter such thoughts can count on being 
on the receiving end of a beating.  There isn’t any discussion regarding the nature of 
democracy.  The internees put their political hopes on parliamentarism’s collapse.  They all 
seek revenge.”  Countering with an equally all-encompassing characterization, he averred:  
“In countless personal conversations, I have received the exact opposite impression.”  
According to Weyand, “the majority of internees were anxious to attain a new world-view 
and to mentally bring themselves into a life according to democratic requirements.”  Most, 
he insisted, wanted only to return to their families, to actively participate in reconstruction, 
and to refrain from any political activity.469   
A weekly report filed two days later by the Officer in Charge of the G-2 liaison 
detachment assigned to Lager Darmstadt, First Lieutenant Martin H. Weik, not only 
corroborates parts of Weyand’s claim, but also demonstrates the consistency with which 
those being held in the camp invoked key points.  The internees, Weik wrote, were “very 
bitter against the campaign in many German newspapers and radio which [did] not give the 
real picture of conditions and activities in the enclosure particularly the SS being accused 
with underground activities in camp.  Their daily topic is to get released, rejoin their 
families, and to help provide for them.”  Weik also wrote of internees’ frustrations with the 
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slowness of tribunal operations and that they could “not understand why men who have 
never committed any crimes have been interned for almost two years.”470   
Behind the scenes, American intelligence officials were keeping close tabs on 
various communications related to civilian internment camps, including Internierungslager 
Darmstadt.  A flag raised by USFET G-2 Assistant Chief of Staff Major General Withers A. 
Burress shows that by February 1947 they were becoming increasingly concerned—from the 
standpoint of security as well as internees’ wellbeing.  Burress suggested (through USFET 
channels) that OMGUS be notified to look into circumstances in the enclosures.  “The 
attached censorship submissions together with observations made by other intelligence 
agencies indicate that present conditions in German internment camps and the guarding 
thereof by the German authorities may not be entirely satisfactory and should be made the 
subject of an overt investigation by Military Government,” Burress wrote.  He went on to 
say, “These submissions in themselves are not of course conclusive evidence of the 
conditions described; however, it is felt that there is enough ‘smoke’ to indicate that the 
present situation constitutes a security threat as well as an inhumane condition that should 
not go unnoticed.”  The handful of examples he offered, such as a 10 January 1947 
communication from an internee previously held at Dachau, suggested worse conditions in 
the enclosure at Darmstadt than elsewhere: 
Darling, the whole of my captivity I have never been housed as badly as I am here in 
the German camp.  One has almost to crawl into the tent.  The walls are covered 
with ice.  Everybody is crowding around the stove made of tin cans.  The wet wood 
gives little heat, but all the more smoke instead so that one gets inflamed eyes.  We 
are covered with dirt and soot.  We cannot think of doing our washing because the 
stuff would get dirty before it is dry.  The wood the ten of us burn every day would 
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suffice to keep ten homes warm...We have to sleep in our clothes or else, one 
freezes.  We slowly deteriorate and become weak of mind.  Many get sick and die.  
There is no chance for release.  What the papers write on this subject is mere 
eyewash…in every respect it was better in Dachau. 
 
On 21 February 1947, OMGUS Chief of Staff Brigadier General C.K. Gailey 
forwarded Burress’s letter and attached censorship submissions to the Information and 
Control Division, along with Clay’s instructions that Public Safety, in coordination with the 
Office of the Director of Intelligence, work with Land Military Government offices to 
thoroughly investigate “the Civil Internment problem.”471  Less than two weeks later and 
with media coverage on the upswing, Radio Frankfurt political commentator Fritz Fay 
broadcasted a detailed description of Internierungslager Darmstadt on the evening of 3 
March.  His remarks, along with the substance of Kogon’s report, clearly suggest that amid 
the widely varying allegations concerning conditions in the enclosure, the view had gained 
traction among German authorities that the civilian internment camp should be drawn down.  
 
‘We Didn’t Lose A Single Minute’:  Circumstances Surrounding Kogon’s Inspection 
Fay, an SPD member, began his broadcast with a somewhat oft-used introductory 
device:  “Internierungslager Darmstadt is one of the most heavily talked about subjects in 
Hesse.  Anyone who asks around will consistently hear completely contradictory opinions 
and descriptions.”  He announced that, because of what he described as recent biased 
newspaper reports, he had spent an entire day at the camp speaking with the German 
administration, guards, Lagerselbstverwaltung, and other internees.  While his address 
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comes across as an earnest attempt to enlighten the public about the enclosure, it also exudes 
support for the Ministry on a number of points.472  He emphasized, for example, that arrests 
had been carried out under Military Government orders and that, although the camp had 
since been turned over to German administration, the authority to grant releases had not.  He 
also addressed the rate of escapes over the past two-to-three months explaining, among other 
things, that the limited number of available camp guards “had only just recently been 
reinforced by a small group of better trained police officials.”473   
With roughly 11,000 internees and as the only civilian internment camp in Hesse, 
Fay described the span of Internierungslager Darmstadt as “its decisive limitation.”  In his 
view, this made well-planned employment of those willing and capable of working virtually 
impossible.  “The situation had inevitably developed,” he confirmed, “in which the majority 
of internees had spent several months, even more than a year, idle.”  Rather than focus on 
the fact that a fairly large potential workforce was not being effectively tapped to rebuild 
local communities, however, Fay went straight to the issue of preparing detainees to be 
reintegrated.  Their inactivity, he criticized, was “not in the least desirable, because the 
purpose of the camp after all [was] also to have an educational impact on the internees.”474   
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As Weyand had done in his press release, Fay indicated that the enclosure’s size 
made relying on the internees in running the camp a virtual necessity.  Ultimately, his 
overall impression of the Lagerselbstverwaltung was nevertheless somewhat mixed.  He 
found that some of those in key positions were genuinely willing to cooperate; “however,” 
he elaborated, “one cannot say this of everyone.”  Moreover, recognizing that influence 
within the camp did not necessarily only derive from formal positions, he recommended 
changes among those who held various functional responsibilities.  “It comes with the 
territory, as is very nearly almost always also the case with the military, that those who 
fulfill some functions in such a group can wield a certain amount of power.”475  Fay drew a 
handful of parallels, including mess sergeants in the army and trustees in prisons.  Although 
he acknowledged the potential for grievances, he stressed the negative impacts that would 
result from trying to pull the internee self-administration from the camp organizational 
structure.476   
The primary thrust of Fay’s broadcast was directed toward making the point that the 
camp’s population was not a homogeneous group.  Throughout his remarks he constructed a 
dichotomous representation consisting of, on the one hand former active and very powerful 
party functionaries and, on the other a large collection of members from various 
organizations who had been detained on the basis of “general criteria”—a reference to the 
scope of automatic arrests.  He imbued the resulting image with a sense of urgency by 
contrasting the attitudes of those who still had hopes of eventually leaving 
Internierungslager Darmstadt with “old fighters” who were only too aware that their release 
from civilian internment would mean transfer to labor camps.   Among the first group, Fay 
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called attention to the significant number of younger internees who “really fell under the 
criteria for the youth amnesty,” but remained in the enclosure because the “necessary 
instructions had not yet been issued.”  Likewise he pointed out that, based on the way legal 
guidelines had unfolded, a number of internees who had been involuntarily transferred from 
the army to the Waffen-SS no longer fell under the Liberation Law’s provisions. What he did 
not mention, however, was that differing interpretations related to both of these issues had 
generated substantial disagreement between American officials and the Ministry.477 
On the whole, Fay’s broadcast comes across as an attempt to debunk claims about 
Internierungslager Darmstadt swirling around in public and political circles while also 
intimating dissatisfaction with military government policies.  Beyond this, it was an effort to 
illustrate the sheer difficulty in running an operation of the camp’s magnitude and to argue 
the need to reduce its scope—elements that would also feature prominently in Eugon 
Kogon’s inspection report.  Fay closed by describing the situation as “precarious” and 
cautioning that the camp held “irreconcilable opponents of democracy and human rights” 
alongside many who were “by all means of goodwill.”  He suggested that as soon as 
possible those willing and capable of labor be placed in satellite camps in order to avoid the 
need to transport them to work sites.  In addition, he urged that severely incriminated 
internees, especially former high-ranking Nazi Party functionaries and SS leaders, be 
excluded from electing members to, and participating in, the self-administration.  He 
reiterated the need for frequent turnover in key positions to avoid the danger of an internee 
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bureaucracy that only too easily might lead to a sinister spirit in the camp, signs of which he 
urged, were already apparent.478 
On the heels of Fay’s broadcast, Eugen Kogon and fellow Buchenwald survivor 
Ferdinand Römhild entered Internierungslager Darmstadt at 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 4 March 
1947, armed with access letters signed by Binder that called upon administrators to 
cooperate fully with their fact-finding mission.  In addition, they carried a list of 25 
questions based upon their years of concentration camp experience.  The two remained until 
5 p.m. on Thursday, 6 March.  “During this time,” Kogon wrote in the first section of the 37-
page report, “we didn’t lose a single minute.”  He went to great lengths to set the document 
apart from the “widespread and contradictory opinions” being bandied about.  “Accounts 
that have been produced by individuals or committees and that have partially reached the 
public,” he wrote, “convey very different impressions; none of them is detailed and 
comprehensive.”479  
The report consists of several segments that vary in length, ranging from a half-page 
snapshot of daily routine to a roughly six-page rundown of living conditions.  Although 
Kogon and Römhild acknowledged that their time in the camp was limited, they 
nevertheless pointed out that they did not find evidence of an underground movement or 
organized efforts to propagate National Socialism.480  Their description of the internee 
population reflects the cumulative effects of American policy adjustments beginning in the 
fall of 1945.  “The only people found in the camp,” the report stated, “are those who fall 
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under automatic arrest provisions as determined by the Military Government.”  Internees 
were brought to Darmstadt from various other enclosures throughout the US Zone, 
transferred from prisoner of war camps, or arrested after the war had ended.  Residents of 
the American zone comprised roughly 68 per cent of the camp’s population.  The remaining 
32 percent were from the British, Russian and French zones as well as Greater Berlin.481   
Moving more directly to the issue of political incrimination, the report described the 
successive reviews carried out prior to handover:  “Over the course of the year 1946, 
internees were repeatedly screened from a variety of standpoints.”  Where deemed 
warranted by the CIC and War Crimes Commission, those of war crimes interest were 
removed to camps at Ludwigsburg, Dachau, and Fürth or to the prison at Nuremberg.  
Moreover, while the enclosure was under American control, internees no longer falling 
under automatic arrest criteria were released.  “Thus, what remains in Internierungslager 
Darmstadt today is a middle category that has been sifted many times over, in which both 
the highest and lowest echelons are absent.”482 
A critique that was intended to include liberal Catholic, Socialist, and Communist 
perspectives, Kogon and Römhild’s report is best appreciated when placed in the context of 
disagreements between Hessian and Military Government officials, in particular over 
whether to release the lesser incriminated for Spruchkammer proceedings in their home 
communities in order to concentrate on those who had wielded more influence in the Nazi 
Party.483  The camp described in the document stands in stark contrast to the one featured in 
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Schmidt’s November 1946 New York Times article, which had used the occasion of the 
transfer to evoke images of progress.  Visiting the enclosure at the end of a long and difficult 
winter, the overarching impression portrayed by Kogon and Römhild was one of pervasive 
stagnation—a message that is quite adeptly reinforced, for example, through repeated 
references to internees they felt should have already been released; details on the sheer 
length of time needed to process tribunal cases at the present completion rate; emphasis on 
internees’ lack of productive activity; and concerns about the fleeting opportunity to reorient 
those who were receptive to democratic ideas.484   
At the time of the visit, the German portion of the enclosure was subdivided into four 
areas, three of which were in use.  A small section of Camp I had been cordoned off to 
segregate those sentenced to labor camps and awaiting transfer.  The majority of the 
population, or roughly 7,500 of the over 11,300 internees, lived in 904 various-sized tents.  
At the center of the compound, the American sector with its workshops and large soccer 
field was in the process of becoming available to German authorities.  Well over half of the 
internees, Kogon and Römhild noted, had been previously detained as POWs.   Statistics 
from the end of February, in fact, showed that over 10,000 had been interned for 18 months 
or longer.485   In a very brief, but highly critical description of day-to-day conduct, they 
wrote that the camp had neither roll call nor compulsory labor.  “Because only about one 
third of the camp inmates work, the daily routine is completely unregulated and the internee 
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left on his own.”  Referring to the camp’s atmosphere, they characterized the vast majority 
of internees as “severely depressed, downright apathetic, and full of resentments.”486 
According to the report, the machinery for effecting releases—if not broken down—
was severely clogged up.  Kogon and Römhild attributed the logjam at least in part to the 
transfer interrupting administrative processes for reviewing cases. Their description of 
tribunal proceedings makes it very clear, however that like many others, they viewed the 
vast number of pending cases to be the decisive issue.  This “problem of mass,” as they 
called it, not only mirrored the struggle afflicting denazification officials elsewhere, but “in 
light of the long duration of detention and particular conditions” described in the report, was 
“intensified in the camp.”487  Although the ten tribunals were technically able to handle on 
the order of 400 cases monthly, roughly 10-15 percent had to be omitted for various reasons 
such as the failure of witnesses to appear.  In the four to five months since the tribunals had 
begun operating, they had decided 1,321 cases.  “At this rate of completion,” the report 
indicated, “the entire process would take roughly three years to bring to a close.488  
 While Kogon and Römhild addressed ways to improve daily operations, their 
detailed recommendations began with a recipe for drawing down the civilian internment 
enclosure—a proposal that they made more pressing through a summary of expenses 
associated with the camp.  According to the report, when tallied, various aspects of 
operations and maintenance were costing the Hessian taxpayer roughly RM 1.680.000 
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monthly.  Moreover, “in the month of February,” they emphatically pointed out, “Lager 
Darmstadt required no less than 46.000 liters of fuel!”  Particularly in light of such drains in 
resources, they argued, continuing to hold a substantial portion of the internees was “neither 
justifiable nor objectively or subjectively purposeful.”  They called for immediate release of 
all persons who did not fall (or no longer fell) under Automatic Arrest criteria as well as 
those unfit to remain in the camp.  In addition, they suggested that a special commissioner 
be charged with accelerating proceedings involving those who had previously been 
politically persecuted and all younger internees (defined as those born after 1919).  These 
measures, they argued, would already reduce the camp’s population by 2,000 to 2,500.489 
 In tandem with identifying persons in the categories described above, Kogon and 
Römhild urged singling out those who appeared to be especially incriminated based on 
having held high rank, having been a long-standing Party member who belonged to several 
organizations, or having been affiliated with the Gestapo or SD.  This group, they estimated, 
would consist of roughly 3,000-4,000.  Those remaining, they suggested, should be 
considered for release for tribunal proceedings in their home communities, provided the 
local mayor (Ortsbürgermeister) and council (Gemeinderat) did not object on the grounds of 
“public security” or that it might cause “significant political unrest.”  Internees released 
according to this process, they emphasized, would not differ from the large number of those 
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“likewise regarded as Nazi activists but presently not in confinement…with the exception 
that these others had not already been in extended custody.”490 
A letter to Newman from Deputy Military Governor Major General Frank A. 
Keating reveals that OMGUS officials shared Hessian authorities’ concerns over the lack of 
progress in trying cases as well as the inconsistencies between civilian internment and 
democratization.  Importantly, however, it also displays a distinct insistence on dealing with 
the cases of those remaining in the camp via tribunal: 
The internment of a large number of civilians who have been held under 
unsatisfactory physical conditions and without trial for nearly two years is repugnant 
to American concepts of justice and humanity and presents a problem which 
requires your personal attention.  Since experience to date indicates that two-thirds 
of the inmates will be released by tribunal verdict the unsatisfactory conditions of 
detention may be greatly improved by immediate trial.  This will also correct the 
injustice of long-time detention without due process of law.491 
 
Keating’s sternly written letter makes it very clear that, from the OMGUS 
perspective, the Liberation Ministry’s lack of success in establishing the specified number of 
Lagerspruchkammern was the root cause of the logjam.  Moreover, American Military 
Government authorities were not only becoming increasingly sensitive to representations of 
civilian internment in the press, but had also begun to suspect that inadequate conditions in 
the camp might be used as leverage:           
The failure of German officials to provide adequate machinery for the speedy trial of 
the most serious offenders under the Law for Liberation may result in the present 
unsatisfactory and unjust situation becoming so aggravated as to become a “cause 
célèbre” to the discredit of the U.S. Occupational forces.  There is danger that the 
present Military Government policy of requiring the trial of these offenders in the 
camps will be circumvented by permitting conditions to become so bad that Military 
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Government will be forced to accede to the demands that the internees be released to 
their home communities for trial.492 
 
The letter confirms Fritz Fay’s observations regarding the particular difficulties 
posed by the scope of the civilian internment program in Hesse.  “While your Land has 
disposed of many more internment cases than the other two Laender combined and is to be 
congratulated for having done so,” Keating wrote, “several years will be required to dispose 
of all internment camp cases at the present rate.”  He rebuked the Denazification Division 
for not having ensured the establishment of 23 tribunals as instructed and closed by directing 
Newman to meet with Hessian officials to discuss the situation:     
 
This office is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the tardiness of German 
officials in providing adequate processing machinery.  It is desired that you hold a 
conference with Minister President Stock regarding the failure of German officials 
to comply with Military Government instructions in this respect, and that your 
denazification officers be instructed to assist the representative of the Minister for 
Political Liberation in providing the required number of tribunals in accordance with 
the provisions of cable this Headquarters V-14252, dated 13 February 1947.493 
 
Conclusion 
Grappling with the cumulative consequences of denazification policies, along with 
the politicization that quickly surrounded the program, by March 1947 American and 
German authorities were well aware that the progress they had hoped for toward quickly 
processing internee cases had proved rather elusive.  As officials contended with this lack of 
forward movement, and with their own disagreements over how best to translate the goal of 
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eliminating Nazism into a coherent plan of action, it is not necessarily surprising that they 
were confronted by growing public scrutiny centered on what was happening inside civilian 
internment enclosures located throughout the zone.  Beyond the strong impetus to follow 
high profile cases, the camps were in many ways physical and symbolic reminders of Nazi 
criminality.  The case of Hesse illustrates, however, that as the society outside the barbed 
wire began to transform, American and German officials found it increasingly difficult to 
navigate the inherent contradictions between internment and democracy.  While 
comparisons with concentration camps emanated most strongly from the right as a way to 
cast doubt on nascent democratization efforts and the liberal critique focused on the lack of 
reeducation efforts, on the whole, the discourse surrounding the camp paralleled—and was 
propelled by—broader debates regarding denazification.     
Closely examining Military Government and Liberation Ministry responses to the 
paradox of detaining a significant segment of the population while initiating democratic 
reforms is instructive for a number of reasons.  Keating’s letter to Newman makes clear, for 
example, the extent to which OMGUS linked the pursuit of justice in internee cases to 
Lagerspruchkammer proceedings.  The circumstances surrounding Binder’s request that 
Kogon inspect the camp, on the other hand, suggest the crystallization of a much different 
perspective.  After a year of administering the provisions of the Liberation Law under the 
watchful eye of Military Government authorities, and with just under six months of 
experience running the camp at Darmstadt, by the spring of 1947 Hessian officials were 
convinced of the need to draw down the camp and to reform the denazification program. 
Beyond a host of practical concerns associated with running Internierungslager 
Darmstadt, authorities in the Ministry had become particularly aware of the gap separating 
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the communities that had formed on each side of the barbed wire.  In many ways, their 
deliberations about the camp thus reflected a larger recognition of the need to effectively 
reconstitute German society as part of the process of effecting an enduring transformation.  
Along with efforts to convince Military Government to prioritize Lagerspruchkammer 
operations toward those presumed to be most heavily incriminated and to establish 
mechanisms for accelerating the processing of cases, as the next chapter will show, Hessian 
officials took several concrete measures to assist younger internees in reentering the society 
that had begun to form around the enclosure. 
Importantly, the recognition that continuing to isolate internees might somehow 
endanger nascent reform efforts had by this time also begun to receive coverage in the 
American press.  Indeed, roughly four months after he had visited Internierungslager 
Darmstadt with OMGH Director Newman and described the transfer of the camp to German 
authorities in order to evoke an overarching image of progress, Dana Adams Schmidt posted 
a summary of Kogon’s report.  Schmidt emphasized that, “whereas a year ago there was a 
preparedness to replace Nazi ideology with new ideas,” signs of Nazism were becoming 
apparent.  Noting that the Ministry for Political Liberation had requested the examination, 
and that Kogon found conditions to be “unpleasant but ‘not so frightful’ as Germans have 
whispered,” he seized on the overarching image of stagnation.  “What shocked Dr. Kogon, 
however, was that in two years ‘as good as nothing has been done toward their [internees] 
political re-education or reorientation’.”494 
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Chapter 5:  
 
A CONTENTIOUS WAY FORWARD:  THE ‘RACE’ TO END DENAZIFICATION 
AND CIVILIAN INTERNMENT, MARCH 1947-OCTOBER 1948 
 
“In granting amnesty to ‘nominal Nazis’ Russia may touch off a race by the four 
occupying powers to wind up denazification.”  A news summary in the 21 September 1947 
Washington Post unmistakably depicted recent developments in Germany through the prism 
of deteriorating Four Power relations and suggested a strategic sea change in Allied 
policymakers’ stances toward eradicating Nazism.  “The Soviet step, under which nominal 
party members may hold office,” the article continued, “is interpreted as intended to put the 
Russians in a favored position to win German support.  Other powers are expected to follow 
suit—if not by granting amnesties, then by speeding up denazification and closing it out 
except for outright war criminals.”495  Less than a month later and against the backdrop of an 
already very perceptible breakdown in quadripartite cooperation, the newspaper confirmed 
its prediction that officials in other zones would take similar measures by announcing Clay’s 
approval of key amendments to the Liberation Law.496   
According to the Washington Post, this “simplification of the American program 
[would] let the great mass of passive Nazi followers escape with mere payment of a fine,” 
but was unavoidable in light of the previously reported general amnesty in the Soviet zone.  
While editorializing on these points, however, the article also suggested that there were 
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distinct advantages to be gained through the new approach to denazification.  “Apart from 
the obvious danger of this sort of rivalry in dealing with the Germans, the modified program 
seems a thoroughly sensible one, inevitable in any case now that the emphasis of American 
rule in Germany is being placed upon democratic reconstruction rather than upon 
deindustrialization.”  Because of the revisions, the denazification process would likely be 
“completed by early spring instead of dragging on through the whole summer, and this,” the 
newspaper asserted, “will help materially in getting Germany back to work.”497 By 
considering Germany’s future within a very broad framework, the Washington Post 
essentially glossed over potential ramifications of abbreviating the denazification program.   
These and similar articles appeared in the American press during a period when a 
number of key developments had swung the pendulum of public and Congressional interest 
in the occupation back toward its crest.  The impasse over reparations at the April 1947 
Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) Conference in Moscow, for example, portended the 
unlikelihood of achieving either economic unity or a German settlement and increased the 
palpable sense that Europe was becoming the physical and ideological front line in a 
struggle between two different brands of “democracy.”  The merging of American and 
British zones, eventual extension of Marshall Plan aid to Germany, and implementation of a 
new level-of-industry plan reinforced the sense of a deepening east-west division, and 
demonstrated the Western allies’ unequivocal shift toward economic reconstruction.498    
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During this timeframe, increased pressure from Washington had a great deal to do 
with Clay’s acceptance of the persistent German position that the denazification program be 
fundamentally changed.  The turning point occurred in August 1947, almost immediately 
after what Gimbel described as a “long and bitter closed session” in which the Military 
Governor had stood his ground against the minister-presidents.  Secretary of the Army 
Kenneth Royall personally delivered instructions to complete the denazification process by 1 
April 1948, prompting Clay to agree to concessions that became the basis for the October 
1947 amendments.499  The associated turnabout in American denazification policy—from 
painstaking scrutiny and insistence on a wide, thoroughgoing purge to emphasis on rapidly 
completing the program—has understandably captured historians’ interest and prompted 
criticisms not only that efforts to eradicate Nazism were truncated largely due to Cold War 
considerations, but also that the tribunal process became devoid of meaning.500   
What circumstances surrounded the conclusion of civilian internment?  This chapter 
examines Internierungslager Darmstadt against the backdrop of the breakdown in Allied 
coordination, briefly considering key factors behind denazification policy revisions as well 
as the primary contours and repercussions of change.  Situating civilian internment within 
the altered strategic framework, the chapter argues that in spite of disagreements regarding 
how to go about it, American and German officials were united by early 1947 in pushing to 
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draw the enclosures down.  Moreover, once the logjam in processing internee cases broke, 
events moved surprisingly quickly.  By October 1948—less than two years after 
Denazification Minister Gottlob Binder signed Military Government documents accepting 
responsibility for 11,001 detainees—the civilian internment camp at Darmstadt was 
closed.501   
In tracing the drawdown and subsequent closure of Internierungslager Darmstadt, 
the chapter also details Hessian officials’ attempts to prepare internees for reintegration into 
society. These efforts came together under the guidance of Head of Information und 
Erziehung Robert Werner in the spring of 1947, just before the camp’s population began 
once again to markedly decline.  Rather than an outgrowth of a well-planned, long intended 
process on the part of American authorities, these initiatives are thus best understood as a 
pragmatic set of educational and vocational measures put in place by Ministry officials 
based on their observations after taking responsibility for the enclosure.   
  
‘Wholesale Extenuation’ or Denazification Reform?  The October 1947 Amendment  
To contemporary observers, the question of how to interpret the October 1947 
amendment not only fueled the already orthodox view of denazification as a failure, but also 
heightened polarized positions regarding causes and consequences.  From its title onward, 
for example, John H. Herz’s pointed December 1948 Political Science Quarterly article, 
“The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany,” exuded frustration at what arguably amounted 
to unraveling the Liberation Law.  On the one hand, he wrote, critics charged that efforts to 
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eliminate Nazis from public influence had been carried to an “extreme” and jeopardized 
German recovery.  On the other, and in Herz’s own view, the program that “began with a 
bang, [had] since died with a whimper,” opening the door to “renewed control of German 
public, social, economic and cultural life by forces which only partially and temporarily had 
been deprived of the influence they had exerted under the Nazi regime.”  He described the 
Liberation Law amendment, and the two amnesties that had preceded it, as part of “the ever 
growing tendency to terminate denazification by wholesale extenuation.”502 
At bottom, Herz sought to convey concerns over what he characterized as a lack of 
resolve in carrying out an effective purge and to issue a solemn warning about the danger of 
resurgent Nazism.  His conclusion makes abundantly clear that he was reacting to Western 
powers’ growing inclination to frame German and European affairs within an emerging 
bipolar landscape.503  Nevertheless, his critique also points to the complexities associated 
with considering Germans’ cases individually based on their actions during the Third Reich.  
It highlights the cluster of competing imperatives—both external and internal to the 
American zone—behind the decision to revise the Liberation Law.  As the following will 
show, Cold War and economic calculations factored heavily in the decision to revise 
denazification.  The amendment also stemmed, however, from officials’ efforts to relieve the 
backlog in cases while attempting to direct the program toward those believed most 
incriminated.  
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Among the principal external inducements for the changes in 1947, those that bear 
particular mention are:  deteriorating quadripartite relations; the Moscow CFM resolution to 
accelerate denazification; and the American public’s increasing view that German and 
European recovery were intrinsically linked.   Scholars who have stressed the Western 
allies’ unequivocal shift toward economic reconstruction in explaining the underpinnings of 
denazification policy revisions have rightly pointed to quadripartite inability to implement 
Potsdam provisions and US policymakers’ desire to cultivate anti-Communist alliances.504  
It is also important to note however, that although the widening chasm between east and 
west was the most visible crack in Four Power relations by early 1947, it was certainly not 
the only one.  In a December 1946 editorial, Ernest O. Hauser tellingly described the ACC 
as “[r]esting on the quicksands of the Potsdam Agreement.”  Given the array of 
deliberations, he observed sardonically,  “Each of the four powers has found itself, at one 
time or another, on the lonely side of the fence.”505  Differing objectives had long since 
become increasingly difficult to navigate. 
In general, the most divisive and paralyzing debates stemmed from the issues of 
economic unity and reparations.  Moreover, impasses related to both—French unwillingness 
to yield on the disposition of the Rhineland and Ruhr, for example—revealed the starkly 
different experiences and agendas of the occupying powers. Beyond this, however, the 
latitude enjoyed by the four commanders-in-chief to exercise unilateral control over their 
respective geographic areas, coupled with their veto authority in quadripartite negotiations, 
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significantly hampered the ACC’s ability to issue coordinating directives.506  Continued 
food shortages in the wake of the severe winter of 1946/47 made economic concerns 
particularly pressing and, in many ways, brought the internal inconsistencies of the Potsdam 
agreement to light.507  While historians have alternatively deemed Clay’s decision to halt 
industrial dismantling and subsequent economic fusion with the British zone as maneuvers 
toward key Potsdam provisions and early signs of the fissure between US and Soviet 
policies, these measures nonetheless ultimately derived from the basic need to provide for 
the population.508   
The theme of Allied discord permeated Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s 
report on the fourth CFM meeting, as evidenced by his introductory remark that, “The 
Conference dealt with the very heart of the peace for which we are struggling.”  He went on 
to say, “In a statement such as this, it is not practicable to discuss the numerous issues which 
continued in disagreement at the Conference.  It will suffice, I think, to call attention to the 
fundamental problems whose solution would probably lead to quick adjustment of many 
other differences.”  Held in Moscow from 10 March to 24 April 1947, the series of 
deliberations failed to produce appreciable progress toward a peace treaty for Austria or in 
overcoming substantial disagreements related to Germany.  As with the ACC, key sticking 
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points included how to achieve economic unity and the question of reparations.  “The issue 
of the degree of centralization of the future German state,” Marshall emphasized, was “of 
greatest importance.”509 Against this backdrop of disunity, however, the CFM issued a Four 
Power Agreement on denazification, directing the ACC: 
(1) To take all appropriate measures to hasten the process of Denazification 
throughout Germany in accordance with Control Council Directive Nos. 
24 and 38. 
(2) To complete as soon as possible the removal of former active Nazis and 
militarists from public and semi-public office and from positions of 
responsibility in important private undertakings and to study the possibility 
of fixing a date for the completion of this process. 
(3) To take all measures necessary to ensure that only those individuals are 
employed in a judicial capacity or as public prosecutors who are 
considered by reason of their political and moral qualities to be capable of 
assisting the development of genuine democratic institutions in Germany. 
(4) To concentrate upon and to hasten the bringing to trial of war criminals, 
members of Nazi criminal organizations and of active supporters of the 
Nazi regime, without requiring the indiscriminate trial of the mass of 
nominal members of the Nazi Party. 
(5) To take action in the near future through Zone Commanders to devolve 
upon the appropriate German authorities responsibility for carrying out 
Control Council Directives No. 24 and 38, by passing the necessary 
German legislation and to ensure through the Zone Commanders that the 
effect of the legislation passed is such as to produce uniform treatment of 
all former Nazis and militarists corresponding to their degree of 
responsibility, while at the same time giving the German authorities 
discretion as to the precise methods by which they carry out this task.510 
 
This succinct, five-point directive belied the fact that denazification had become the 
source of substantial jockeying among the Four Powers, whose respective criticisms of one 
another were embedded within stipulations such as the need to avoid “indiscriminate trials,” 
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a disapproving reference to the Liberation Law.511  According to a cable from Marshall to 
Truman, American emphasis was on the need for uniformity.  After Marshall initiated 
discussions along those lines, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov “launched a lengthy attack 
against U.S. and British procedures” and introduced the recommendation for acceleration.512  
In a summary of ensuing developments, OMGUS CAD tersely noted that the ACC could not 
even agree upon uniform instructions for putting the new guidelines into effect.  “Each of 
the delegations,” the report stated, “presented a proposal for implementing the Council of 
Foreign Ministers’ agreement in light of its own interpretation.”513  Significantly, however, 
the directive’s emphasis on quickly completing the purge, expressed in an environment in 
which American public interest was again on the upswing, tipped a number of OMGUS 
officials toward being more receptive to the idea of revising denazification policy.514     
It would be difficult to overstate the impact that US public opinion had on 
occupation policy over the course of 1947.  In particular, portrayals of denazification as an 
impediment to moving forward, amplified by Cold War concerns, had by mid-year begun to 
resonate with the American media.  Echoing the Mitläufer thesis, for example, a 12 July 
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1947 Saturday Evening Post editorial drew on the case of Hessen to charge that the program 
was causing reconstruction to “move at a snail’s pace, while the individual German listens 
more and more receptively to the blaring broadcasts from the other side of the iron curtain.”   
Of 4 million Hessians, the article averred, “800,000 are barred from all but the most menial 
tasks because they are waiting for trial for having been, at one time or another, members of 
the Nazi Party.  The vast majority, of course, had no part in the atrocities and massacres of 
which their leaders were guilty.  Like the mass of people in other countries we could 
mention, they just went along.”515     
The extent to which American industrialists by this time came to perceive a new 
approach toward Germany as the linchpin in West European recovery is typified by writings 
such as Lewis H. Brown’s Report on Germany in which he stressed the need “to get German 
industry on its feet and off the backs of the American taxpayer as soon as possible.”516  
Brown, who had served as a consultant during the war to Army Chief of Ordnance 
Lieutenant General Levin H. Campbell, Jr., summarized his proposals in a Collier’s Weekly 
piece, stressing that the “real problem [was] to bring about the economic reconstruction of 
Europe as a whole.”  In addition to inviting Germany to take part in Marshall Plan 
discussions, he called for establishing a central government in the west, focusing on 
availability of consumer goods, and instituting a new currency with sufficient purchasing 
power.  Brown insisted that Military Government should  “[b]ring to an immediate and early 
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end the process of denazification except for the 80,000 top Nazis.”  The German people, he 
emphasized, not only needed a diet above 1200 calories, but also to get back to work.517   
 A late August 1947 telegram to Royall and Under Secretary of the War Department 
William H. Draper illustrates that Clay had considered the forthcoming Liberation Law 
amendment not only within the broader context of the American public’s increased interest 
in denazification, but also deteriorating quadripartite relations and growing competition with 
the east.  He cautioned, for example, against proceeding too closely after Soviet 
modifications, which were “obviously aimed at political popularity.”  More importantly, 
however, his comments also show that the substance of the changes stemmed from a 
deliberate attempt to reconcile longstanding procedural disagreements between Military 
Government and German officials that had played out in various forums including the 
Länderrat.518  These exchanges highlighted mounting administrative and logistical 
difficulties, nascent state governments’ concerns about legitimacy, and the dilemma of 
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reconciling denazification with reconstruction.519  The revisions, Clay wrote, “will 
accomplish our objectives and at the same time prevent denazification from taking years.”520 
Under the October 1947 amendment, efforts to relieve the backlog in cases while 
directing the program toward those believed most incriminated took two primary forms.  
First, with the exception of former members of the organizations deemed criminal by IMT 
verdict (Gestapo, SS, SD, and Leadership Corps of the NSDAP), the changes increased 
public prosecutors’ discretion in basing charges on the actual evidence, as opposed to 
mandatory provision of the law.  Second, to reduce the number of respondents calling for 
early trial in the hopes of being cleared for employment, those individuals placed in the 
presumptive category of followers were permitted to “resume positions other than ordinary 
labor pending trial.”521  According to Clay, OMGUS “estimated that this procedure would 
cut the load of major offenders and offenders from 700,000 to perhaps as low as 300,000.”  
He went on to say that “this reduction of load should enable the program as a whole to be 
brought to an end sometime around 1 April 1948 as originally contemplated.”522  
According to Military Government records, American authorities viewed enabling 
tribunals “to concentrate their efforts against the more highly incriminated and influential 
Nazis, militarists, and profiteers” as the primary purpose of Liberation Law revisions.  It is 
also very clear, however, that OMGUS exerted pressure to quickly conclude these 
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proceedings.  On 2 December 1947 Adjutant General Lieutenant Colonel G.H. Garde issued 
instructions, via the respective Offices of Military Government, that Ministers of Political 
Liberation were to require public prosecutors to develop court calendars by 15 January.  
“The period of time required to dispose of such cases will vary with each community,” the 
letter stated, “but should not be permitted to exceed 30 May 1948.”523  In relaying this 
guidance, OMGH Assistant Executive Officer Robert W. Bruce urged L&S offices to 
promptly correct any omissions and ensure “no dilatory tactics are used by either public 
prosecutors or tribunals subsequent to publication of the calendars.”524    
Gaining momentum in processing civilian internee cases was also essential to the 
broader goal of concluding denazification efforts.  The severity of the backlog in enclosures, 
however, had by this time become quite apparent.  On 31 March 1947, German administered 
camps in Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden and Hesse held a total of 50,747 internees.  Of these, 
50,485 were either awaiting trial or the result of an appeal.525  Eugen Kogon had rightly 
concluded during his visit to Internierungslager Darmstadt that many of the difficulties 
facing Lagerspruchkammern—the lack of qualified personnel and sheer workload, for 
example—paralleled those plaguing tribunals in nearby communities.  Yet, the camps also 
posed particular challenges, such as the need to screen the internee population in light of 
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IMT verdicts.  As the following will show, although American and German officials were 
agreed by the spring of 1947 about the goal of drawing down civilian internment enclosures, 
working through the logjam required negotiating several thorny and interrelated issues.  
 
Negotiating the Draw Down of Civilian Internment Enclosures 
“In a civilian internment camp in Regensburg some 8,000 men have been vegetating 
for two years.”  A crisp item in the 10 July 1947 New York Times oozed a pervading sense 
of futility along with persistent doubts about civilian internment by emphasizing the 
slowness of tribunal proceedings:  “The five denazification courts inside the area dispose of 
only fifteen cases daily including those of many Elite guards and secondary war criminals.  
But a further reduction of the population through a constant trickle of escapes rouses no 
excitement among the German guards.”  The article claimed that as “former comrades in 
arms of the prisoners,” those charged with preventing internees from leaving were instead 
abetting them.  Because of this, “prisoners’ letters describing the guards’ ‘brutalities’ [were] 
laughed off” by American officials as “calculated propaganda.”526  The following month, the 
US Constabulary reported allegations in Augsburg’s Schwäbische Landeszeitung that, 
among other things, former high-ranking Nazis in the camp nearby received preferential 
treatment and guards routinely asked internees for letters of endorsement.527 
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In many ways, these criticisms were symptomatic of the very perceptible lack of 
forward movement that plagued civilian internment enclosures in the spring and summer of 
1947.  Indeed, the camps under German administration had become veritable magnets for 
disapproval in both the American and German press on issues ranging from lapses in 
security to the fact that the calorie allotment for internees was higher than that of the 
population at large.528  With the east-west competition becoming more pronounced, similar 
topics provided sensational grist for Soviet propaganda, leading to attention-grabbing 
headlines such as “Russians on Tour Cite Nazi Coddling.”529   
Against this backdrop, American authorities continued to harbor concerns about the 
overall adequacy of conditions in the camps and that internees might somehow endanger 
ongoing reform efforts.  In April 1947, Clay directed contingency planning for US forces to 
resume control of civilian internment enclosures.  The language in the resulting draft 
directive suggests that, should the procedures be put into effect, OMGUS officials’ mindset 
was based on the potential need to move in quickly and quell a disturbance.  In a section 
titled “Preliminary Seizure of Camps,” for example, the plan read: 
When it has been determined that Military Government will assume control of 
German civilian internment enclosures, security conditions may require that one or 
more of the camps be seized immediately.  Under these conditions, the US 
Constabulary, utilizing a Land rural police force requisitioned through the Director 
of the Land Office of Military Government, will assume control of the designated 
camp or camps pending the final transfer to the Land Director of Military 
Government as described in paragraph 4 below.  If more than one camp is to be 
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seized by the US Constabulary the operation will be coordinated so that all are 
seized on the same day.530   
 
During roughly the same timeframe, American authorities stood their ground against 
continued IRC pressure for access to German run enclosures.  After a recent meeting, 
Keating wrote to Dr. Meyer in May 1947 that IRC personnel would be permitted to  “visit 
Civilian Internment Enclosures under American military control.”  He went on to say 
however that, “Enclosures under German control come within the purview of German law 
and are national in character.  As the International Red Cross, or other international 
agencies, is not as yet authorized to deal with the German government, there is no basis for 
the investigation of the German Civilian Internment Enclosures, and permission to visit 
these camps cannot be granted.”  Meanwhile, Keating privately advised Clay that Meyer had 
requested access to determine what relief might be provided to detainees and solicited 
Clay’s view as to whether he was “correct in maintaining [their] former position.”531   
Taken together, the contingency planning and denial of IRC access to German 
enclosures highlight the Military Government’s generalized anxiety about state officials’ 
capabilities to effectively administer the camps.  Although to differing degrees, weekly 
reports from throughout the zone had been replete with troublesome issues caused by 
scarcity of resources, deficient training, and improper procedures.  Among the more striking 
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examples, on 10 February 1947 Chief of OMGUS Public Safety forwarded the following 
excerpt (from a USFET Weekly Intelligence Summary) to OMGB Special Branch, and 
directed an investigation of “lax security” in the enclosure at Moosburg: 
24 prisoners escaped from Arbeitslager at Moosburg during period 13-15 January, 
one of whom was on personal staff of Hitler.  War Crimes Judge Advocate in 
Nurenberg had requested the lager commandant to place this man in close 
confinement preparatory to trial as war criminal; instead the individual was allowed 
freedom of camp for two days, during which time he escaped.  Because of apparent 
lack of checking system or prisoner head count at camp, lager authorities are of 
opinion that the number of escapes may be larger than that given [sic.].532 
 
 Roughly a month-and-a half later, New York Times correspondent Delbert Clark 
posted what he touted as “[a]n amazing story of counterfeiting, passport forgery and 
bribery” in the camp at Moosburg, based on “a word-of-mouth account by a leader of the 
interned men.”  According to Clark internees enjoyed “a comfortable, even luxurious life” 
and for the most part sought to avoid “organized violence on the part of fanatics, which 
would bring an investigation and tighter restrictions.”  Moreover, he wrote, “highly illegal 
industries” flourished in the camp, where German and Polish guards were very susceptible 
to bribery.533  Responding to OMGUS about the allegations, OMGB Executive Officer 
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Hamilton indicated that several of them, particularly those 
“regarding a comfortable and luxurious life [were] greatly exaggerated.”  He did, however, 
grant that some of the claims had a basis.  Incidences of passport forgery and bribery did 
take place, for example, but to a much more limited degree than Clark had suggested.  “The 
                                                 
532
 Letter, OW Wilson to OMGB Special Branch, Lax Security at Civilian Internment Enclosure Moosburg, 10 
Feb 47, NARA RG 260 OMGUS, Records of the CAD, PS Branch, Records Relating to CIEs 1946-48, Box 
307, F:  68 - Civilian Internment Enclosure No. 6 Moosburg II. 
 
533
 Delbert Clark, “High Life of Nazis in ’Jail’ Reported,” NYT, 17 Mar 47, 6.  The article’s provocative 
subtitle read “Guards Wink at Forgery and Counterfeiting—Inmates Hate to Leave.”  According to Clark’s 
account, the details were relayed to him second hand, by an individual who had heard the story from “one Dr. 
Segler, an instructor before the war in the University of Cologne and a colonel in the Elite Guard. 
  256
internees,” Hamilton admitted, “occasionally manipulate escapes through the use of forged 
identification credentials usually in the form of a Kennkarte.”534    
In a letter to Keating, denazification adviser Dr. Walter L. Dorn emphasized that lack 
of American involvement in day-to-day activities within the enclosures was a contributing 
factor in such persistent problems.  After stating that he had just concurred with Public 
Safety’s contingency plans for the potential resumption of US control, Dorn not only 
reminded Keating of Military Government responsibilities under JCS 1067 and the Potsdam 
Protocol, but also emphasized the importance of taking every possible action to prevent a 
takeover from becoming necessary.  “Since the transfer of these enclosures to German 
administration,” he wrote, “their supervision by Military Government has been inadequate 
and ineffective.  Outside the representatives of C.I., whose status is still undetermined since 
the dissolution of Third Army, only a single member of the OMGUS Special Branch unit 
and the local Liaison Officer in which the enclosure lies, have taken an immediate 
supervisory interest in the administration of these enclosures.”  Using Internierungslager 
Darmstadt as an example of the difference that could be made by a permanent Military 
Government presence in the camps, Dorn proposed that a Special Branch representative be 
assigned to each.535    
                                                 
534
 Letter, Lt Col Paul Hamilton (OMGB Executive Officer) to Director, OMGUS, Conditions in Internment 
Camps, 11 Apr 47, NARA RG 260 OMGUS, Records of the CAD, PS Branch, Records Relating to CIEs 1946-
48, Box 307, F:  68 - Civilian Internment Enclosure No. 6 Moosburg II.   
 
535
 Letter, Walter L. Dorn to Deputy Military Governor Major General Frank A. Keating, “Need of a Special 
Branch Officer in the German Civilian Internment Enclosures,” 18 Mar 47, NARA RG 260 OMGUS, Records 
of the Executive Office, The Chief of Staff, Correspondence and Recs Maintained by Maj Gen Frank Keating, 
1946-1947, Box 26, F:  Mar 47. Dorn also proposed that C.I. personnel currently in enclosures be transferred to 
Military Government under Special Branch supervision.  According to the OMGB response to Clark’s article 
(cited above), by April arrangements had been made to allocate one Military Government officer to each camp.  
Security issues were not confined to Bavaria.  In the fall of 1947, for example, Intelligence officials notified 
OMGUS CAD of the possibility that students from a technical school in Darmstadt had been periodically 
taking internees’ places in the camp for days at a time.  Letter, Capt. A.F. Hennings to CAD, Information 
  257
In the face of mounting concerns, OMGB surveyed the five civilian internment 
camps in Bavaria—Augsburg, Moosburg, Regensburg, Hammelburg, and Nürnberg—from 
20 to 27 March 1947.536  Inspectors documented a number of prevalent security problems, 
but their findings also provide insight into the logistical and procedural challenges 
associated with attempting to draw down civilian internment enclosures.  They noted that at 
Moosburg, for example, 428 internees “on the amnesty list of sick and crippled” still 
remained in the camp.  Moreover, of 110 cases that had been “found in categories III, IV, or 
V in which no prison or labor sentences were involved, only seven [had] been released.”  In 
addition to the Moscow Conference and tribunal proceedings, internees at Hammelburg, 
they wrote, were following progress toward releasing “the old and disabled internees” with 
great interest.  An especially biting general comment read, “Even when tried and found 
eligible for release, internees often experience unnecessary waiting while incompetent 
personnel attempt to summon sufficient courage or initiative to sign the release order.” 537 
Correspondence between the Hessian Ministry for Political Liberation and OMGH 
during the early months of 1947 suggests that there was more behind the circumstances 
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described than indicated in the OMGB report.  In short, German officials’ efforts to reduce 
camp populations were complicated by the inability, in practice, to grant releases.  OMGUS 
criteria permitted release of civilian internees in several instances, primarily:  in accordance 
with tribunal findings; when determined by the public prosecutor not to be incriminated 
under the Liberation Law; and for transfer to zone or Land of residence.  In addition, with 
appropriate approval, release was permitted for proceedings by home tribunal in the cases of 
certain politically important internees provided the security risk was slight and Military 
Government objectives were not endangered; and internees who were deemed physically 
unfit or mentally incapacitated such that “continued detention would involve undue 
hardships and an unnecessary burden upon the facilities available for their care.”  In 
exceptional circumstances, compassionate leave was also permitted.  These guidelines had 
been in place since January, but time consuming and cumbersome procedures required 
public prosecutors to notify Liaison and Security offices fifteen days in advance of intended 
releases on the grounds of non-incrimination or in accordance with tribunal findings.  In the 
event the L&S office objected, the individual was to be detained pending decision by the 
regional office of Military Government.538 
In general, local military government personnel examined proposed releases very 
closely, often kicking them back to the Ministries for Political Liberation for justification.539  
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This high degree oversight is particularly evident in the case of internees deemed to be unfit 
to remain in the camps, a group for which German officials had pushed early and hard to 
secure approval for release to home tribunal.540  While American authorities eventually 
agreed to such a policy, their stance toward the issue was both firm and skeptical.541  On 15 
February 1947, for example, OMGH Assistant Executive Officer Robert Wallach notified 
field offices that those internees deemed to be so ill as to cause a strain on the camp at 
Darmstadt were soon to “be transferred to their homes.”  In the event any of these 
individuals were to leave their local communities or accept any sort of employment, they 
would be immediately returned to the camp.  “In effect,” Wallach wrote, “these persons will 
be under town arrest pending decision of the tribunal.”542  Teitelbaum meanwhile advised 
Binder that he had sent a list of proposed medical releases dated 13 February back to Didlo 
for further review, reminding the Liberation Minister that these were only to be granted in 
instances where continued internment would place an undue burden on the camp, “and not 
for the comfort of the person in question.”543   
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While American authorities’ scrutiny undoubtedly exacerbated the logjam in the 
camps, OMGH Denazification Division correspondence reveals distinct concerns about 
preventing the misuse of release procedures, especially those for medical reasons.  The 
complexity of the situation was also evident in community reactions to such releases, once 
they did begin to occur.  On 9 May 1947, for example, the commander of the Darmstadt 
Liaison and Security Office, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Skarry, relayed local dissatisfaction 
about the fact that 11 internees found physically unfit to remain in the enclosure had been 
transferred to a home for war invalids established in Brandau by the Hessian Red Cross.544 
In many ways, Military Government intractability toward releases derived from 
denazification officials’ insistence that those remaining in the camps appear before 
Lagerspruchkammern, and was a reaction to the overarching trend toward leniency in 
tribunal proceedings.545   Under OMGUS pressure to process more cases, officials in Hesse 
and Württemberg-Baden took important logistical steps toward significantly increasing 
tribunal capacity.546  On 26 February 1947, the Officer-in-Charge of the CIC staff at 
Darmstadt reported that 20 tribunals would be operating by 1 March.547  The following May, 
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Director of OMGWB Sumner Sewell notified Keating that the Minister President, Dr. 
Maier, had assured him that 11 additional tribunals would be put into operation by mid-June.  
Sewell also reported that in the meantime, two American medical officers were screening 
internees to identify those who were unfit for continued internment.  He expected them to 
release roughly 10% to home communities for trial, reducing the number in the 
Württemberg-Baden camps to approximately 11,000.548 
According to the OMGB inspection report, the lack of Spruchkammer activity was 
particularly pervasive in the Bavarian enclosures.  In spite of the fact that the tribunal had 
been in place at Augsburg since the previous August, for example, “not one single case” had 
been tried, although the first was scheduled for 27 March 1947.  The Lagerspruchkammer at 
Nuremberg was established in November, but had not begun operating until the last week of 
January.  Moreover, of the 42 cases thus far completed, 29 had resulted in a finding of Class 
V.  Only two of the remaining 13 were deemed Class II and none of the internees were 
determined to be Class I.  The reasons cited for the slowness in instituting proceedings and 
processing cases varied.  The field Special Branch office attributed the problem at 
Augsburg, for example, to the need for support from the Bavarian Ministry.  At 
Hammelburg, where tribunal operations had been underway since 15 January but were also 
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proceeding slowly, the issues cited were lack of personnel, serviceable typewriters, and 
vehicles needed to “travel considerable distances for evidence.”549   
In addition to the inconsistent Military Government supervision emphasized by 
Dorn, however, political turmoil had much to do with the lack of progress toward 
establishing tribunals in the Bavarian camps.  The degree of organizational disarray 
characterizing the southernmost state’s denazification machinery is evidenced by the fact 
that no fewer than four ministers headed the apparatus.  This turbulence—at least inasmuch 
as the denazification program was concerned—did not begin to subside until July 1947, 
when Minister President Hans Erhard appointed Dr. Ludwig Hagenauer (Christian Social 
Union) to the position.  Hagenauer, along with Camille Sachs, who by this time had been 
appointed state secretary, implemented many of the logistical and administrative measures 
that had already been set in place in the other two Länder.550    
Negotiating the logjam in internee cases also involved the arduous task of applying 
mechanisms such as amnesties to individual circumstances.  In mid-February 1947 OMGUS 
instructed local Special Branch offices to restrict use of D&E reports to situations involving 
heavily incriminated respondents and to assist public prosecutors in identifying persons 
falling under amnesty criteria.551  By early March 1947 German officials were poised to 
begin determining the applicability of the Youth and Christmas Amnesties to internee 
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cases.552  The former was announced roughly nine months earlier and, in general, applied to 
persons who were younger than 25 years old in 1945.  The criteria for the Christmas 
Amnesty, which was granted in December 1946, were quite specific.  According to February 
1947 implementing instructions, in addition to cases of significant disability (defined as 50 
percent or more), the amnesty was to include persons whose taxable income during the 
calendar years 1943 and 1945 was less than RM 3600 and whose property as of 1 January 
1945 did not exceed RM 20,000.  Importantly, neither amnesty was to be applied to cases in 
which the respondents fell within the presumptive classes I (major offender), or II (lesser 
offender).  If either amnesty did apply, however, public prosecutors were not to file charges.  
Moreover, “any proceedings already initiated [were] to be quashed.”553 
During the spring and summer of 1947, public prosecutors also received the 
necessary guidance to begin applying IMT verdicts to internee cases.  Most notably, in early 
May 1947, the Ministry for Political Liberation in Württemberg-Baden released a six-page 
document relaying OMGUS instructions regarding the applicability of IMT decisions.   In 
addition to an overview of the tribunal process and findings, the document provided four 
examples dealing with whether the Youth Amnesty or Christmas Amnesty would apply to 
former SS members.554  As illustrated by an exchange between Teitelbaum and the MPL 
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two-and-a-half months later, the issue of how to apply the IMT verdicts to specific situations 
remained open for quite some time.555 
 Drawing down civilian internment enclosures also required establishing labor camps 
(Arbeitslager) to house those who received such sentences.  This issue was more logistically 
complex in Hesse than the other Länder, which had multiple, smaller civilian internment 
enclosures where officials could simply designate segregated areas for that purpose. This 
step had already been taken at Internierungslager Darmstadt, but as tribunals processed 
more cases, additional Arbeitslager would be needed.  Beginning in the months leading up 
to the handover, Ministry officials had run into a number of challenges in finding suitable 
facilities.556  As late as 18 February 1947, Weyand pointed out to Binder that almost all of 
the available barracks were being “allocated either to the American Army, UNRRA, or the 
Commissioner for Refugees.”  In spite of this, he notified the Liberation Minister that the 
first labor camp (outside the compound at Darmstadt) was in operation at Kassel-
Niederzwehren and already had a population of 200.  Those whose tribunal sentences were 
final would be put to productive work within the week.  In addition, smaller camps of 
roughly 50 to 150 were in place at Offenbach and Frankfurt am Main.557   
In March 1947, the Hessian MPL set up a labor camp with a projected capacity of 
approximately 300 in Wetzlar at a former POW enclosure already being used as a refugee 
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camp.558  The following June, Binder signed an implementing order with standard operating 
procedures for Hessian labor camps, which stated that “in order to pay restitution for their 
complicity [Mitschuld] in the misery caused by National Socialism, Major Offenders and 
Offenders (activists, militarists, and profiteers) [would] be transferred on the basis of 
tribunal sentence to labor camps to carry out reconstruction work in accordance with the 
Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism.”  Describing the labor camps’ 
purpose, the document went on to say that “those who are guilty should have the opportunity 
to find their way back from National Socialist ideologies to a peaceful community,” and that 
“labor camps are not penal institutions.”559  Head of Information und Erziehung Robert 
Werner developed these instructions, in coordination with Weyand as well as Bavarian and 
Württemberg-Baden officials.  As the next section will show, Werner meanwhile 
orchestrated several measures aimed at preparing internees to enter into democratic society.   
 
From ‘Die-Hard Nazi’ to ‘Convinced Democrat’?  (Re)education in Lager Darmstadt 
“Germany was betrayed.”  In early March 1947, American journalist Edwin Hartrich 
sought to convey his views regarding the mentality of a 26-year old former first sergeant of 
the Waffen-SS Totenkopf (Death’s Head) Division who, along with the roughly 11,000 other 
internees, was being held in the enclosure at Darmstadt.  “Until cleared by a denazification 
tribunal,” Hartrich explained, “they must wait behind the barbed wire as proven Nazis, 
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hence dangerous to postwar Germany.”  The sergeant, named Albers, had joined the Hitler 
Youth in 1933 at the age of thirteen.  He now lived in a US Army tent with other former SS 
sergeants for whom the daily monotony was broken only by meals.  Hartrich wrote that 
many of the camp’s prisoners “wander up and down the dirt walks of the tent city as restless 
lions pace their cages.”  Albers eschewed politics, stating that he simply wanted to return to 
his wife and child and to have a job.  “He and other prisoners repeated almost parrot-like,” 
Hartrich observed, “their willingness to ‘rebuild and reconstruct Germany.’”560   
The reporter made it quite clear that he did not believe the young sergeant’s claims 
of not knowing about the “war crimes and other acts which made his division stink in the 
nostrils of military men.”  In spite of his conviction regarding the likelihood that Albers was 
complicit in his unit’s activities, however, Hartrich’s overarching message had less to do 
with whether the former first sergeant might be brought to account than with what was being 
done to prepare him to eventually join the society reconstituting outside the barbed wire.  
“Left to stew in their own ideological juices,” Hartrich cautioned, “Albers and his cohorts 
may prove to be far more dangerous when released.  Sergeant Albers is the prototype of the 
embittered, harshly trained, narrowly educated young men, who are beginning to think of 
themselves and defeated Germany as martyrs.”  Hartrich went on to emphasize what he 
perceived as internees’ ignorance of the nascent transition outside the camp.  “If their 
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remarks are true,” he concluded, “to them ‘postwar democracy’ is what keeps them behind 
barbed wire and threatens them with prison terms if they were Nazi advocates.”561   
A highly impressionistic account, Hartrich’s article nevertheless raised important 
questions regarding what, if anything, was done to prepare internees to at some point be 
reintegrated into a society that was itself on the cusp of transformation.  Hessian ministerial 
records show that these sorts of initiatives were implemented in Internierungslager 
Darmstadt at roughly the same time Hartrich interviewed Albers.  Among several immediate 
steps, for example, Head of Information und Erziehung Robert Werner called for placement 
of “suitable” books and newspapers in the camp along with establishment of small 
discussion groups involving internees, ministry officials and “prominent democratic figures 
from all walks of life.”562  In addition, he supported internees’ ongoing attempts to rebuild 
elements of the vocational and technical training that had been actively attended during the 
previous summer.  A 21 February 1947 report from the self-administration’s culture 
department indicated that instructors for agriculture and horticulture related fields (Landbau, 
Landwirtschaft, Gartenbau) as well as chemistry and accounting had already resumed 
teaching while others were available for retraining internees in trades such as blacksmith, 
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plumber, cabinetmaker, carpenter, and bricklayer.  In addition, courses in construction, 
engineering and business were slated to begin in the spring.563      
According to Werner’s initial progress update, forwarded through Binder to OMGH, 
his department’s work in the camp began formally on 1 March 1947, guided by five 
overarching objectives.  First, internees were to be informed of actual conditions in 
Germany, without any sort of glossing-over of difficulties.  Through interaction with 
prominent public leaders, they would receive both theoretical and practical exposure to the 
problems involved in “building an honest and true democracy.”  Second, internees needed to 
understand the causes of Germany’s predicament and that National Socialism had not only 
failed, but also inevitably led to collapse.  Third, by explaining the nature and effects of 
National Socialism, the program sought to clarify the reasons for internment.  Fourth, open 
discussions would offer a way to dispel existing tensions and foster tolerance for other 
points of view.  Fifth, in conjunction with promoting understanding of very real difficulties 
associated with the ongoing democratic transition, the program was geared toward the 
principle that work offered a means to be reintegrated and connected into economic life.564 
On 25 March 1947, Knappstein relayed Teitelbaum’s request that lectures be 
initiated in the camp as soon as possible.565  Scheduled talks began in the large 1000-
capacity theater in early April and featured leading figures of democratic life as well as from 
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specific fields of activity (Arbeitsgebiete).  In this way, for example, a 10 April presentation 
titled, “The Functions and Work of a Landrat” was followed the next day by “Problems of 
the Job Market.”  Other lectures included “Basic Questions of Personal and Political Life” (6 
May) and “Christianity and Socialism” (30 May).  Voluntary attendance at the first session 
was roughly 400, but grew to capacity by the second.   Each lecture was followed by 
questions and discussion during which Werner noted that “subjective opposition” was 
expressed but that the majority of listeners refrained from such things.566   
According to capsule summaries in the ministry files, internees not only asked 
questions, but in some instances also used them to voice criticisms of denazification, 
political developments, and ongoing reforms.567  On 22 April 1947, for example, a 
prominent local community member presented a lecture titled “Do We Have a Future?” in 
which he considered issues ranging from the need to come to terms with Germany’s loss of 
power, to the significance of Christianity to Western civilization  [abendländische Kultur].  
During the discussion period, an internee asked, “Why is it that in spite of proclaiming 
religious freedom, the CDU has allowed secession from the church to be considered as 
incriminating in tribunal proceedings?”  On 29 April 1947 Oberbürgermeister Kolb 
(Frankfurt) spoke in the “jam-packed theater” about the “Duties and Responsibilities of 
Local Self-Government in this Day and Age” before an audience of roughly 1600 internees.  
According to the memorandum for record, internees thanked Kolb for speaking and 
mentioned that since important individuals had begun making appearances in the camp, 
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“they no longer had the impression of being viewed by the outside world as second class 
people.”  Among the questions asked was why, if the Constitution expressly provided due 
process of law to every prisoner, this did not apply to internees.568 
Werner’s files suggest a fairly active schedule of these sorts of lectures throughout 
the summer of 1947, but his progress updates show in particular the educational emphasis 
that the Ministry placed on younger internees.  In documenting his first impressions, Werner 
had singled out the camp’s 21 and 22-year old Waffen-SS troops, who struck him as 
impressionable but without direction and purpose.  “It would be irresponsible,” he wrote, “to 
cast these youths unprepared out on the street.”  He went on to say that these young 
internees “didn’t have the slightest idea” what they were in for vocationally or 
economically, and that they didn’t have clear plans in this regard.  Nor, for that matter, did 
they understand either the historical causes of the Third Reich’s collapse or the political 
requirements of the new state.569  Among the most noteworthy measures that the Ministry 
directed primarily toward younger internees, officials arranged for career counselors to 
come into the camp from nearby communities to discuss vocational possibilities.570 
One such adviser, Dr. Hecht from the state employment office (Landesarbeitsamt) in 
Frankfurt, described this opportunity during a talk on the topic “Economic Structure and 
Guiding New Careers” (Wirtschaftsstruktur und Berufsnachwuchslenkung) on 18 April 
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1947.  According to notes encapsulating the lecture, in addition to describing economic 
uncertainties and the scarcity of consumer goods, Hecht explained that current trends 
favored small and medium sized enterprises built around skilled labor.  He noted that 
occupational retraining (Umschulung) in the enclosure would “soon be deepened and 
expanded.”  Boards of Examiners would issue certifications “that would also be valid after 
release” to internees who completed the necessary requirements.  “In this way,” the record 
indicated, “time spent in the camp would not be lost (verloren).”571   
Werner’s characterization of these career-counseling efforts in his initial progress 
update made clear that they were intended to benefit internees, but in a way that would also 
support reconstruction needs.  This is born out by a Landesarbeitsamt memorandum for 
record, in which Hecht documented various sorts of coordination, including a 1 April 1947 
meeting with elected representatives of the younger internees as well as discussions with 
Werner and camp administrators.572  In a list of points summarizing main principles for the 
retraining, Hecht noted that the measures would “primarily encompass the understaffed 
building trade and related occupations.”  He also indicated that theoretical lessons would 
take place in the camp and that, as needed, groups would be taken to training and rebuilding 
sites for practical instruction.  In addition to mentioning plans for certification testing, Hecht 
made a point of noting that after release those trained in the camp should not “in any way 
experience handicaps in the practice of their new profession because of their political 
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past.”573   According to Ministry records, 17 internees trained as bricklayers and carpenters 
did in fact participate in intermediate-level skilled worker (Facharbeiter) tests, along with 
86 individuals from outside the camp.574 
Werner reported that by the end of May 1947 advisers from Frankfurt, Kassel and 
Giessen had counseled 60 internees.  In they meantime, he had arranged with camp 
administrators to establish a youth barracks—a dedicated space to read books and 
newspapers.  The reading room, he wrote, received roughly 300 visits daily and held books 
on subjects such as the new Hessian constitution, American history, and matters related to 
reconstruction.  The youth barracks also served as a meeting area for working groups to 
discuss cultural and economic issues.575  By the end of September 1947, Werner indicated 
that, due to numerous transfers and releases, the circumstances under which his department 
operated had greatly changed.  In June, the main camp at Darmstadt had held over 10,000 
internees.  At the time of his writing, however, the number at Internierungslager Darmstadt 
had “sunk to 4,000 while over 2,500 had been placed in newly established and equipped 
camps at Frankfurt/Main, Wiesbaden, Weilburg, and Wegscheide.”  In addition to these 
enclosures, his department’s responsibilities now included education efforts in the labor 
                                                 
573
 Ibid. 
 
574
 Werner, “1. Bericht über die Umerziehungs arbeit im Interniertenlager Darmstadt in der Zeit vom 1.3 – 
31.5.47,” 7 Jun 47, esp. 3, 5-6; On testing held on 21 and 22 May, including brief comparisons of internee 
preparedness with those trained outside the camp, see Prüfungs-Kommission des Fachausschusses für 
berufliche Umschulung beim Arbeitsamt Frankfurt/Main (with attachment), 27 May 47, HHStAW 501/21. 
 
575
 Werner, “1. Bericht über die Umerziehungsarbeit im Interniertenlager Darmstadt in der Zeit vom 1.3 – 
31.5.47,” 7 Jun 47, 3.  The reading room also held copies of Hessian newspapers, as well as Munich-based Die 
Neue Zeitung and 6 youth magazines. 
  273
camps at Kassel, Wetzlar, and Hersfeld, as well as the separate women’s compound at 
Darmstadt, which served the dual purpose as both an internment and labor camp.576 
Werner’s remarks not only highlight the difficulties associated with establishing 
programs at multiple locations, but also clearly show the extent to which education 
initiatives at Internierungslager Darmstadt were gearing up as the camp was drawing down.  
While it would be difficult to assess the individual effectiveness of democratization efforts 
undertaken in the spring and summer of 1947, Werner’s reports demonstrate that they are 
best understood as one facet of a pragmatic reorientation effort put in place by Hessian 
officials after taking responsibility for the enclosure.577  Two key aspects of that approach 
were first, to recognize that, while important, the benefits of lectures and discussions about 
democracy were limited; and second, that in the case of those open to democratic ideas, 
continued internment would likely be counterproductive. The realism with which the 
Ministry approached the matter is evident in Binder’s comments at the same 4 July 
parliamentary deliberations over denazification reforms in which he admitted the need to 
speed up camp tribunal proceedings.  “I know that we are not going to be able to make a 
convinced democrat out of a die-hard Nazi overnight,” he acknowledged.  Binder stressed, 
however, that Ministry officials’ experiences had been that a number of internees, 
particularly the younger ones, “were quite receptive to democratic considerations.”578   
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The period during which education efforts were carried out at Internierungslager 
Darmstadt was characterized by an increased awareness of ideological competition, the 
visible indications of which varied in enclosures throughout the zone.  In April 1947, the 
Camp Supervisor addressed this issue in a report in which he also described an overall 
improvement in the camp morale.  By his assessment, propaganda for the Soviet zone 
(besetzte Ostgebiet) had not assumed a large scope.  Moreover, the atmosphere “had 
improved substantially” due to four factors:  those unfit to remain in the camp were soon to 
be released; tribunals were operating more smoothly and faster; internees had the 
opportunity to undertake actual work in smaller camps thereby obtaining better living 
conditions; and the warmer time of the year had begun.579  A July 1947 Washington Post 
article suggested, however, that internees were well aware that mention of communism 
would evoke reactions among American and German officials.  According to the report, the 
Hessian Ministry for Political Liberation was investigating claims that agents of the 
Moscow-Directed Free German Committee had surreptitiously gained access into the 
enclosure at Darmstadt in an attempt to incite unrest and recruit members.  An unidentified 
ministry official, the article noted, suspected internees had planted the letter that prompted 
the investigation in an effort to create discord between German and American officials.580   
Finally, it bears mentioning that the OMGH Denazification Division exercised a 
form of indirect supervision over Ministry educational initiatives.  On 18 November 1947, 
for example, Teitelbaum notified Didlo that he concurred with an agreement that Werner 
would approve the schedule of lectures in the internment enclosure and labor camps while 
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keeping Didlo informed.  Teitelbaum explicitly indicated, however, that he expected Didlo 
to stay on top of the situation and, if necessary, issue guidance concerning anticipated 
speakers and subjects.  “As to lectures by internees, it should not be our intention to prohibit 
[them] from speaking their opinions, even though we may disagree with such opinion,” he 
stressed.  “However,” Teitelbaum continued, “internees do not have higher rights than those 
outside internment camps.  They may not make addresses to groups advocating Nazism or 
Nazi ideology.  This would be contrary to American Military Government policies.” He 
agreed that internees could be permitted to educate others on technical subjects, but drew the 
line on allowing them to give lectures on social, political, or economic issues.  “Needless to 
say,” he stressed, “internees may not give instruction on religious subjects.” Teitelbaum 
emphasized the necessity of these guidelines “in view of the fact that there are young 
internees in the camps who may be rehabilitated by proper education.”581  
 
 ‘To Be the First in the Race’:  The Push to Wind Up Denazification 
Beginning in the fall of 1947, Military Government authorities made a number of 
very rapid policy adjustments that not only placed increased discretion in the hands of 
German authorities, but also reduced the denazification program’s imprint on daily life 
outside the enclosure.  On 19 September 1947, for example, regulations governing the 
marking of Kennkarten were amended such that—with the exception of major offenders, 
offenders and lesser offenders—cards would no longer be punched but instead stamped 
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“politically screened.”  According to OMGH Executive Officer E.K. Neumann, a person 
with such a stamp would not be “subject to any labor restrictions.”582   
Correspondence between the OMGH Denazification Division and Ministry for 
Political Liberation during the latter months of 1947 reveals a discernibly changing power 
dynamic.  To be sure, OMGH continued to exert influence over issues pertaining to the 
camps.  As late as 14 October, for example Teitelbaum reminded MPL officials that 
internees who did not receive labor sentences were not to be released immediately following 
tribunal proceedings because the judgment needed to be validated.583  Less than two weeks 
later, he expressed dissatisfaction over female internees’ cases being handled before a 
separate “special tribunal” (Sondertribunal).  “It would be more advisable,” he wrote, “if the 
women were dealt with by all of the tribunals along with the other internees.  This system 
should be put in place immediately.”  On the other hand, as evidenced by a Ministry-internal 
document dealing with the latter issue, MPL officials were less quick to respond than 
previously.  This memorandum for record noted that, at the latest, the Public Prosecutor 
would be finished with the remaining cases of the Women’s Tribunal by Christmas.  “As a 
result,” it read, “pursuing the suggestion of the Land Military Government is moot.”584   
On 20 January 1948 Sheehan notified Hessian Minister President Christian Stock 
that he was authorized to refer internee proceedings to home tribunals that had cleared 
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pending cases.585  By March, Captain E. E. Griswold Jr., a Special Branch officer assigned 
to the L&S office responsible for overseeing the Darmstadt-Stadt and -Land tribunals, 
alerted the OMGH Denazification Division that public prosecutors were misusing recently 
instituted Liberation Law revisions in an attempt to quickly clear overloaded dockets.  The 
mechanism to which he referred, known as the “B II Procedure,” was intended to expedite 
proceedings in specified presumptive Class II (offender) cases.  According to Griswold, 
however, public prosecutors had been employing the new process much too broadly, indeed 
in his view “automatically” and without adequate investigation into respondents’ actions 
during the Nazi period.  “It appears quite evident that the main object of all public 
prosecutors and of the tribunals,” he concluded, “is to dispose of the whole backlog of cases 
they still have as quickly as possible by means of this new speed-up procedure, and to be if 
possible the ones who can as the first in the race report completion of their task.”586 
Griswold’s reference to a “race” to wrap up tribunal proceedings bears out critiques 
that policy changes in the American zone substantially undercut denazification efforts.587  
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His cautions clearly indicate the extent to which, in many ways, the push to complete the 
program eclipsed the entire process.  On 24 March 1948, in fact, Yakoubian reported to 
Newman that,  “the rate of completion of trials for the first half of March already shows a 
250% increase over the rate of the month of January.  However, the rate of progress being 
made is still insufficient to accomplish a new deadline sought by OMGUS.”  Yakoubian 
advised Newman that the Denazification Division was about to introduce “a further 
expedited procedure” in order to decrease internee cases from the current total of 2,600 to 
1,250; Class I cases from 2,580 to 1,800; and normal Class II cases from 31,000 to 4,500—
by the target date of 1 May 1948.  “The unusual pressure being exerted on denazification at 
present is well shown by the fact that a growing resistance has arisen on the part of Germans 
to further white-wash incriminated Nazis.”588 
Proposed by the Länderrat and enacted on 25 March 1948, the second amendment to 
the Liberation Law permitted Public Prosecutors discretion to “allocate to the group of lesser 
offenders or followers those persons against whom the evidence does not appear to suffice 
to sustain a [higher] charge.”  In addition, the new provisions enabled tribunals to suspend 
the impositions of sanctions or period of probation if warranted by the respondent’s conduct.  
This option was also available in the event that “the sanctions which must be imposed in 
accordance with the finding [were] disproportionate to the personal and economic sanctions 
to which the respondent [had] been previously subjected.”  In promulgating these new 
guidelines, OMGUS Adjutant General Lieutenant Colonel G.H. Garde emphasized that a 
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rapid conclusion to denazification was “essential” to meeting Military Government 
objectives.  Moreover, he relayed Clay’s direction that L&S offices contact public 
prosecutors and tribunals to assist in selecting the “relatively few heavily incriminated cases 
to be tried formally and the disposition of the remainder under the expedited procedure.”589    
The additional acceleration process Yakoubian had mentioned to Newman was 
released to Special Branches on 25 March 1948.  OMGH Assistant Executive Officer Robert 
W. Bruce outlined a number of particularly sweeping changes, but began by pointing out 
that Hesse was “authorized to retain a limited number of unprocessed cases of heavy 
incrimination as of 1 May 1948.”  These quotas, he continued, were to be allocated among 
the various Kreise (counties).  Additionally, the recently completed calendars of more 
heavily incriminated cases were to be used “as a guide from which to select cases warranting 
trial.”  The remaining proceedings, Bruce instructed, “should be made eligible for the 
expedited procedure.”  Effectively, the concurrent processes of establishing quotas and 
segregating cases, which were to be worked out down to the tribunal level, placed a limit on 
the number of proceedings that could be initiated against community members who had 
been influential Nazis or were otherwise heavily incriminated.  The singling out of cases to 
be pursued was to take precedence over other activities and, once this was done, “all 
emphasis [was to] be placed upon clearing up the cases not segregated for trial.” 590   
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According to Bruce’s letter, Special Branch Offices, such as the one where Griswold 
was assigned, were to assist OMGH Field Advisors and tribunals in clearing up cases.  Until 
1 May 1948, in fact, the offices were to refrain from conducting any investigations.  
Thereafter, inquiries would be restricted to the segregated cases described above.  The D&E 
system was henceforth suspended.  The Ministry for Political Liberation would handle any 
such reports remaining in the pipeline, “without the necessity of returning them to the 
originating Special Branch Office.”  In addition, German officials now had the authority to 
overturn previously disapproved downgrade proposals.  Erroneous amnesty decisions would 
not be corrected except in cases of heavy incrimination.  Bruce made clear that the 
provisions detailed in the letter applied to internees.  Moreover, public prosecutors now had 
the authority to downgrade cases involving members of organizations declared criminal by 
the IMT to Lesser Offender or Follower without seeking approval.  “No objections to the 
charge or decision,” Bruce wrote, “will be raised by Military Government.”591  On 5 April 
1948, Bruce announced that those members of organizations declared criminal by the IMT 
not already detained were no longer subject to automatic arrest.  Public prosecutors and 
tribunals could, however, intern them on the basis of Article 40 of the Liberation Law.592  
In a move that unquestionably signaled to Hessian officials the American pullback 
from denazification efforts, on 7 May 1948 Newman advised Minister President Stock that 
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Military Government Law No. 8 was rescinded.  Moreover, with the number of chargeable 
cases yet to be tried under the Liberation Law reduced to the “proportionally few heavily 
incriminated and leading Nazis,” the D&E system was terminated.  OMGH would no longer 
reassess tribunal decisions, except in situations where new evidence became available or that 
involved significant errors.  Such instances would be brought to the MPL’s attention in 
writing.  Newman closed by stressing that German authorities would handle—and that 
Military Government would not examine—remaining cases.593  
Military Government correspondence during this timeframe, particularly with regard 
to the Lagerspruchkammern, shows a clear tension between desire to speed up cases and 
concerns of being too lenient.  Among several items described in the OMGH Denazification 
Division’s weekly diary from 18-24 June 1948, for example, Deputy Division Chief Roger 
E. Reynolds wrote that, “[r]eview of the recent decisions made by the tribunals in the 
Darmstadt Camp has revealed that several chairmen and Public Prosecutors seem to be 
extremely lenient in the disposition of cases before tribunals.  As the MPL contemplates a 
large reduction in personnel in the near future, they are strongly advised that use of such 
persons in future operations should not be considered in the interest of efficiency.”594   
In mid-June 1948, Teitelbaum reported to OMGH Director Newman that 3,113,423 
individuals in Hesse had registered under the Liberation Law and that 899,321 of them had 
been deemed incriminated.  The majority of these persons fell under provisions of the 
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amnesty granted by General McNarney in December 1946, leaving 162,000 cases to be tried 
by Spruchkammern.  “Thus,” Teitelbaum continued, “5.33% of the adults in Hesse were 
required to be tried and placed under employment sanctions.  It would appear, therefore, that 
the claims made that industrial recovery was held up by denazification, are certainly gross 
exaggerations.”  Such conclusions reflected an effort to address key criticisms of 
denazification, take stock of what had been accomplished, and come to terms with the 
program’s limitations.  According to Teitelbaum’s assessment, for example, many of the 
1.19% of Hessian adults subject to labor sanctions “were never more than ordinary laborers.  
A summary of their experiences and employment prior to the Nazi seizure of power shows 
that the vast majority of active Nazis were never more than common laborers or at best 
lower middle class employees.”  In spite of noting that more individuals charged under the 
Liberation Law had been placed in Class V than I or II, he indicated that “undoubtedly many 
of the leading activists in the Nazi Party movement had been punished.”595 
The increasing momentum and concomitant inequities of the push to wind up 
denazification were immediately evident at Internierungslager Darmstadt, where by mid-
1948 the number of internees had dropped to less than one thousand.  On 14 May 
Denazification Field Supervisor Eugene L. Weyland wrote, “The Darmstadt Camp Trial 
Tribunals are now in a period of transition.  The expedited phase is now virtually completed 
with a ‘hard core’ of approximately 870 persons left to be tried.”  He also described the 
deleterious impacts of accelerated procedures on internee cases:  
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  283
The fact that Military Government no longer exercises close supervision over 
tirbunals [sic] decisions and the fact that cases involving less formal incrimination 
were permitted to be disposed of quickly through very cursory written and oral 
hearings without witnesses, has had a markedly deteriorating effect on the quality of 
the Spruchkammer results.  There were some cases jammed through in the past few 
weeks which were entirely inequitable.596   
  
As of 12 July 1948, the combined population of the civilian internment and labor 
camps in Hesse was 1,039 (470 internees and 569 serving labor camp sentences).597   Over 
the next several days (12-17 July), camp tribunals finalized a total of twelve cases: 1 was 
found to be in Group I; 8 in Group II; 2 in Group III; and 1 in Group IV.598   In a telling 
statement that underscored one of several ways inequities crept into Lagerspruchkammer 
proceedings, Weyland reported that tribunals had begun routinely taking length of 
internment, which often exceeded the duration of labor camp sentences, into account.  
“Thus,” he explained, “a decision ordering a labor camp sentence may be less severe than a 
decision ordering Sonderarbeit.”599  The latter, which literally translates as “special work,” 
was a form of prescribed service toward reconstruction similar to work performed by those 
in labor camps, but with the intended lesser severity associated with not being confined.  
Weyland gave the following example to illustrate his point:  
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This internee was given a two year labor camp sentence, but his confinement from 8 
May 1945 more than cancelled this sanction, leaving him with a DM 100.— fine and 
the usual sanctions provided by Paragraphs 4-10 of Article 16.”   This person was a 
member of the NSDAP since 1930, and was an OGL, Oberabschnittsleiter, HJ 
Bahnnfuehrer from 1943-1945, Kreisjaegermeister, Gauschulungsleiter, Gauredner, 
Reichsstosstruppredner, and member of the NSLB since 1931 (Reichshauptstellenleiter 
1934-1941).  He was a teacher by profession and held the position of 
Oberstudiendirektor and held the rank of Oberregierungsrat.  In 1933 he was the Leiter 
of the Thueringische Staatsschule fuer Fuehrertum und Politik.  There are some local 
statements which indicate estrangement with the local Gauleiter but this person’s 
political activities are sufficient evidence for the insignificance of his enmity.  He is 
characterized by the Antifa-Block of Bad Berka as one of the original Nazi founders 
and as an active Nazi big wheel (Erster Motor!) 
 
The activities of this ardent Nazi were largely confined to the institutions and 
organizations which propagandized Nazi philosophy and doctrines to the German 
youth and he is undoubtedly responsible for the indoctrination of many young persons.  
It does not seem fair that this person should be released without any considerable 
disadventeges [sic] while others are asked to perform Sonderarbeit or continue their 
stay in an Arbeitslager.600 
 
The dissolution of Internierungslager Darmstadt was completed two-and-a-half 
months later, via a sequence of steps that fell within the parameters that had been set by 
OMGUS, and after several exchanges between Teitelbaum and the Ministry’s Chief Public 
Prosecutor, Oberregierungsrat Oppenheimer.  On 30 August 1948, Oppenheimer notified 
Berufungskammern in eight locations that he had ordered the transfer of a large number of 
civilian internees from the camp at Darmstadt to their home communities for trial.  With the 
camp slated to close at the end of September, these cases were to take precedence over those 
against other respondents.  Oppenheimer directed the tribunals to promptly notify him of the 
number of proceedings against internees that would not be decided by 30 September and to 
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identify individuals whose continued detention appeared appropriate.601  On 6 September, 
Oppenheimer proposed to the Denazification Division that, along with the closure of 
Internierungslager Darmstadt, automatic arrest be fully revoked at month’s end.  Internees 
whose continued detention was warranted would be held under Article 40 of the Liberation 
Law.  All others would be released.  Teitelbaum responded three days later, indicating that 
he was “completely in accordance with [Oppenheimer’s] proposal.”602  
By 12 September 1948, Hesse’s combined civilian internment and labor camp 
population had dropped to 714 and included: 220 internees, 323 individuals with finalized 
labor camp sentences, and 171 who were being held under Article 40.  Weyland notified the 
Denazification Division of the Kassel Labor Camp’s planned dissolution on 1 November 
1948.  The enclosure at Darmstadt would remain “as the only labor camp in Hesse.  This 
move,” he continued, was “contemplated to reduce the costs of maintenance.  An agreement 
has definitely been reached with the Darmstadt city government to employ the labor camp 
inmates for rubble removal.”  The labor camp administration was to “be turned over to the 
Ministry of the Interior about 1 December 1948.”603   
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Weyland announced the closure of Internierungslager Darmstadt in his 30 
September 1948 weekly report. “Effective 2400 hours this date the internment phase of 
Land Hesse will be concluded.”  Remaining internees would be released, with the exception 
of 95 who would be “held on request of Hesse Appellate Tribunals under the provisions of 
Article 40.”604  On 1 October 1948, Special Branch offices in Hessen were closed.  With 
this, the denazification functions of Military Government were officially scaled back to 
observing and reporting.605  Meanwhile, the Ministry dissolved the Landesamt für Arbeits- 
und Internierungslager, creating instead a section charged with overseeing labor camps 
known as Referat VII, Lagerleitung der Arbeitslager.606   
Distilling the efforts of the last twenty-three months to two tabular numerical 
snapshots, Weyland compared actual findings with classifications originally requested in the 
9882 cases considered by Darmstadt camp tribunals (Tables 7 and 8).  Over 85% of 
respondents were initially placed in the first two categories, thus illustrating the extent to 
which the presumption of guilt applied to internees’ cases.  As in tribunals elsewhere, 
however, the results otherwise show a clear trend toward downgrading cases.   Over 44% of 
findings were Group III (Lesser Offender), for example, in spite of the fact that only 7% of 
internees were originally charged in that category. 
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Table 7:  Classifications Requested by Prosecutors, Internierungslager Darmstadt 
Category Number Percentage of Total 
Group I 1938 20.1 
Group II 6504 65.8 
Group III 692 7.0 
Group IV 84 .9 
Group V 9 .1 
Not Affected by Law 610 6.2 
Total 9882 100 
  Source:  Weekly Report, Eugene L. Weyland to OMGH Denazification Division, 30 Sep 48 
   OMGH CAD, Rpts and OTR Recs of the Denazification Branch 1946-48, Box 1115,  
  F:  Weekly Diary. 
 
Table 8:  Summary of Camp Tribunal Findings, Internierungslager Darmstadt 
Category Number Percentage of Total 
Group I 178 1.8 
Group II 1505 15.5 
Group III 4401 44.6 
Group IV 1164 11.8 
Group V 142 1.4 
Christmas Amnesty 167 1.7 
Youth Amnesty 666 6.8 
Not Affected by Law 622 6.3 
Suehnebescheide 1037 10.5 
Total 9882 100 
   Source:  Weekly Report, Eugene L. Weyland to OMGH Denazification Division, 30 Sep 48 
   OMGH CAD, Rpts and OTR Recs of the Denazification Branch 1946-48, Box 1115,  
  F:  Weekly Diary. 
 
Conclusion  
 During an address over Munich radio on 7 August 1947, Chief of OMGB Special 
Branch William E. Griffith spoke to the German public about the need to accelerate 
denazification.  Interestingly, his remarks took place within two days of the closed-door 
meeting during which Clay agreed to concessions upon which the October 1947 amendment 
was later based.  New York Times correspondent Kathleen McLaughlin described the speech, 
which Griffith delivered in German, in an article titled “Germans Spurred to Try ‘Big 
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Nazis.’”  According to her report, without question, the tandem thrusts of the remarks were, 
first, that denazification must be completed “at the earliest possible moment” and, second, 
that the main responsibility for the program rested in German hands.  In order to move 
forward, state officials needed to increase tribunal staffs as well as the rate of processing 
cases.  “Only thus,” Griffith stressed, “could a reasonably prompt conclusion be brought to 
the task facing the German people—of ridding its budding democracy of ‘the political and 
social ruins of National Socialism and militarism.”607   
Griffith’s speech articulated the Military Government viewpoint on a number of 
issues with which American and German authorities grappled beginning in the spring of 
1947.  He explained, for example, that the high incidence of escapes from civilian 
internment camps had made “assignment of a Military Government supervising officer” 
necessary. He sought to debunk the popular belief that Military Government wanted to 
prolong the denazification program as a way “to harass and persecute the German people.”  
Rather than lesser ranking party members, he insisted, “we are interested in catching the big 
Nazis, the activists, those who enthusiastically furthered and supported the Nazi tyranny.”  
Moreover, consistent with the goals laid out by the CFM in Moscow, American officials 
stood ready to “assist the German authorities to concentrate their efforts on these cases.”608 
Closely examining developments surrounding the wind up of denazification 
reinforces the point that Cold War considerations played a key role in the decision to 
accelerate the program.  Moreover, the trajectory of policy changes from mid-1947 to late 
1948 reveals the extent to which Military Government simultaneously pushed toward the 
two pillars of Griffith’s address—rapidly completing the program and placing more 
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responsibility in the hands of German authorities.  In the case of Hessen, this is especially 
clear from the fact that denazification was being drawn down even as the Ministry was still 
ramping up to meet the demands of the program.  Although key revisions such as the 
October 1947 amendment reflected the resolution of longstanding disagreements between 
American and German authorities, on the whole, this breakthrough was eclipsed by the 
increasing speed with which policy adjustments were carried out. 
  
 
Conclusion: 
THE CAMP WILL ‘FINALLY BE ERASED FROM THE VIEW OF OUR CITY’: 
SHORT- AND LONG-TERM LEGACIES OF ARREST POLICIES 
 
 In mid-September 1949, a local newspaper announced that the Frauenarbeitslager at 
Darmstadt was about to be dissolved, following impending release of three women who had 
served their sentences.  The two remaining female detainees would be moved inside the 
men’s compound.  Moreover, the barracks that “for some time” had been occupied by these 
last five women would soon be handed over to the Protestant Relief Organization, which had 
already begun using the other quarters to set up a refugee camp for expellees from Hungary. 
“With that,” the Darmstädter Echo proclaimed, “the women’s labor camp…will finally be 
erased from the view of our city.”  The newspaper also explained that “widely circulating 
rumors about alleged closure of the men’s labor camp” were inaccurate.  This area would, 
however, be further reduced through accelerated probationary parole of those who were close 
to completing their sentences and deemed eligible.609  
 Printed just days before newly elected Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s first 
Regierungserklärung (policy statement to parliament), this countdown to ultimate erasure of 
the barbed wire compound reflected an unmistakable forward-looking inclination that 
accompanied the Federal Republic’s founding and end of military occupation.610  The staff of 
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the Darmstädter Echo was not alone in anticipating the enclosure’s complete shutdown.  On 
the whole, developments during the preceding year-and-a-half were characterized by local 
and state officials’ strong belief that Lager Darmstadt had outlived its purpose.  This 
manifested itself in a number of ways, most notably, through close scrutiny of resource 
expenditures and a concerted push to reduce personnel as well as the compound’s physical 
footprint.611  Ironically, after June 1948 currency reforms, administrators’ unsuccessful 
attempts to keep inmates gainfully employed at wages comparable to those prevalent in the 
German economy heightened the camp’s perceived and actual inefficacies.  Expressing his 
dissatisfaction on the matter to the Ministry for Political Liberation in August 1948 
Teitelbaum wrote, “I am sure that you will agree that even unpaid work from which the 
Ministry derives no income would be better than idleness for these individuals.”612   
By early 1949, Hessian officials had not only set plans in motion to repurpose the 
facilities in the compound for activities such as the Ministries of Finance and Justice as well 
as local government offices, but also briefly considered the option of moving the labor camp 
to the former ordnance works (Munitions-Anstalten) in Allendorf.613  At year’s end, 
administrators reported a total population of 128, but indicated that through early releases 
they expected to have that number down to 108 in roughly four months.614  Meanwhile, 
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officials in Württemberg-Baden had already closed that state’s last labor camp.  The small 
number of persons serving sentences in Bavaria had been moved to a prison at Eichstätt.615   
During the Hessian enclosure’s final months, the Kasseler Post featured remarks from 
one of the fifty inmates left—prefaced by editorial comments that read, “today we remember 
those who are forgotten at Darmstadt by reproducing a letter sent to us by an internee.”  The 
individual in question deployed many of the same rhetorical strategies used in earlier internee 
correspondence, such as emphasizing that few of the inmates had been high-ranking Party 
members.  Making references to human rights, he attempted to cast himself and his fellow 
internees as victims.  More tellingly, he sought to associate the topic of release for remaining 
labor camp inmates with ongoing political debates over issues related to denazification and 
transitional justice.  Those still inside the barbed wire at Lager Darmstadt, he stressed, 
awaited the end to “the dark chapter of denazification” and the possibility to be set free.616  
That opportunity came when the compound was officially dissolved on 31 October 1950, 
thus removing the camp from the local landscape.617  
The fact that the Federal Republic was able to withstand pressures such as those 
associated with the heated parliamentary debates described above, even during its embryonic 
phases, stands in stark contrast to the highly fractured political culture of the late Weimar 
period.  To what extent, however, did the mass arrests carried out in the aftermath of the 
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Third Reich’s collapse contribute to occupation aims and West Germany’s transition from 
the Nazi dictatorship to a functional, pluralistic democracy? 
 
A Necessary Quarantine 
The civilian internment program was part of a specific Allied response in the first 
postwar years to an array of interrelated challenges associated with embarking on the 
occupation as well as creating the environment for enduring political, social, and cultural 
change.  These difficult tasks included restoring order and quashing potential threats to 
Allied forces as well as the populations under their control; meting out punishment to those 
deemed responsible for the gruesome crimes committed under the Nazi dictatorship; and, in 
time, putting a web of rehabilitative mechanisms in place.  In spite of significant 
interdepartmental and interallied disagreements over issues such as how to delimit arrest 
criteria, from the outset American policymakers conceived of the expansive detention of 
presumably ardent Nazis as necessary to achieving all three of these objectives.  Indeed, the 
use of arrests as a transformative mechanism was clearly and openly discussed as early as 
April 1945 during final deliberations over JCS 1067—the post-defeat policy directive that, 
along with Morgenthau, has come to embody the punitive approach in postwar scholarship. 
The wide-scale arrests in 1945 contributed to the success of the occupation and the 
Federal Republic’s postwar transition by establishing security, ensuring some degree of 
punishment, and helping to open space in which a new system could take hold.  One aspect 
of a set of processes that Hans Woller described as a “political-moral quarantine…during the 
first, very uncertain years after Hitler,” this drastic measure served important functions 
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within and beyond Germany.618  From the perspective of the occupiers, bringing the reality of 
defeat home to the German people was certainly a key component of this, especially given 
initial perceptions that innate propensities toward nationalism and militarism had led to a 
second devastating war and needed—once and for all—to be stamped out.  Moreover, the 
search-and-screening operations conducted in the months immediately surrounding German 
surrender leave little doubt that, as they undertook the occupation, American military leaders 
afforded very heavy weight to locating war crimes suspects and ensuring security.  Their 
concerns were motivated by the possibility of resistance, and on a broader level, by potential 
vulnerabilities associated with the transition from combat to a military government structure.  
The dragnets isolated many of those most likely to disrupt this critical endeavor and inhibited 
others who managed to evade arrest from openly supporting resurgent Nazism or militarism.     
American authorities’ move away from thoroughgoing sweeps to more selective use 
of arrests in the fall of 1945 reflected their assessment that organized resistance was not 
likely and that security, while an ever-present consideration, had become less of an 
overriding concern.  This alteration coincided with several key policy adjustments that 
signaled a distinct change in occupation priorities toward laying the foundations for the 
revival of democracy.  Organizationally, these included the establishment of the three 
Länder, the October 1945 installation of OMGUS and military government detachments’ 
phased pullback from directly supervising local administrations.  
While the arrests helped open space for democratic reform by temporarily isolating 
significant numbers of those who comprised core segments of the Third Reich, they were 
clearly inequitable.  Moreover, the civilian internment program itself created a number of 
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daunting challenges for American authorities as well as the Germans who entered the 
postwar political arena.  In terms of logistical problems, this is most easily discernible first, 
during the fall of 1945, when detentions quickly outpaced Army abilities to establish camps; 
and second, during the severe winter of 1946, after German officials took control of the 
enclosures and struggled to meet the demands associated with running them.  The 
repercussions of these issues alone would be enough to help explain the frustrations that 
surrounded the program, but it was persistent logjams in effecting releases—coupled with the 
fact that arrest categories did not adequately discern between individual degrees of sympathy 
for the Nazi Party—that proved to be most problematic.  Indeed, by the time Clay signed the 
March 1946 legislation approving the transfer of denazification and civilian internment to 
German officials, experience had begun to reveal the many defects of arrest categories.    
On an individual level, the short-term legacies of the arrests were largely a matter of 
perspective and experience—conditioned by factors such as reason for and length of 
internment as well as difficulties in reestablishing oneself in the society that had begun to 
coalesce on the other side of the barbed wire.  On a wider scale, the immediate response was 
one of frustration and disappointment—as illustrated by the fact that public support for the 
broader denazification program had plummeted by the end of the occupation, not to mention 
the chord struck by Ernst von Salomon’s semiautobiographical representation, Der 
Fragebogen.619  Published in 1951, the deliberately provocative and accusatory book sold a 
somewhat surprising 200,000-plus copies.  As the title suggests, Salomon sought to criticize 
denazification and the formulaic notion that a series of 131 questions could be used as an 
indicator of degree of support to the Third Reich.  However, it was the book’s final 200-page 
section in which he recounted his “automatic arrest” and internment that, in the words of 
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literary scholar Gregor Streim, elicited “the most violent public reaction.”620  While this 
response did not necessarily signify approval of Salomon’s general evaluation, his polemic 
did include mention of specific details that sparked resentment, such as association of the 
counterintelligence corps with the Gestapo.   
Owing to its inequities, not to mention the many administrative and practical failings 
described in this study, contemporary frustrations over the way civilian internment was 
carried out have overshadowed recognition of the program’s long-term benefits.  The case of 
Hessen illustrates that the process of confronting large groups of people for their activities 
during the Third Reich prompted changes in discourse and behavior toward at least outward 
acceptance of reforms.  Internee correspondence, for example, repeatedly invoked the 
language of democracy and human rights, stressed a willingness to support reconstruction, 
and sought to establish distance from the Nazi regime.  Disagreements with American 
authorities and political debates surrounding the camps meanwhile served as both catalysts 
and mechanisms for German officials to begin making their own assessments regarding how 
to strike a difficult balance between dealing with the past in order to shape the future.  While 
debates centered on the extent to which socio-economic status or Party rank should factor 
into denazification efforts, Hessian officials also considered circumstances such as degree of 
exposure to Nazi indoctrination and adaptability to a liberal democratic society.  These sorts 
of concerns, in particular, led them to focus on the need to prepare younger internees to be 
reintegrated into the society being reconstructed outside the barbed wire.  
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The quasi-judicial proceedings established under the Liberation Law provided a 
means for reintegration into society.  Moreover, although camp tribunals became log 
jammed, as the program unfolded, civilian internment forced a continual process of review 
that included:  the security boards charged with determining whether individuals were being 
incorrectly held; determinations made prior to the handover to German authorities to 
segregate those suspected of war crimes; identification of cases in which amnesties applied; 
assessments prompted by the IMT verdicts, and in the case of Hessen, Chief Public 
Prosecutor Oppenheimer’s instructions upon termination of automatic arrest that tribunal 
staffs examine cases to determine instances in which continued detention was warranted.  
The extent to which successive reviews had been carried out, in fact, struck Kogon and 
Römhild during their inspection of Internierungslager Darmstadt, and led them to remark 
that the camp population had been “sifted many times over.”621      
The trials of the 1950s and 1960s, and decades of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, attest 
to the limitations of such reviews.  Moreover, they illustrate that events during the occupation 
should be viewed as one aspect of a much longer-term undertaking.  In describing this 
period, Woller was certainly right in using the imagery of “seedlings” that, while starting “to 
grow here and there,” needed to be “protected from the very beginning.”  Acknowledging 
factors such as American idealism and German resistance to occupation measures, Woller 
nevertheless stressed that “many of the positive possibilities inherent in the complex 
‘incubation’ period, many of the promising starts that did not develop because of negative 
conditions, were still fostered by the American military government and in most cases put on 
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the right track.”622  This characterization not only reinforces the need for both American and 
German participation in the postwar transformative project, but also points to the fact that the 
period of military occupation was merely the beginning of that multifaceted undertaking. 
For scholars of post-1945 Germany, particularly historians investigating the 
immediate postwar period, this dissertation suggests the importance of deconstructing the 
standard narrative of the American occupation, which holds that it was initially punitive and 
then as a result of a number of factors, transitioned to a rehabilitative strategy.623  Rather than 
sequential, these impulses overlapped and operated in tension with one another throughout 
the entire period under study.  Indeed, the lines between them were frequently blurred.  The 
extent to which Military Government authorities understood this at the time is certainly 
debatable, however, the handover of civilian internment camps to German authorities was an 
administrative attempt at the theater policy level to distinguish between the very different 
processes of ensuring security, pursuing justice, and fostering regime change. 
In addition, detailed examination of state authorities’ efforts to assume responsibility 
for the camps offers a window into a host of underappreciated intricacies that confronted the 
Germans who entered the postwar political arena.  While American authorities focused on 
establishing a democratic framework for processing tribunal cases, for example, state 
officials’ deliberations suggest that from their perspective the crux of the matter went much 
further than this to include the larger issue of when and how to reconstitute German society 
as part of the process of effecting an enduring transformation.  Moreover, the writings of 
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those American Military Government participants such as Harold Zink who openly critiqued 
the denazification program during and after the occupation, coupled with internal debates 
over how to structure arrest policies, provide important counterpoints to Niethammer’s Cold 
War inspired criticisms that automatic arrest criteria were a knee-jerk reaction to the 
possibility of resistance and the political purge a repressive military action on the part of the 
victors.624  Events that played out in the aftermath of the Third Reich’s collapse, in the 
critical period before the Federal Republic’s founding, were much less clear-cut than that.   
Clearly a blunt, inequitable instrument when examined on a case-by-case basis, the 
wide scale arrests in late 1945 nevertheless collectively interrupted sociopolitical continuity 
at a critical juncture, creating the space in which democracy could take hold.  Moreover, the 
debates that surrounded the camps spurred necessary deliberations regarding how to begin 
moving forward in the wake of a twelve-year fascist dictatorship.  Therefore, the story of 
civilian internment is an essential supplement to the literature on denazification and to recent 
scholarship on postwar trials.  It not only deserves more sustained and systematic study, but 
also larger space within the literature of the origins of the “democratic miracle” after 1945. 
Ultimately, Alfred Strauss’s November 1947 weekly report in which he cautioned 
that the camps might become the “last reservoirs of National Socialism” reflected the 
uncertainties—for Americans and Germans alike—of this fragile beginning.  On the other 
hand, the fact that by this time his focus was already on the question of how to reintegrate 
those inside the enclosure at Augsburg into the democratic society that was beginning to take 
shape on the other side of the barbed wire is, in itself, quite remarkable.  
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